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SUMMARY
Internet applications have experienced a rapid and massive growth in popu-
larity in the last decade. For example, today many Web and Voice over IP (VoIP)
applications rely on large and highly-distributed infrastructures to process requests
from millions of users in a timely manner. Due to their unprecedented requirements,
these large-scale Internet applications have often sacrificed security for other goals
such as performance, scalability and availability. As a result, these applications have
typically preferred weaker but more efficient security mechanisms in their infrastruc-
tures.
Authentication mechanisms, a security layer required by most Internet applica-
tions, are an example of this trend. Mechanisms such as Digest authentication, HTTP
Cookies, HTML form-based authentication and SSL/TLS server authentication are
widely deployed regardless of their known weaknesses. However, as recent incidents
have demonstrated, due to the increasing importance of large-scale Internet applica-
tions, powerful adversaries are now targeting and exploiting the weaknesses in these
authentication mechanisms. While more robust authentication mechanisms have been
proposed, most of them fail to address the specific requirements and threat model of
large-scale Internet applications and, as a result, they have not been widely deployed.
In this dissertation we demonstrate that by taking into account the specific re-
quirements and threat model of large-scale Internet applications we can design au-
thentication protocols for such applications that are not only more robust but also
have low impact on performance, scalability and existing infrastructure. In particu-
lar, we show that there is no inherent conflict between stronger authentication and
other system goals.
xvii
This dissertation makes four major contributions. First, through an extensive
experimental study, we demonstrate how even a simple authentication mechanism
such as SIP Digest authentication can significantly impact the performance and scal-
ability of a carrier-scale VoIP infrastructure. Second, we propose Proxychain, a SIP
authentication protocol that not only provides better security guarantees than Digest
authentication but also improved performance and scalability for highly-distributed
VoIP environments. Third, we develop One-Time Cookies (OTC), a more secure
alternative to the use of HTTP cookies as session authentication tokens. OTC is
inherently robust against session hijacking attacks while preserving the efficiency and
statelessness benefits of cookies. Fourth, we present Direct Validation of SSL/TLS
Certificates (DVCert), a practical mechanism that offers more robust validation of
SSL/TLS server certificates without requiring external third-parties or additional in-
frastructure. By providing stronger server authentication, DVCert effectively reduces
the risk of man-in-the-middle attacks against SSL/TLS connections. In so doing, we
provide robust and practical authentication mechanisms that can improve the overall




Internet applications have experienced a rapid and massive growth in popularity in
the last decade. Today, Voice over IP (VoIP) providers such as Vonage and AT&T
and Web applications such as Facebook, Google and Twitter offer their services to
millions of users located in different geographical areas. This vast and distributed user
base generates a significantly large number of requests that need to be served in a
timely fashion to provide adequate user experience. To process this high request load,
these applications rely on a highly distributed and complex infrastructure composed
of thousands of servers and other network components. As a result, the architects
and developers of these large-scale Internet applications have made availability, per-
formance and scalability their top priorities when designing and implementing such
systems.
Due to this focus on performance and scalability, security has been often consid-
ered a secondary goal. In general, it is often assumed that robust security mechanisms
conflict with high performance and scalability demands. Therefore, many large-scale
Internet applications have deployed weaker but simpler and more efficient security
mechanisms to avoid degrading other system goals. One of the reasons for this ap-
proach is that many of the mechanisms currently available were designed decades
ago, when the scale and threat models of Internet applications were different. As a
result, such mechanisms are not appropriate for today’s large-scale Internet applica-
tions. In addition, robust security mechanisms can be more complex and expensive
to deploy (e.g., additional infrastructure requirements). For example, as a response
to the increasing number of attacks, Google enabled full SSL/TLS support by default
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in its applications. However, while Google reported that no additional hardware was
required, this project took several years and required multiple changes to servers and
the SSL/TLS software stack [116]. In contrast, Facebook has enabled full SSL/TLS
support as optional only, while Yahoo has not deployed it yet. To compensate for the
performance impact of more robust security mechanisms, Internet applications could
rely on the high capacity and elasticity of cloud computing technologies. However,
such approach requires additional financial investments. Thus, it is desirable to have
robust security mechanisms that are easier to deploy by using existing infrastructure
more efficiently.
Authentication, the correct validation of the identity of the participants in a com-
munication channel, is a core mechanism for most Internet applications. Without
reliable user authentication, other mechanisms such as session management, access
control, audit logs and billing cannot work properly. Even worse, adversaries can have
arbitrary access to users’ accounts and their data. In addition, reliable server authen-
tication is important to prevent a variety of active attacks such as man-in-the-middle
(MITM) and server spoofing. Unfortunately, authentication mechanisms such as Di-
gest authentication, HTTP Cookies, HTML form-based authentication and SSL/TLS
server authentication are widely deployed despite their known weaknesses. The secu-
rity community has long been critical of the lack of robustness of such mechanisms
and their vulnerabilities to known attacks. Nevertheless, many large-scale Internet
applications rely on them due to their simplicity, efficiency and easy deployment.
The growing importance of Internet applications has increased their risk to attacks
and, by extension, their need for stronger authentication mechanisms. Today’s ap-
plications process a vast amount of confidential information (e.g., personal, business
and government data). In addition, some applications have also become an important
communication medium in countries with oppressive governments [89]. Consequently,
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Internet applications have become a valuable target for a variety of adversaries, in-
cluding organized crime and governments. For instance, the Open Web Application
Security Project (OWASP) Top Ten report classifies “Broken Authentication and
Session Management” as the third top security risk for Web applications. Recent at-
tacks against Gmail [35], Hotmail [27] and Facebook [55], where adversaries exploited
weaknesses in authentication mechanisms, are examples of this problem. Similarly,
attacks against providers of authentication technologies such as RSA [83] and certi-
fication authorities [82, 36] show that adversaries are targeting different elements of
the authentication infrastructure.
Large-scale Internet applications require stronger authentication mechanisms to
defend against powerful adversaries. However, as mentioned earlier, while more ro-
bust authentication mechanisms are available, most of them are not appropriate for
large-scale Internet applications due to their negative impact on performance and
scalability and their significant deployment costs. Thus, robust authentication mech-
anisms designed to accommodate the specific performance, scalability and deployability
requirements of large-scale Internet applications are currently lacking.
1.1 Thesis Statement
This dissertation aims to study the specific characteristics and requirements of large-
scale VoIP and Web applications and to use this knowledge to design and implement
robust authentication mechanisms for this class of applications. We argue that, by
taking into account factors such as network latency, server state requirements, re-
sponse times, CPU utilization and deployment costs, we can design practical authen-
tication protocols that offer a more balanced trade-off among security, performance,
scalability and deployability. Our purpose is to demonstrate that there is no inherent
conflict between robust authentication and other system goals. Therefore, we propose
the following thesis statement:
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Current authentication protocols do not address the specific requirements and se-
curity needs of large-scale Internet applications. Authentication protocols designed for
the scale and threat model of such applications can offer stronger security guarantees
with low impact on performance, scalability and changes to existing infrastructure.
1.2 Research Challenges and Methodology
There are several challenges associated with the analysis of large-scale Internet ap-
plications. First, our evaluation requires the proper generation of the operational
conditions of large-scale Internet applications. This includes the use of high-capacity
servers, generation of high request loads and the configuration of the different infras-
tructure’s components. Thus, several assumptions will be required due to the lack of
public information regarding the infrastructure and operational conditions of large-
scale Internet applications. Second, our analysis requires the correct characterization
of the systems under study using different configurations and requests loads. The
test load generated should be high enough to reach the maximum system’s capacity
(i.e., saturation). Third, our proposed solutions should include the implementation of
new authentication mechanisms into existing Internet applications without affecting
existing functionality or violating the application’s constraints. Finally, we need to
validate the security properties of the mechanisms proposed. This includes informal
evaluation-by-inspection and automated formal approaches.
In general, our study uses the following methodology. First, we design and im-
plement experimental testbeds that simulate the operational conditions of large-scale
VoIP and Web applications. Second, we use these testbeds to evaluate the perfor-
mance and scalability of widely supported authentication mechanisms in these sys-
tems. For VoIP, we evaluate SIP Digest authentication; for Web applications, we
evaluate session authentication based on HTTP cookies and server authentication
based on SSL/TLS certificates. In this context, performance refers to how efficiently
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the application uses its resources (e.g., server CPU utilization, network bandwidth,
etc.) to process requests and the maximum load supported under operational condi-
tions. Similarly, scalability refers to the ability of the application to expand its ca-
pacity to handle expected or unexpected increases in the number of requests. Third,
based on the results of the experimental analysis, we identify key properties that a
robust authentication mechanism requires to address the requirements of large-scale
Internet applications. Fourth, we use these properties to design and implement new
authentication mechanisms. Our design also considers deployability, the effort and
cost required to deploy the mechanism into existent infrastructure (e.g., modification
of client and server components, additional hardware, etc.). Fifth, we implement
the proposed authentication mechanisms and evaluate their performance and scal-
ability. We then use the experimental results to compare our proposed mechanism
to currently deployed mechanisms. Sixth, we also evaluate the security properties of
the proposed mechanisms using informal and semi-formal security analysis based on
automatic protocol verifiers. Finally, we make our prototype implementations freely
available to the research community for further analysis and to extend research in
this area.
1.3 Contributions
This dissertation offers the following main contributions:
• We present an detailed experimental study of the impact of SIP Digest au-
thentication on the performance and scalability of a carrier-scale VoIP infras-
tructure [49, 47]. This study demonstrates how a simple protocol such as SIP
Digest authentication can significantly degrade call throughput in a highly dis-
tributed scenario and explores different techniques to improve performance in
such scenario.
• We propose Proxychain [51], a SIP authentication protocol that uses temporary
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authentication credentials based on hash chains to not only provide better secu-
rity guarantees than SIP Digest authentication but also improved performance
and scalability in a carrier-scale VoIP infrastructure.
• We develop One-Time Cookies (OTC) [50], a more secure alternative to the use
of HTTP cookies as session authentication tokens. OTC is inherently robust
against active attacks such as session hijacking while preserving the efficiency
and statelessness of HTTP cookies.
• We propose Direct Validation of SSL/TLS Certificates (DVCert) [48], a practi-
cal mechanism that offers more robust validation of SSL/TLS server certificates
without requiring external third-parties or additional infrastructure. DVCert
relies on existing user authentication credentials to provide stronger server au-
thentication and effectively reduces the risk of MITM attacks against SSL/TLS.
1.4 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 offers background concepts associated with large-scale Internet applica-
tions and authentication mechanisms; Chapter 3 presents relevant work in the areas
of VoIP and Web authentication mechanisms; Chapter 4 describes our experimental
study of the impact of SIP Digest authentication on the performance and scalabil-
ity of a distributed VoIP infrastructure and our analysis of different techniques to
reduce such impact; Chapter 5 presents the design and evaluation of Proxychain,
a more secure alternative to SIP Digest authentication that also provides improved
performance and scalability; Chapter 6 describes One-Time Cookies, a more robust
session authentication mechanism that is inherently secure against session hijacking
attacks and maintains the performance benefits of authentication cookies; Chapter 7
explores the problems associated with the current CA-based trust model for SSL/TLS
and presents Direct Validation of SSL/TLS Certificates (DVCert), a easy to deploy
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mechanism that allows more robust SSL/TLS server certificate validation without
additional third-parties, preventing MITM attacks against SSL/TLS connections;




2.1 Large-Scale Internet Applications
Internet applications are a type of distributed programs that communicate using In-
ternet protocols and services. Their process-to-process communications are performed
by protocols and methods defined at the application layer of the Internet protocol
suite (TCP/IP) and the Open System Interconnection (OSI) model. In general, these
applications use a centralized client-server model where hosts running client programs
send requests to hosts running server processes that prepare corresponding responses.
However, the peer-to-peer model, where hosts act as both a client and a server and
there is no a central infrastructure, is also common.
First Internet applications such as email and FTP were designed in the late 1960’s
and early 1970’s as part of the ARPAnet, a predecessor of the Internet. With the
standardization of the TCP/IP protocol in the 1980’s and the ARPAnet transition
to research and educational networks in the early 1990’s (i.e., the early Internet)
more applications were developed. In addition, several authentication mechanisms,
that are still in use today (e.g., Kerberos, PAKE, PKI, SASL and HTTP Basic and
Digest authentication), were designed during this period. However, the size of the
Internet by mid 1990’s was relatively small compared to today’s Internet and, as a
result, most Internet applications had small to moderate performance and scalability
requirements. Moreover, the number of security threats and adversaries affecting In-
ternet applications was also small. This scenario changed rapidly in the mid 1990’s
with the introduction of the World Wide Web (i.e., the Web), the commercialization
of the Internet and improvements in network technologies and infrastructures. These
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factors fueled the extraordinary increase in the number of hosts, users and applica-
tions, leading to the Internet we know today. Current Internet applications are not
only capable of providing most of the functionalities found in traditional standalone
applications but also new and advanced functionality and capabilities (e.g., electronic
commerce, social networking and online gaming) that have changed our lives as well
as the world’s social and economical landscape.
The increasing popularity of the Internet has allowed some applications to grow to
unprecedented level, resulting in large-scale Internet applications. Examples of such
applications are search engines such as Google, Bing and Yahoo; social networking
services such as Facebook and Twitter; VoIP providers such as Skype, Vonage and
AT&T; and electronic commerce sites such as Amazon and Ebay. Due to their pop-
ularity, large-scale applications serve a vast number of users, typically in the order
of millions, located in different geographical areas. As a result, these applications
require a massive infrastructure capable of processing the high request load gener-
ated by users. For example, Ebay had an estimated of 212 millions users generating
around 1 billion page views (i.e., requests) per day in 2006 [170]. To process such
load, Ebay used approximately 15,000 application servers. More recently, Facebook
announced that, in March 2012, it had approximately 901 million users generating
close to 3.2 billion “likes” and comments request per day [91]. While Facebook does
not disclose the number of servers in its infrastructure, this number was estimated
to be at least 60,000 in 2010 [133]. To provide better capacity and response times,
large-scale Internet applications rely on a highly distributed infrastructure, with server
clusters located geographically close to the users. As a result, there are high network
latencies among different components of the application’s infrastructure. The high
network latency makes certain requests and state synchronization operations among
the application’s servers considerably expensive. Moreover, large-scale Internet appli-
cations require a scalable architecture capable of handling expected and unexpected
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increases in request load (e.g., flash crowds, emergency situations) that could affect
the availability and quality of the services offered.
The specific requirements of large-scale Internet applications, described earlier, de-
termine the security mechanisms that are used by these applications. In the following
sections, we describe the basic concepts of two popular types of Internet applications:
VoIP and Web applications, present example scenarios of large-scale deployments of
such applications and describe the standard authentication mechanisms used by these
systems.
2.2 VoIP Applications
Voice over IP (VoIP) can be defined as the set of protocols, technologies and infras-
tructure required to transmit voice signals over an IP network such as the Internet.
VoIP has fundamentally reshaped the telephony landscape. Instead of using dedi-
cated, circuit-switched lines, VoIP allows for phone calls to be multiplexed with other
data traffic over the Internet. This convergence between voice and data communica-
tions provides a number of benefits. For instance, providers can now offer a range of
new services such as video calls, video conferences and presence.
VoIP uses different protocols for signaling (i.e., session establishment and manage-
ment) and data transmission. In general, there are two main signaling protocols for
VoIP applications: H.323 [99] and the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [161]. How-
ever, SIP has more widespread support due to is simpler and more efficient design.
As a result, SIP can be considered the de facto signaling protocol for VoIP. Once a
session has been established, VoIP uses additional protocols such as the Real-Time
Transport protocol (RTP) [166] exchange voice and video data among the participants
in the session.
Authentication of user requests and server responses is performed at the VoIP
signaling layer (authentication is not performed at the data layer). Thus, we will
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focus on the SIP protocol and its authentication mechanisms.
2.2.1 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
As stated before, SIP is an application-layer signaling protocol. Instead of simply
passing content between parties, SIP allows endpoints to negotiate the characteristics
and protocols of communication and establish and tear down sessions [161]. SIP is
used mainly to establish client-to-client sessions, instead of just client-server interac-
tions (e.g., HTTP protocol). While widely used to perform the signaling operations
for multimedia applications including Voice over IP (VoIP) and video conferencing,
SIP can also be used to establish connections for applications such as instant mes-
saging.
SIP uses uniform resource identifiers (URI) to identify each network resource. SIP
URIs are similar to email addresses, following the username@domainname format.
A SIP network contains a number of different components:
• User Agents (UAs): Instead of traditional telephones, SIP users communicate
via UAs – software entities running on the user platform (e.g., desktops, laptops,
SIP phones). UAs are simply communications endpoints and are responsible
for initiating, responding to and terminating calls between other endpoints. A
UA acts as a client (UAC) if it send a SIP requests and as a server (UAS) when
it receives a requests and returns a SIP response.
• Registrar: To allow the mobility of users and their UAs between different do-
mains, SIP networks operate Registrars. Like Home Agents (HAs) in Mobile IP
or Home Location Registers (HLRs) in cellular telephony, SIP Registrars keep
track of the current location (IP address) of a UA and are queried during call
setup.
• Proxy: When a UA attempts to make a call, it relies on a proxy to route its
request to the appropriate domain. Thus, a proxy acts as a UAC and UAS to
11
make requests on behalf of other clients. Proxies also assist in authentication
and billing operations. Accordingly, the performance of these servers is of crit-
ical importance to providers. Because both proxy and registrar functionality
is implemented in software, these tasks are often executed on a single physical
node.
• Redirect: A redirect server is used to redirect a UAC request to the targeted
UAS. Instead of forwarding requests on behalf of the UAC (like a proxy), a
redirect server informs the UAC of the address of the targeted UAS. With this
information, the UAC can send a request to the UAS directly.
The communication among UACs, UAS and other SIP components is based on
different type of request (client to server) and response (server to client) messages.
There are six type of request messages:
• REGISTER: used by a UA to notify its current location (i.e., IP address) to a
Registrar server.
• INVITE : used to invite another UA to communicate and then establish a session
between them.
• ACK : used to acknowledge a reliable message exchange.
• CANCEL: used to terminate a pending request.
• BYE : used to terminate an existent session.
• OPTIONS : used to query for the capabilities of SIP servers or other UAs.
The SIP responses are group into six categories that indicate the status of the
current request:









Figure 1: A hypothetical nationwide VoIP SIP infrastructure. As it is done by some
cellular providers, the authentication service/database (DB) is centrally located, with
proxies (P) distributed across the country.
• Success (2xx): the request was successfully received and accepted.
• Redirection (3xx): the request requires further actions to be completed.
• Client error (4xx): the server cannot process the request because it contains
errors.
• Server error (5xx): the request was successfully received but the server cannot
process it.
• Global failure (6xx): the request was received but it cannot be processed by
any server.
2.2.2 A Nationwide SIP Infrastructure
Telephony networks have long relied on a collection of distributed databases and prox-
ies to store user information and implement authentication. However, advances in
processor speeds and ease of management have prompted a number of cellular [139]
and VoIP providers such as Skype to rely on a central authentication service1. The
use of a central database or network authentication service provides several benefits:
1Note that calls are placed through “Super-Nodes” in Skype, but that users sign on through a
















Figure 2: A different view of a nationwide VoIP SIP infrastructure. Alice and Bob
communicate via a SIP provider with proxies distributed across the United States.
it simplifies management, avoids complex database synchronization operations, re-
quires less hardware resources and allows better protection of user information (e.g.,
information is stored in a single location). Figure 1 provides a high-level view of
a hypothetical nationwide VoIP SIP infrastructure. Notice that the provider has
deployed multiple SIP proxies (P) across the country to minimize the latency as-
sociated with servicing user requests. In addition, the provider relies upon a cen-
tralized service/database to authenticate incoming call requests. The centralized
service/database is located somewhere in the middle of the country to reduce the
network latency with the proxies. Figure 2 shows a different view of the nationwide
SIP infrastructure. A user Alice (alice@westcoastu.edu) in California attempts to
call her friend Bob (bob@eastcoaststate.edu) in Georgia. Alice’s call request (IN-
VITE) is first transmitted to the closest proxy. The proxy then authenticates Alice’s
identity with the assistance of the centralized service/database. Successfully authen-
ticated call requests are forwarded to the proxy currently serving Bob. After the call
































Figure 3: SIP call setup using Digest authentication (bold).
2.2.3 SIP Digest Authentication
There are a number of ways in which SIP transactions can be authenticated. The
SIP standard, RFC 3261 [161], recommends strong security mechanisms such as TLS,
S/MIME and IPSec to authenticate and protect SIP sessions. However, these mech-
anisms are complex to deploy and impose a significant overhead. Instead, most
SIP providers use SIP Digest authentication, a simpler and lighter-weight challenge-
response authentication protocol based on HTTP Digest authentication [71]. Fur-
thermore, it is the only authentication protocol required in the UAs according to
RFC 3261 (support for other protocols is not required). Thus, digest authentication
is often considered the de facto authentication mechanism for SIP.
Digest authentication is used by SIP proxies to validate the identity of requests
received from UAs (i.e., user authentication). It allows users to prove their knowledge
of a shared secret (e.g., password) to a server without sending the secret unprotected
over the network (protection against eavesdropping attacks).
Figure 3 shows a SIP call dialog using Digest authentication. As in most de-
ployments, only INVITE requests require authentication. First, Alice’s UA sends an
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INVITE request to the proxy. The proxy determines that the request requires authen-
tication and responds with a SIP 407 response (“Proxy Authentication Required”)
containing a nonce. Alice’s UA acknowledges the reception of the challenge, computes
the hash of the shared secret and the nonce and sends it back to the proxy using a new
INVITE message. The proxy then computes the answer after querying a database
that stores the user’s shared secret. Finally, the proxy compares both values and, if
they match, forwards the INVITE to the destination and the SIP dialog continues its
standard flow.
Digest authentication efficiency relies on the use of hash operations and nonces,
instead of symmetric or public key cryptography. In its basic form, a Digest authen-
tication response is computed as follows:
response = MD5(HA1|n|nc|cnonce|qop|HA2)
where the MD5 hash algorithm is run over the concatenation of a value HA1, the
nonce generated by the proxy, an optional nonce count (nc) value to prevent replay
attacks, an optional client nonce (cnonce), the Quality of Protection (qop) value that
should be set to “auth” and a value HA2. HA1 and HA2 are calculated as follows:
HA1 = MD5(username|realm|password)
HA2 = MD5(method|digestURI)
where username and password are unique values to Alice (and ideally all other users),
realm is the protection domain (i.e., the provider or proxy’s name), method is the
SIP action being authenticated and digestURI is the destination address the client
is attempting to reach.
Digest authentication has a number of weaknesses. Most significantly, it only
provides user authentication (i.e., no mutual authentication) and it is vulnerable to
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offline dictionary attacks due to the use of low-entropy secrets (i.e., passwords) to
compute the UA response. Moreover, a number of weaknesses in MD5 [195, 20, 108]
have led the security community to recommend the use of other hashing algorithms.
Still, in spite of its weaknesses, MD5-based digest authentication is widely supported
by most SIP providers.
2.3 Web Applications
The World Wide Web (WWW), or simply the Web, is a repository of documents (web
pages) linked together that are accessible over the Internet. The HTTP protocol is
the main mechanisms to access these linked documents. The Web uses a client-server
model where a web browser (client) is used to retrieve and display web pages from a
web server. The set of related web pages and other documents stored in a web server
is known as a web site.
During the early days of the Internet and the Web, most web sites only provided
static content and basic functionality. Browsers were mainly used to request and
display static web content. Thus, the flow of information was mostly unidirectional
(i.e., server to client). However, due to the popularity of the Web, improved Internet
access and the development of new web technologies (i.e., server-side and client-side
code, Flash, AJAX,etc.), many web sites are now web applications, offering dynamic
and customized content and a wide variety of services. In addition, the information
flow is bidirectional: from the server to the client and the client to the server (i.e., user
generated content). The set of new web technologies and web applications has been
informally named as Web 2.0. Today’s web applications not only allow novel services
such as social networking, online banking and online shopping; but also enable many
of the tasks traditionally performed by standalone applications (e.g., word processing,
spreadsheets, video games, etc.). This trend continues as web applications begin to
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Figure 4: Simplified view of the traditional and the new Web 2.0 client-server mod-
els. In the new model, state synchronization among the web application’s servers is
expensive due to network latency.
mobile applications).
2.3.1 Large-Scale Scenario
Figure 4a shows a simplified view of the traditional model used by web applications.
Clients located in different geographical areas send requests and retrieve content from
a set of web application’s servers located in a single physical location. In this model,
synchronizing state among the servers is typically not expensive. However, highly
distributed Web 2.0 applications have replaced the traditional model with the one
depicted in Figure 4b. In the new model, a web application has data centers in diverse
locations and relies on Content Delivery Networks (CDN). Clients send requests and
retrieve content from servers located in different geographical areas, typically closer
to the client. This approach provides several benefits such as better redundancy,
improved access bandwidth and reduced access latency. In this model synchronizing
state among all the web application’s servers is expensive. For example, the web
application cannot guarantee that all the servers have the same state information at
a given moment. If this state information is required for authenticating requests, then
some requests are likely to be denied wrongly.
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2.3.2 The HTTP Protocol
The HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [68] is an application-layer protocol used
to access Web resources. HTTP uses a messaged-based, client-server model in which
browsers send requests and the servers return response messages. The server’ re-
sponses include the requested resource (if successful) or a error message indicating
why the request failed. HTTP is also a stateless protocol. Requests to a web server
are treated as independent transactions with no relation to each other. In addition,
HTTP relies on Uniform Resource Locators (URL) to identify and locate any resource
on the Web. Each web resource is assigned a unique URL which defines four things:
protocol, host computer, port and path (e.g., http://www.example.com/index.html).
An HTTP transaction consist of a browser request and a server response. All
the HTTP requests and responses have one or more headers containing connection
details and an optional message body. The first line of each HTTP request has three
components: an HTTP method, the requested URL and the HTTP version being
used. The HTTP method is the actual command or action to be performed on the
specified resource. The HTTP standard defines several methods such as:
• GET: requests a resource from the web server.
• POST: sends information from the browser to the web server. Also used to
perform an action on the web server.
• HEAD: similar to GET except that the web server does not return the resource
requested, only the response header (i.e., no message body).
• PUT: sends resources from the browser to the server.
• TRACE: echoes the incoming request. Used for diagnostic purposes.
• OPTIONS: enquires about the possible methods supported by the web server
for a particular URL.
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However, from the list above, the GET and POSTmethods are the most commonly
supported by web servers.
Similarly, the first line of the HTTP response messages includes a 3-digit status
code and a short text description of the result of the request received. The response
status codes can be divided in five groups:
• 1xx: informational status.
• 2xx: successful request.
• 3xx: redirection to a different resource.
• 4xx: the request contains an error (i.e., client error).
• 5xx: the server encountered an error processing the request (i.e., server error).
In general, the most common status codes are: 200 OK (the request was success-
ful), 404 Not Found (the resource was not found), 301 Moved Permanently (redirects
the browser permanently to a different URL) and 401 Unauthorized (the request lacks
proper authorization, HTTP authentication is required).
2.3.3 HTTPS: HTTP over SSL/TLS
Due to is simple design, HTTP offers no protection for the message’s control infor-
mation (headers) and payload. As a result, the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol
[72] and its successor, Transport Layer Security (TLS) [53] were developed to provide
confidentiality and integrity protection for HTTP transactions (and latter extended
to protect other application protocols). SSL/TLS offers a transparent transport en-
cryption layer to web applications and it is widely supported by most browsers and
web servers. Thus, HTTPS (i.e., HTTP over SSL/TLS) has become the standard way
to provide protection to web communications. SSL/TLS can also be used to provide
client and server authentication (see Section 2.3.6).
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2.3.4 User Authentication
Most web applications require users to create an account (i.e., registration) and log
in to create or resume a session. During registration, users are typically required
to create a password that will be used during the log in process to authenticate the
user. User authentication is one of the core security mechanisms used by most web
applications. If user authentication fails, then an adversary can take control of the
user account and access all the data stored in the application. In this section, we
describe some of the main user authentication mechanisms used by web applications.
2.3.4.1 HTTP Basic and Digest authentication
Basic and Digest authentication [71] are HTTP’s built-in authentication mechanisms.
Both mechanisms assume that each user shares a secret (password) with the server.
The user needs to prove her knowledge of the password to the server in order to be able
to access protected resources. For this purpose, Basic authentication requires the user
to send her password unprotected (cleartext) over the network to the server. However,
sending cleartext passwords over the network is a serious security flaw because an
attacker can eavesdrop an authentication session and learn the user’s password. Digest
authentication avoids this problem by sending a hash of the password and other
authentication parameters instead of the password itself. In this way, it is more
difficult for an attacker to obtain the user’s password by capturing her network traffic.
While Basic and Digest authentication were the main authentication mechanisms
used during the early days of web applications, today they are rarely used in appli-
cations of medium or large complexity. One of the reasons is that these mechanisms

















Figure 5: HTML form-based authentication example.
2.3.4.2 HTML Form-based Authentication
With the adoption of server-side scripting languages, web applications became ca-
pable of directly validating users credentials, instead of relying on server mechanims
(e.g., digest authentication). Thus, HTML form-based authentication rapidly be-
came the main user authentication mechanism used by current web applications due
to its simplicity and flexibility. It has been estimated that more than 90% of web
applications use this authentication method [179].
Figure 5 depicts an HTML form-based authentication flow. First, the browser and
the server establish a SSL/TLS connection (step 1) to protect the subsequent HTTP
transactions. Next, the browser sends a request for the web application’s login page
(step 2), which is then returned by the server (step 3). The login page includes
an HTML form that is used to capture the users’s authentication credentials (i.e.,
username and password). Once the user inputs her authentication information and
presses the submit button, the browser sends the user’s authentication credentials
to the server in a POST request (step 4). Finally, the server compares the values
received with values stored in the application’s database. If the values match, the
user is successfully authenticated and the server sends a 200 OK HTTP response to
the browser (step 5). If the verification fails, the application typically asks the user
to input her authentication information again (i.e., sends the login page again to the
browser), for a limited number of times.
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2.3.4.3 Other Authentication Mechanisms
Web applications can also rely on other well-known user authentication mechanisms
such as NTLM (NT LAN Manager) and Kerberos. However, these mechanisms are
rarely used in Internet scenarios (they are more appropriate for intranets and private
networks). Similarly, SSL/TLS client certificates can be used to provide strong user
authentication; however, they are typically used only in scenarios with high security
requirements due to their associated deployment and management costs. Some web
applications use multifactor authentication to provide more robust authentication.
In this approach, users employ hardware tokens that generate one-time passwords.
More recently, some web applications can also send one-time codes to users through
secondary channels such as text messages and phone calls. Still, multifactor authen-
tication mechanisms are not widely deployed due to their implementation costs and
effects on user experience. Finally, web applications can also rely on third-party
authentication services such as OpenID [146] and Microsoft Passport [132]. In this
approach, users only share authentication credentials with an identity provider. To
log into a web application, users authenticate first with an identity provider which
vouches for the user identity to the targeted web application. This approach, however,
has not been widely adopted.
2.3.5 HTTP Cookies and Session Authentication
HTTP does not provide support for session management. Each request and response
exchanged between a client and a server are considered an independent transaction.
While this is sufficient for most basic static pages, the need for session management
mechanisms increased with the development of the first web applications. In 1994,
Netscape proposed the use of HTTP cookies [113, 114, 15] for web session manage-
ment. Due to their simplicity and efficiency, HTTP cookies were rapidly adopted by
all major browsers and web applications, becoming the default mechanism for web
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK [Set-Cookie: SID=645aa87285e8d8adbe97c4f3e22]
GET priv1.php HTTP/1.1[Cookie: SID=645aa87285e8d8adbe97c4f3e22 ]
8
9
Figure 6: Session authentication using HTTP cookies. The browser attaches the same
cookies to all the HTTP requests sent to a particular domain.
session management.
Cookies consist of name-value pairs containing session information that is stored
in the browser. A web application generates cookies and sends them to the browser
using the Set-Cookie HTTP response header field, as shown in the following example:
Set-Cookie: SID=645aa87285e8d8adbe97c4f3e22
In addition to the cookie’s name and value, the web application can define other
attributes such as the domain and path to define the cookie’s scope, the expiration to
determine cookie’s lifetime, the httponly flag to decide if client-side scripts can access
the cookie and the secure flag to determine if the cookie should be transmitted only
using a secure channel (i.e., HTTPS). Once cookies are accepted by and stored in the
browser, they are appended to each request sent to the web application, using the




Authentication cookies are generally created during the user login process. After suc-
cessful validation of the user’s authentication credentials, the web application gen-
erates authentication cookies and sends them to the browser. The browser attaches
these cookies to each request that requires authentication, based on the cookies’ scope
and flags. Once established, authentication cookies become a temporary replacement
of the user’s password credentials.
Figure 6 shows how cookies are set and used to authenticate browser requests.
First, the browser and the server establish an SSL/TLS connection to protect the
user login process (step 1). Next, the user authenticates to the web application using
HTML form-based authentication (steps 2 to 5). Notice that after the successful vali-
dation of the user credentials (step 4), the server response includes the authentication
cookie (SID) as part of the message header (step 5). The browser stores the cookie and
proceeds to attach it to each request that match the domain and path of the cookie.
For example, requests for private resources in steps 6 and 8 require authentication;
thus, the browser attaches the cookie to these requests. If the cookies are valid, the
server returns the requested resources (steps 7 and 9). In addition, notice that the
requests and responses after user login are not protected by SSL/TLS. This is a com-
mon practice in web applications to reduce performance overheads and complexity
due to SSL/TLS. However, this practice also introduces security vulnerabilities due
to the static nature of the authentication cookies (see Chapter 6).
Authentication cookies should be carefully constructed to prevent abuse. How-
ever, due to the heterogeneity of web applications, there are no standards for designing
and implementing cookie-based session authentication mechanisms. As a result, many
web developers design and implement in-house mechanisms, frequently introducing
critical vulnerabilities [73, 191]. In general, web applications rely on well-known cryp-
tographic techniques (e.g., symmetric encryption algorithms and cryptographic hash
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functions) and secret information (e.g., cryptographic keys, users’ passwords) to build
authentication cookies. The secret information is shared among all the web appli-
cation’s servers that need to verify the authenticity of users’ requests. Nevertheless,
while the confidentiality and integrity of cookies can be guaranteed by cryptographic
mechanisms, attacks are still possible based on how cookies are used.
2.3.6 Server Authentication
Most of the protocols previously described only provide user authentication. However,
implementing both user and server authentication (i.e., mutual authentication) is
important to defend against different types of attacks such as server spoofing, phishing
and MITM attacks (see Section 7.1.2). The most common approach to validate the
identity of a web application’s server is via X.509 digital certificates [4]. A digital
certificate binds the server’s identity (i.e., domain name) to the server’s public key
and it is signed by a Certification Authority (CA) trusted by both the server and
the browser. CAs are required because the browser and the server do not share any
secrets at the SSL/TLS layer; thus, a trusted third-party is needed to vouch for the
authenticity of the server’s certificate.
2.3.7 The SSL/TLS Protocols and Web Applications
Figure 7 presents a simplified view of the SSL/TLS handshake protocol between a
browser and a web server. First, the browser sends a SSL/TLS ClientHello message
to the server to request a new SSL/TLS connection (step 1). The server responds
with a ServerHello message that typically includes the server SSL/TLS certificate
Cert (step 2). Next, the browser proceeds to validate the server certificate to ensure
it is valid (i.e., it has not expired or revoked) and that it has been signed by a
trusted CA. After successful validation, the browser uses the public key included in
the certificate to encrypt protocol state parameters that are required to complete
the handshake (i.e., parameters required to derive the session keys). The browser
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Figure 7: Simplified view of the SSL/TLS handshake protocol. The server can only
complete the protocol if it has the private key corresponding to the public key in the
server certificate (Cert. Thus, a successful handshake validates the server’s identity.
then sends the encrypted information in a ClientKeyExchange message to the server,
together with an authenticated and encrypted Finished message (step 3). Next, the
server decrypts the information received and proceeds to use this information to
generate the SSL/TLS session keys. The server then sends a Finished message to the
browser that is encrypted and authenticated with the sessions keys (step 4). Finally,
the browser uses the session keys to decrypt and to validate the server’s Finished
message. If this validation succeeds, then the server has proven to the browser it has
the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. As a result, the
browser is able to successfully verify the server’s identity and the sessions keys are





3.1.1 SIP Authentication and Its Impact on Performance
Performance and scalability are critical properties for telecommunication networks.
Emergency situations (i.e., natural disasters, terrorist attacks [88]), large scale events
(i.e., American Idol [188], President’s Inauguration Day [159]), and Denial of Service
attacks [119] are examples of events that can cripple the availability of the telecommu-
nication network. SIP, as one of the central protocols of many IP telephony networks,
plays an important role in the performance and scalability of such systems.
The performance and scalability of a SIP infrastructure has been the subject of
several studies. Schulzrinne et al. [167] described a set of metrics for evaluating and
benchmarking the performance of SIP proxy, redirect and registrar servers, and an
architecture and techniques to measure SIP server performance. Other studies have
focused exclusively on the performance of a SIP proxy, analyzing how different config-
urations impact overall performance. Nahum et al. [141] evaluated the impact of state
management, transport protocol and authentication on proxy’s performance. Their
findings show that proxy’s performance varies greatly depending on the configuration
chosen and that authentication has the greatest impact across all the configurations
analyzed. Salsano et al. [162] presented a similar study focused on security configu-
rations such as Digest authentication and TLS. They also concluded that authenti-
cation considerably affects the performance of the proxy. Ono et al. [145] analyzed
how the use of TCP affects the performance and scalability of a proxy. In addition,
the author proposed several configuration changes to improve performance. Cortes et
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al. [44] evaluated the parsing, string processing, memory allocation, thread overhead
and overall capacity of a proxy.
Several studies have suggested modifications and mechanisms to improve the per-
formance of SIP proxies. Janak [102] proposed the use of lazy parsing (parse only
the minimum number of headers required) and incremental parsing (parse contents
of headers incrementally) as significant performance optimizations for proxies. Bala-
subramaniyan et al. [13] proposed an algorithm to dynamically distribute call state
information among proxies organized in a hierarchical SIP infrastructure. The au-
thors demonstrated how this dynamic distribution of call state provides significant
performance gains compared to standard configurations. Similarly, Cortes et al. [45]
suggested that proxies belonging to an IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) should be
configured with stateless and stateful functionality, allowing proxies to dynamically
adapt to network and CPU conditions. Singh et al. [173, 174, 175] presented a reli-
able, scalable and interoperable Internet telephony architecture for user registration,
call routing, conferencing and unified messaging using commodity hardware. The
authors proposed an identifier-based two-stage load sharing method based on Web
server redundancy techniques for high service availability and scalability. Finally,
Shen et al. [169] proposed three new window-based feedback algorithms for overload
controls in proxies and compared them to current algorithms.
Still, while some of the previous studies have analyzed the impact of SIP Digest
authentication on the proxy’s performance, none of them consider large-scale scenarios
where the user authentication credentials are stored in a remote database or a network
authentication service is used instead (i.e., RADIUS). Such scenarios are common
in real deployments because they allow better scalability and easier management.
Moreover, none of the previous works propose more efficient alternatives to SIP Digest
authentication, even though it has been shown that Digest authentication can have a
considerable impact on proxy’s performance and scalability, particularly if a remote
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database or authentication service is used.
Our initial work in this area [49, 47], described on Chapter 4, addressed this gap
by evaluating the use of multiple processes and batch requests to improve the perfor-
mance of a SIP proxy configured with Digest authentication and a remote database.
The use of batch queries has been explored in other areas. For example, in file sys-
tems such as XFS [181] and FARSITE [8], batching file updates has been shown to
improve performance significantly. Moreover, batch queries have also been used in
business applications [125]. Boneh and Shacham [168] described how batching in the
SSL handshake protocol can improve the performance of Web servers. Our work is the
first to apply the concept of batch requests in a SIP proxy to improve performance.
3.1.2 Robust and Efficient SIP Authentication
SIP Digest authentication is often considered the default authentication mechanisms
for SIP (see Section 2.2.3). The SIP standard, RFC 32611 [161], also recommends
more robust security mechanisms such as TLS, IPsec and S/MIME that not only
provide authentication but also other security guarantees (e.g., integrity and confi-
dentiality). However, several studies have shown that these mechanisms are compu-
tationally expensive [134, 130, 41, 34] and, thus, not suitable for VoIP applications
with high-performance requirements. In addition, these mechanisms are more com-
plex to deploy and manage (e.g., client certificates are required). As a result, Digest
authentication is the preferred authentication mechanism for most SIP deployments
due to its efficiency and simplicity.
However, as the previous section described, several studies have shown that Di-
gest authentication still produces a significant impact on the performance of a SIP
infrastructure. For example, Nahum et al. [141] demonstrated that Digest authen-
tication can degrade the performance of a SIP proxy by a factor of four, depending
on the scenario. Similarly, Salsano et al. [162] found that the Digest authentication
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accounted for nearly 80% of the processing cost of a stateless SIP proxy. Our own
work [49] showed that the loss in performance is worse in distributed environments
with a remote authentication database. We measured a performance drop of almost
three orders of magnitude when the network latency between the proxy and the au-
thentication database was 30 ms (see Chapter 4). While our work suggests a hybrid
request mechanism to reduce the impact on performance, the central database can
still become a bottleneck if the load from the proxies increases. Also, the database
can be vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. For example, multiple malicious
clients could generate enough request load to saturate the database, a type of attack
that has been demonstrated practical in cellular networks by Traynor et al. [189].
The processing costs of Digest authentication also affect the level of security it can
offer. For example, due to its performance overhead, Digest authentication is only
used to authenticate a subset of the SIP message requests (e.g., INVITE and REG-
ISTER messages) used in a SIP session. This practice and the lack of server-side
authentication allow adversaries to execute several attacks against SIP infrastruc-
tures [207, 3]. In addition, Digest authentication is considered a weak authentication
protocol by cryptographic standards. For example, it is vulnerable to offline dictio-
nary attacks and it does not support mutual authentication. Therefore, a variety of
active attacks [203, 59, 195] can be used by adversaries to compromise the security
guarantees offered by Digest authentication.
The security community has proposed more robust alternatives to Digest authen-
tication. For example Wang et al. [195] suggested enforcing TLS or IPSec between
clients and proxies. However, as mentioned before, such mechanisms are more expen-
sive than Digest authentication. Tao et al. [183] proposed an alternative authentica-
tion mechanism for SIP that relies on shared keys and symmetric encryption (e.g.,
AES). This mechanism provides mutual authentication and it is resistant to offline
attacks, but it requires complex key establishment and management protocols (i.e.,
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difficult to deploy and scale). Similarly, researchers have proposed a great variety of
robust authentication mechanisms based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange[203], the
RSA problem [33] and Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [205, 38, 193]. While these
mechanisms solve most of the weaknesses found in Digest authentication, they re-
quire more expensive cryptographic operations. Thus, their overhead is excessive for
large-scale SIP deployments. In addition, most of these mechanisms lack a thorough
performance evaluation. As a result, none of these alternatives have been deployed
in practice and Digest authentication is still widely used.
To solve the performance and security problems of Digest authentication, we pro-
pose Proxychain [51] (see Chapter 5), a novel authentication mechanism based on
temporary authentication vectors stored in the proxies. The use of temporary au-
thentication vectors is also explored in the area of 3G cellular networks by the Au-
thentication and Key Agreement (AKA) [2] security protocol. However, instead of
using multiple authentication vectors as AKA does, Proxychain relies on a modified
hash chain construction [115] to provide mutual authentication. Hash chains have
been used in security protocols in different domains where efficiency is critical such
as sensor networks [152, 124] and RFID tags [182]. Our work is the first to take
advantage of the security, performance and space efficient properties of hash chains
to reduce the overhead of the authentication process in SIP.
3.2 Web Applications
3.2.1 More Robust Alternatives for Session Authentication
As we described in Section 2.3.5, web applications rely on HTTP cookies to authenti-
cate users’ requests. However, the use of cookies as session authentication tokens has
raised security concerns since their adoption in the mid-90’s. Several surveys [73, 191]
have shown the multiple problems affecting web authentication mechanisms, including
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vulnerability to session hijacking attacks (see Section 6.1). In response to these prob-
lems, researchers have proposed changes to authentication cookies to improve their
robustness. Park et al. [150] and Fu et al. [73] suggested cookie mechanisms that
provide better confidentiality and integrity guarantees by using well-known crypto-
graphic techniques. In addition, these authors proposed the use of cookie expiration
times to limit the impact of session hijacking attacks. However, many applications
use long expiration times to avoid affecting user experience, reducing the effective-
ness of this approach. Juels et al. [104] proposed the use of cache cookies, different
forms of persistent state in the browser (e.g., browser history, temporary internet
files), as an alternative to cookies for storing user and session identifiers. While re-
sistant to pharming attacks, cache cookies still need HTTPS protection to prevent
active attacks. Bortz et al. [25] demonstrated a new class of attacks to steal cookies,
related-domain attacks, where cookies stored by one site can be modified by another if
the two sites happen to share a sufficiently long suffix. To prevent this type of attacks
the authors proposed origin cookies, an extension to standard cookies that require
minimal implementation costs. However, as the previous solutions, origin cookies are
still vulnerable to session hijacking. Another alternative to authentication cookies is
the use of hidden form fields to store authentication tokens per page. For example,
the ASP.NET ViewState [136] mechanism uses this approach. Still, this approach re-
quires additional state in the server and breaks browsing functionality (e.g., the back
button). In addition, there is a small window of vulnerability where the adversary
could send a valid ViewState token to the server before the user. In this case, the
adversary will be able to send at least one arbitrary request that will be accepted by
the server.
The problem with the previous mechanisms is that they still rely on static to-
kens to authenticate requests; thus, allowing session hijacking attacks. Therefore,
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researchers have also explored the use of unique tokens per request to prevent arbi-
trary reuse. Liu et al. [123] proposed a secure cookie protocol that creates unique
cookies based on a session secret and a SSL/TLS session key. While Liu’s proto-
col has low server state requirements, it requires the use of an SSL/TLS channel
(i.e., HTTPS). Moreover, browsers and web servers typically do not have access to
SSL/TLS session keys, particularly when HTTPS reverse proxies are used. Blundo
et al. [24] designed a lightweight mechanism for web caching authentication that
relies on unique tokens based on a hash chain. While the use of a hash chain pre-
vents session hijacking attacks, it requires additional state in the web application –
a costly requirement for highly distributed web applications (see Section 2.3.1). Ben
Adida proposed SessionLock [7], a session authentication protocol that also relies
on a session secret to generate unique authentication tokens to prevent session hi-
jacking. SessionLock’s main novelty is the use of URL fragment identifiers to store
the session secret. This approach allows SessionLock to be implemented using only
JavaScript, avoiding browser modifications. However, this JavaScript-only approach
makes SessionLock vulnerable to active attacks (e.g., code injection) and affects its
correctness (e.g., session secrets can be exposed or lost accidentally). Moreover, Ses-
sionLock is also stateful in the web application (see Section 6.5.5 for a comparison
between SessionLock and our proposed mechanism). More recently, Choi and Gouda
presented HTTPI [39], a new secure transport protocol more efficient than HTTPS
because it only provides server authentication and session integrity (i.e., no confi-
dentiality). As previous solutions, HTTPI uses a session secret to generate unique
authentication tokens per request. Still, it also requires state in the web application.
Finally, researchers have also explored the use of capability-based web servers such
as Waterken [40] to provide stronger security guarantees to web applications, includ-
ing session authentication. While this approach is more robust and does not require
browser modifications, it still needs significant changes of the web application (i.e.,
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new web server platform).
None of the mechanisms previously described has been widely deployed. While
several of them prevent session hijacking, they fail to address the requirements of
highly distributed web applications, particularly requests’ statelessness. Therefore,
like SIP Digest authentication in VoIP deployments (see Section 3.1.2), HTTP cook-
ies are still the preferred method for session authentication in web applications due to
their simplicity, efficiency and wide support. In addition, many web applications have
chosen always-on HTTPS as the main defense against session hijacking attacks. To
enforce always-on HTTPS and prevent downgrading attacks (e.g., SSL stripping at-
tacks [154]), several policy mechanisms have been developed. Jackson and Barth [100]
proposed ForceHTTPS, a browser add-on that ensures that all session cookies are se-
curely configured and forces all HTTPS errors to be treated as critical. A similar
approach is used by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) tool HTTPS Every-
where [60]. Based on this idea, a new web security policy mechanism, HTTP Strict
Transport Security (HSTS), is being proposed to the IETF [94]. Still, these policy
mechanisms only enforce the use of HTTPS, they do not improve HTTPS deployment
or performance. Moreover, even with always-on HTTPS, cookies can be disclosed
through many different attack vectors (see Section 6.1). Therefore, to effectively pre-
vent session hijacking attacks, a more robust, efficient and practical alternative to
authentication cookies is needed. In Chapter 6, we describe our proposed solution.
3.2.2 Stronger Server Authentication
In the previous Section, we stated that many web applications are relying on SSL/TLS
to protect HTTP authentication cookies. However, the confidentiality and integrity
guarantees offered by SSL/TLS depend on the correct validation of the server’s iden-
tity via SSL/TLS certificates. If server authentication fails, then adversaries will
be able to defeat the protection offered by SSL/TLS by using MITM attacks (see
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Section 7.1.2).
Most browsers perform multiple checks to validate SSL/TLS servers certificates
and authenticate the server-side of the communication. If any of these checks fails,
the browser relies on security indicators (e.g., warnings messages) to notify the user.
Unfortunately, average users tend to ignore these indicators due to the lack of training
and high false positive rates [52, 164, 180, 93]. More effective security indicators have
been proposed [204, 202, 180], but have not been widely adopted by major browser
vendors.
Still, adversaries can defeat security indicators by using forged certificates obtained
through the exploitation of well-known weaknesses in the PKIX CA trust model [63,
90, 5]. These forged certificates are accepted by most browsers without raising any
alert; thus, they are commonly used for MITM attacks [176]. As recent surveys
show [57, 160, 58], the increasing complexity and lack of transparency of the CA
trust model facilitates this type of attacks.
As a response to the increasing threat imposed by forged certificates, the CA/Browser
forum proposed Extended Validation (EV) certificates [32] – certificates emitted under
stricter identity verification procedures. However, the effectiveness of this operational
measure have been questioned by several studies that show that average users do not
differentiate between EV and standard certificates [101, 19]. The CA/Browser forum
also published baseline standards for the secure operation of CAs [185]. Still, these
operational measures do not solve the main problems of the CA trust model.
Multiple browser-based mechanisms have been proposed to detect forged certifi-
cates. For instance, browser extensions can keep track of the certificates used by
the browser and can detect certificate changes [1, 201, 176]. While simple, the effec-
tiveness of this approach is affected by false positives and lack of user training. A
related technique, known as certificate pinning [66], uses a white-list of certificates
for important domains that are hardcoded in the browser. This solution is less prone
36
to false positives; however, it is neither flexible nor scalable. A more robust approach
is the use of secondary channels such as cellular networks [151] and Tor [9] to obtain
additional copies of the server certificate. Assuming that adversaries have no con-
trol over the secondary channels, any inconsistency among the certificates received
will indicate a possible MITM attack. Unfortunately, this technique has considerable
deployment costs and can introduce significant delays to SSL/TLS connection setup.
Most research in the area of MITM defenses focuses on using additional third-
parties to improve or replace the CA trust model. For example, mechanisms such as
Perspectives [196], Convergence [129], VeriKey [178] and Crossbear [96] allow users to
choose multiple network notaries that can complement or replace CAs signatures. In
this approach, the browser queries notaries located in different network vantage points
to determine if they have observed similar certificate information for a particular
domain. The Mutually Endorsing CA Infrastructure (MECAI) [64] proposal also
suggests the use of notaries for certificate validation. However, instead of introducing
new authorities, MECAI uses existing CAs as notaries. Thus, in addition to verifying
the CA signature, the browser randomly queries other CAs for additional proofs of
authenticity. A different technique is presented by the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF) Sovereign Keys (SK) project [61]. In this project, a domain certificate includes
an additional integrity signature created with the domain’s sovereign key. To verify
this signature, browsers can obtain the corresponding sovereign key from a semi-
centralized, append-only public data structure. Google’s Certificate Transparency
(CT) [118] proposal also relies on a similar data structure, but instead of storing
keys, it stores records of each certificate emitted by a CA. Browsers can then validate
if they are using the correct certificate for a particular domain by querying this
public audit log. The IETF DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE)
working group [95] is developing protocols that use secure DNS (DNSSEC) extensions
to bind certificates to domain names. In this approach, often considered the most
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robust, certificates may have both CA and DNSSEC signatures or only the latter.
Finally, while third-party based solutions offer several benefits, their adoption has
been hindered by multiple problems such as deployment and operational costs, lack
of user training, false positives and others (see Section 7.1.3).
To a lesser degree, researchers have also explored the use of shared secrets (e.g.,
passwords) to defend against MITM attacks. For example, the TLS-SRP proto-
col [184] uses SRP [199] for mutual authentication and SSL/TLS key derivation based
on the user’s password (i.e., certificates and CAs are not required). Hence, MITM
attacks are not possible without knowledge of the user’s password. However, TLS-
SRP requires inter-layer communication between the application and the SSL/TLS
stack, breaking SSL/TLS transparency. A different technique is to use shared secrets
for channel binding [197, 10], as proposed in the Session Aware (TLS-SA) user au-
thentication protocol [148]. To detect MITM attacks, TLS-SA uses authentication
codes based on user credentials and SSL/TLS session information, effectively binding
the application and SSL/TLS layers. TLS-SA, however, requires client certificates
and hardware tokens to resist offline dictionary attacks, affecting its adoption. Fi-
nally, the Mutual Authentication Protocol for HTTP [144, 143] also combines user
authentication with SSL/TLS channel binding, but it relies on the user’s password
instead of client certificates. To provide mutual authentication and prevent offline
guessing attacks, this mechanism uses a PAKE protocol (KAM3 [97]). However, this
mechanism requires additional server state, only protects the login connection and
requires changes to the browser and web application login UI (a significant challenge
for deploying PAKE-based protocols[65]).
MITM attacks could also be detected by uniquely identifying servers based on
their inherent features and the characteristics of the network path between them and
their clients (i.e., server fingerprinting). This idea has been used in IP traceback
mechanisms [177, 163, 92] to identify the origin of spoofed IP packets. Moreover, this
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technique can be improved by also measuring features of the application-layer pay-
load. This idea has been used to fingerprint the source and path taken by voice calls
[14]. However, the size and highly distributed nature of large-scale web applications
hinder the use of such techniques for preventing MITM attacks. First, an adversary
can spoof most of the TCP/IP control information due to the lack of integrity protec-
tion mechanisms. Second, network variability (e.g., network jitter, network failures)
can negatively affect the accuracy of such techniques. Third, browsers typically send
requests to different set of servers on each session with a large-scale web application.
As a result, browsers will need an updated list of all the servers’ fingerprints used
by each web application. For large-scale web applications, such list could contain
thousand of entries and it could require frequent updates as new servers and network
paths are added or removed. A related approach is to measure the time delay intro-
duced by an adversary during a MITM attack [12, 192]. Still, network variability is
likely to affect the accuracy of such approach, resulting on high false positive rates.
In summary, while a considerable amount of research exists in this area, currently
there are no effective and practical defenses against MITM attacks. Mechanisms
relying on third-parties, the most popular approach, are too complex and expensive
to deploy and operate at large scale. In the mean time, the number of attacks against
CAs and SSL/TLS continues increasing. Therefore, it is important to find simpler and
easier to deploy defenses against this threat. In Chapter 7, we present our proposed




IMPROVING AUTHENTICATION PERFORMANCE OF
DISTRIBUTED SIP PROXIES
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an application layer signaling framework (see
Section 2.2.1). Instead of simply connecting participants, SIP allows users to negotiate
the terms of, establish and terminate sessions. Because of its relative simplicity (i.e.,
human readable encoding) and flexibility (i.e., transport layer agnosticism), SIP is
now used by a wide array of multimedia services including video conferencing, instant
messaging and presence.
SIP is also being widely adopted by IP telephony providers, including Vonage
and AT&T, as the foundation of large scale deployments. Such providers typically
deploy SIP proxies, nodes responsible for routing call requests and assisting in billing
operations, across multiple geographic regions in order to efficiently deal with sub-
stantial volumes of traffic. With the assistance of a centralized remote server, these
proxies also aid in the authentication of users and handle signaling requests. This
architecture is often used to protect back-end databases from attack and to minimize
distributed consistency issues. In the face of increasing volumes of both legitimate
and malicious (i.e., spam) traffic at currently deployed nodes, developing effective
techniques for scaling proxy throughput is becoming a critical task.
In addition, several studies have analyzed the impact of authentication, particu-
larly Digest authentication, on the performance of a SIP proxy (see Section 3.1.1).
However, these studies have focused on the evaluation of single proxy configurations
with a local authentication service or database. Taking into account that large-scale
VoIP deployments rely on distributed architectures, it is important to understand
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how an authentication mechanism such as Digest authentication can affect the per-
formance and scalability of this these architectures.
In this chapter, we present an empirical study of the impact of two techniques,
parallel and batch requests, designed to improve the throughput of authenticated
signaling requests for distributed SIP proxies sharing a remote database. Our re-
sults show that an enhanced version of the currently recommended parallel process
execution method can dramatically increase proxy throughput. This improvement
comes at the cost of a significant bandwidth overhead (≈ 25 Mbps) and an increased
dropped call rate. Request batching, an alternative technique that has not previously
been applied in this domain, is then shown to greatly reduce the bandwidth costs
but fails to achieve the same high throughput as the first technique. We demonstrate
that a carefully balanced hybrid of these two approaches can achieve throughput at
the proxy equal to the capacity of the authentication service, an improvement of 33%
over the best parallel execution approach, using 77.3% and 76.6% less bandwidth for
requests and responses between proxy and database and maintaining call dropping
rates below 1%. We note that these improvements are not simply the result of maxi-
mizing the settings of the two mechanisms and that the careless combination of these
techniques can actually degrade performance.
Through this work, we make the following key contributions:
• Modify and extend a popular open source SIP proxy to support batch
requests: We made several enhancements to the open source OpenSER proxy
software to allow for far greater throughput. We discuss our modifications and
make them available as a patch to the community at: http://www.cc.gatech.
edu/~idacosta/proxy_batch.html
• Characterize performance improvements of both parallelization and
batching: We performed an extensive measurement study of the performance
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gains realized by the use of multiple proxy processes, the use of batching and
the range of combinations of these two approaches. Our analysis offers the first
discussion of the tradeoffs inherent to these performance enhancing techniques
in the context of SIP proxies.
• Provide recommendations for optimal throughput and resource use
by proxies: By performing our experiments over a range of possible configura-
tions, we are able to demonstrate that throughput is not maximized simply by
using the maximum possible settings for parallelization and batching. Instead,
carefully tuning settings can maximize throughput while using approximately
24% of the bandwidth required in näıve settings.
• Characterize the delay added by batching to call setup time: By run-
ning additional experiments, we demonstrate that the delay introduced by the
use of batch requests is adequate even for time-sensitive applications such as
VoIP. Our measurements show that this delay is at most 160 ms in our testbed
and, therefore, does not cause unnecessary retransmissions (default retransmis-
sion time is 500 ms).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 offers an overview
of the two main techniques used to improve Digest authentication performance in
distributed scenarios; Section 4.2 describes our methodology and provides the details
of our experimental testbed; Section 4.3 provides the results of our experimental
evaluation for the different configurations studied; Section 4.4 presents a general
discussion of the results obtained and additional considerations; Section 4.5 offers a
summary of our work.
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4.1 Improving SIP Authentication Performance in a Dis-
tributed Scenario
The SIP standard (e.g., RFC 3261 [161]) recommends several security mechanisms
that provide user authentication (i.e., Digest authentication, SSL/TLS, IPsec, S/MIME).
However, Digest authentication is the preferred mechanism in most SIP deployments
because it is more efficient and easier to deploy than the other recommended mech-
anisms. SIP Digest authentication (see Section 2.2.3), a challenge-response authen-
tication protocol, is more efficient because it relies on cryptographic hash operations
(i.e., MD5 algorithm) which are computationally cheaper than using symmetric or
public key cryptography.
In this work, we analyze the performance of Digest authentication in a SIP dis-
tributed scenario where multiple proxies share a central authentication service, similar
to the nationwide SIP infrastructure scenario depicted in Figures 1 and 2 in Sec-
tion 2.2.2. In this scenario, SIP proxies are located in areas geographically close to
subscribers to reduce effects of network latency on session setup. The central authen-
tication service can perform authentication operations itself (i.e., RADIUS, LDAP)
or can store subscriber information required for authentication (i.e., database). In
the latter case, the authentication service sends the subscriber’s authentication cre-
dentials to the proxies, and the proxies perform the authentication operations. We
followed this model in our study because it is the one typically used in Digest au-
thentication.
While the use of a central database topology offers several advantages (i.e., simpli-
fied management and security), its performance is significantly reduced when Digest
authentication is enabled (see Section 4.3). There are two main reasons for this per-
formance problem: the larger network latency between the proxies and the database
and the fact that Digest authentication requires a query to the database for each mes-
sage authentication operation. Each time a proxy process authenticates a message,
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it has to wait for the database response to continue processing the message. During
this time, the proxy process can not serve new requests (blocking call). As a result,
each proxy process handles a lower call throughput.
An often recommended technique to reduce the effects of network latency in dis-
tributed scenarios is parallel execution. The idea is to use multiple proxy processes
per server. The higher the number of concurrent processes, the lower the probability
that a client request will have to wait for a process to become available. As a re-
sult, the proxy can support higher call throughput. The trade-off, however, is higher
hardware requirements such as CPU, memory and network bandwidth.
Another technique, that to the best of our knowledge has not been used before in
SIP deployments, is request batching. The idea is to reduce the number of times the
proxy needs to access the database so as to avoid the impact of the high round trip
time between the proxies and the database. Instead of sending single queries to the
database, the proxy holds requests in a queue of size n. Once the queue is full, the
proxy sends a batch query to the database to retrieve the corresponding n authen-
tication credentials in one single round trip. While this technique is more efficient
than parallel execution (e.g., lower hardware requirements), our experimental analysis
shows that it fails to achieve similar performance improvements. In addition, request
batching adds delay to each requests in the batch. However, the delay introduced is
tolerable even for VoIP applications (See Section 4.3.5).
As mentioned earlier, the use of multiple processes is an effective way to improve
throughput. However, it is not efficient in terms of the bandwidth required between
the proxy and the database. Request batching, alternatively, is not effective for
maximizing throughput, but does improve performance with dramatic reductions in
communications and application-layer overhead. The complementary nature of these
two techniques makes their combination a logical next step. We propose and evaluate
the use of a hybrid approach: combining multiple processes with batch requests.
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Our experimental evaluation and analysis of this hybrid approach is presented in
Section 4.3.4.
4.2 Experimental Setup
To characterize the performance of a SIP proxy with Digest authentication, we im-
plemented an experimental test bed based on the nationwide VoIP provider scenario
depicted in Figures 1 and 2 in Section 2.2.2. SIP proxies are located in areas geo-
graphically close to subscribers to reduce effects of network latency on session setup.
The proxies share a central authentication service which stores subscriber information
and performs authentication related operations.
The authentication service can perform the authentication operations itself (i.e.,
RADIUS, LDAP) or can simply store subscriber information. In the latter case, the
authentication service sends the subscriber’s authentication credentials to the proxies,
and the proxies perform the authentication operations and then delete the credentials.
This is the model used in SIP Digest authentication, and therefore, the one modeled
in our study.
4.2.1 Testbed Configuration
Our experimental test bed consists of three main components:
• SIP Proxy: we used OpenSER 1.3.2 [147] (now known as OpenSIPS) as our SIP
proxy. OpenSER is a mature and stable open source SIP proxy optimized for
high performance. OpenSER was configured with minimal functionality (only
required modules were enabled). A single stateless proxy was used in our tests.
OpenSER was installed in a server with 8 2-GHz Quad-Core AMD Opteron
processors, 16 GB of memory, 1 Gbit Ethernet card and running 2.6.24 Linux
Kernel (Ubuntu 8.04.2).
• Remote database: MySQL 5.0.51a [140] was used as the database software for
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storing OpenSER’s configuration data and subscriber’s information (including
authentication credentials). A default configuration was used in our test (no
database optimizations were used). The database was populated with 10,000
subscribers, all belonging to a single SIP domain. MySQL was installed in a
server with the same hardware and operating system as the server used for the
proxy.
• User Agents (UAs): to simulate the SIP workload generated by the UAs, we
used SIPp 3.1 [75], an open source test tool and traffic generator for the SIP pro-
tocol. A total of 24 SIPp instances were used to generate the workload, divided
in two groups: 12 UA clients (UAC) and 12 UA servers (UAS). The number of
SIPp instances was determined based on the hardware resources available. A
total of 7 servers were used for running the SIPp instances (multiple instances
per server). The default SIPp scenarios were modified to support Digest au-
thentication, according to the call dialog show in Figure 3 in Section 2.2.3 (only
INVITE messages are authenticated). The SIPp servers had similar hardware
and operating system as the servers used for the proxy and database.
The above components communicated using a dedicated Gigabit Ethernet net-
work. To simulate the network latency between the proxy and the database, we used
the Linux traffic control tool [28] with the network emulation module (netem). A net-
work latency value of 30 ms was used in our experiments. This is a conservative value
to a centralized location on the continent considering that the typical coast-to-coast
network latency in the United States is between 80 to 100 ms.
Experiments were executed using a combination of Bash and Perl scripts. Ad-
ditional open source tools such as iftop, pidstat, mpstat and vmstat were used to
capture the required metrics in each test.
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4.2.2 Adding Batch Requests Support to OpenSER
In our study, we evaluated the use of batch requests to improve proxy performance.
The basic idea behind this approach is to avoid individual requests to the database.
Instead, requests are temporarily stored at the proxy and sent together as one multi-
condition request. For example, a batch request of size 2 uses the following SQL
query syntax:
Select ha1 from subscriber where username=’00033’ OR username=’002459’
The previous SQL query returns the authentication credentials of two subscribers
using a single round trip to the database. Using this approach, we can reduce the
impact of the bandwidth overhead associated with individual requests. More details
about this technique are presented in Section 4.3.3.
OpenSER does not support batch requests. Therefore, it was necessary to modify
OpenSER to add this mechanism. Our code was added to OpenSER’s authentication
module. However, it was also necessary to modify OpenSER’s core components to
enable batch requests. Our experimental code is available to the community as a soft-
ware patch for OpenSER version 1.3.2 at http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~idacosta/
proxy_batch.html
4.2.3 Methodology
Three configurations were evaluated in our tests: the use of multiple processes, the
use of batch requests and the combination of both mechanisms (i.e., hybrid approach).
To evaluate each configuration, we focused on the following metrics: call throughput
at the proxy, message retransmissions, failed calls, bandwidth between the proxy and
the database and CPU utilization for the proxy and database.
Call throughput corresponds to the number of successful calls per second (cps)
measured in each time period (5 s). The maximum call throughput was determined as
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the highest load where the number of failed calls remained under 1% of the total load
(maximum usable throughput with 1% failure tolerance). We selected this bound as it
is commonly applied in more traditional telephony networks. Message retransmission
refers to the number of SIP messages being retransmitted due to the expiration of
timers in the SIPp instances. We used the default retransmission time recommended
by the SIP RFC: 500 ms. Failed calls correspond to the number of unsuccessful
calls in the last period measured by the SIPp UASs. The two main reasons for call
failures in our tests were unexpected messages (messages out of order) and maximum
number of retransmissions (maximum number of UDP retransmission attempts has
been reached). We used the default values in SIPp for UDP retransmissions: 5 for
INVITE transactions and 7 for others.
Each test was run for 10 minutes. During this period, the SIPp instances gener-
ated an increasing SIP workload. The workload was increased every 5 seconds by a
constant amount. The amount of increase was adjusted according to the configura-
tion evaluated (depending on the number of processes running on the proxy), ranging
from 12 to 180 cps (to avoid saturation of the proxy too quickly). During each test,
performance statistics were collected by the UASs. Additional data (i.e., bandwidth
and CPU utilization) was collected using the tools described in Section 4.2.1.
To ensure the validity of our results, each test was repeated 10 times. Average
values were used in our analysis and a 95 % confidence interval is provided. Approx-
imately 600 unique tests were executed during our study.





















Figure 8: Proxy’s throughput with and without Digest authentication. The network
latency (30 ms) between the proxy and the database significantly reduces proxy’s
performance
4.3 Analysis of Throughput Enhancement Techniques
4.3.1 Standard Configuration
Our first test evaluated the performance of two stateless SIP proxy configurations:
non-authentication (base case) and Digest authentication with remote database (RTT=30
ms). Both configurations used 4 child processes (default OpenSER value). The results
are presented in Figure 8.
For the non-authentication configuration, the maximum throughput registered
was approximately 20,000 cps. However, this was not the maximum throughput that
the proxy could handle. At 20,000 cps the SIPp instances were unable to continue
increasing the workload. In other words, the SIPp instances reached saturation before
the proxy. At 20,000 cps the proxy had a CPU utilization of 20%. Therefore, we can
estimate that the maximum throughput that our proxy can handle is significantly
larger.
For the Digest authentication configuration, the maximum throughput registered
was approximately 130 cps. This value represents a drop in performance of almost
three orders of magnitude, but is logically correct as it closely matches the estimation
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1000 ms/30 ms delay = 33 ∗ 4 processes. This drop in performance also means that
the proxy and database are heavily underutilized (less than 1% CPU utilization).
The main reason for this significant drop in performance is the network latency
between the proxy and the database. When Digest authentication is not used, the
proxy routes messages very quickly (less than 50 µs per message). However, when
Digest authentication is enabled, the proxy needs to contact the database to get
the subscriber’s authentication credentials to verify the subscriber’s request (AUTH
box in Figure 3 in Section 2.2.3). This operation adds approximately 30 ms to the
total session setup. This additional time slows down the processing of messages in
the proxy, because each OpenSER process routes messages serially. Each time an
OpenSER process needs to contact the database, it stops processing other messages
and waits for the database’s response (blocking call).
A popular approach to reduce the effect of blocking calls and network latency
is to increase the number of parallel operations performed by the proxy. In other
words, increase the number of OpenSER child processes. This approach is often
recommended by OpenSER developers to improve performance. In the next section,
we present the evaluation of this option.
4.3.2 Improving Performance with Multiple Processes
To evaluate the use of multiple processes to improve performance, we measured the
proxy’s throughput over a range: from 2 to 1024 processes, increasing our interval
by a factor of 2. Figure 9 shows the results of our experiments. As expected, the
proxy’s throughput improves as the number of processes increases. Intuitively, this
improvement is due to the increased probability that a non-blocked process will be
available when a new request arrives at the proxy.
It is important to notice that the throughput values in Figure 9 represent the























Figure 9: Proxy’s maximum usable throughput (<1% failed calls) for different num-
ber of processes. Proxy’s performance improves with higher number of processes.
However, performance drops sharply when 1024 processes are used.
most cases, this value is equivalent to the maximum throughput handled by the proxy.
However, in certain configurations, the maximum throughput has a high percentage of
call failures (>> 1%), which makes this value impractical in production environments.
Figure 9 depicts the maximum usable throughput for 512 processes: almost 9,000
cps. This value represents a considerable improvement in performance when com-
pared with the value obtained in the previous section (130 cps). Our results also
show that at 1024 processes, the maximum usable throughput decreased markedly to
approximately 5,500 cps. Even though the performance improvement is significant,
it still falls short when compared to the proxy’s throughput with no authentication
(approximately 20,000 cps). To understand why the proxy can not handle higher
throughput, we analyzed in more detail the differences between configurations using
512 and 1024 processes.
Figure 10 provides a more in-depth characterization of the behavior of 512 pro-
cesses. As previously mentioned, traffic is gradually increased with time to create
performance profiles. Two critical observations can be made from this configuration.
First, the maximum throughput is approximately 13,000 cps; however, the corre-












Figure 10: Proxy’s throughput for the 512 processes configuration. The maximum
throughput that the proxy can handle is limited by the database maximum through-
put.
Second, message retransmissions begin before reaching the maximum throughput and
grow extremely rapidly once it is reached. The number of failed calls also grows faster
once the maximum throughput is reached. Typically, the number of retransmissions
and failed calls increases because the proxy can not process the messages fast enough
(the proxy is too busy). However, the proxy’s CPU utilization at the maximum
throughput was approximately 40%. Figure 12 provides additional context to clarify
this discrepancy. Specifically, around 512 processes the database application is us-
ing more than 100 % CPU utilization (multiprocessor machine). At 512 processes,
the database application is using almost 120% CPU utilization. At this point the
database can not process a higher rate of requests from the proxy, and as a result,
the database becomes the performance bottleneck.
Based on our results and assuming the use of a faster database (i.e., an in-memory
database), we could continue increasing the number of processes to improve the
proxy’s throughput. For example, the proxy could theoretically handle a throughput
of almost 35,000 cps with a 100% CPU utilization (13,000 cps uses 40% CPU utiliza-
tion). At that point, the proxy’s CPU will be the bottleneck. However, Figure 11




















Figure 11: Proxy’s throughput for 1024 processes configuration. Trashing in the
proxy due to the high number of processes degrades proxy’s performance
(at a lower traffic rate) during the tests on 1024 process when compared with the
512 processes case. The maximum throughput for 1024 processes is also less than
the 512 process case, indicating that the database is not the only cause for the drop
in performance in this configuration. The reason for this behavior is that the high
number of processes begins to degrade the proxy’s performance due to thrashing (an
elevated number of page faults and context switches). As a result, we can conclude
that only increasing the number of processes is not enough to maximize throughput.
The use of simple parallelization techniques also causes bandwidth usage between
the proxy and the database to become a concern. Figure 13 shows the bandwidth for
the queries-to and responses-from the database. The response bandwidth is higher
than the query bandwidth because the queries have smaller size than the correspond-
ing responses (authentication credentials). Note that bandwidth grows linearly with
the number of processes. For example, 512 processes require a bandwidth of 12 Mbps
for queries and 24 Mbps for responses. These bandwidth values can be prohibitive
for some scenarios, specially if the database and the proxy communicate across the
public Internet. The bandwidth between the proxy and the database may therefore















Figure 12: Proxy and database CPU utilization for different number of processes.
Around 512, the database CPU utilization is more than 100 % and the database
becomes a bottleneck for proxy’s performance
The network and application layer overheads are the main reason for the high
bandwidth requirements. A single query has a packet length of 126 bytes, with 56
bytes of payload (56% overhead). The corresponding response has a packet length of
247 bytes with 146 bytes of payload (41% overhead). Therefore, almost half of the
traffic exchanged between the proxy and the database corresponds to network and
application layer headers and control packets. The situation is made worse if we con-
sider the use of security protocols such as IPsec or SSL to protect this communication
channel.
Finally, we note that OpenSER creates an independent TCP connection to the
database for each child process it spawns. This approach is not very efficient if a high
number of processes are used (i.e., a TCP port per process needs to be allocated). A
more efficient approach could be to share a pool of TCP connections to the database






















Figure 13: Bandwidth between the proxy and the database for different number
of processes. A considerable amount of bandwidth is required for high number of
processes
4.3.3 Improving Performance with Batch Requests
The second approach to improve proxy performance is the use of request batching.
The idea is to reduce the number of times the proxy needs to access the database so as
to avoid the impact of the high round trip time between the proxy and the database
(the most expensive step of the authentication process). Instead of sending a single
query to the database, the proxy holds requests in a queue of size n. Once the queue
is full,1 the proxy sends a batch query to the database to retrieve the corresponding
n authentication credentials in one single round trip.
Based on the above, the time a batch query takes to retrieve n credentials should
be less than the total time n single queries take to retrieve n credentials, as the
following inequality shows:
RTTpd + tbatch < n× (tdb +RTTpd) (1)
1Because we have relatively high amounts of traffic, we are not worried about starving requests
by forcing them to wait for the queue to fill. A real deployment could avoid such an issue by






















Figure 14: Proxy’s maximum usable throughput for different batch sizes using a
single process. The performance improvement is lower when compared with multiple
processes.
where RTTpd is the network latency between the proxy and the database, tbatch is the
query execution time of a batch query of size n, and tdb is the query execution time
of a single query (query execution time corresponds to the time the database takes
to execute a query).
Assuming that tbatch = n×tdb (worst case scenario), the impact of network latency
is reduced by a factor n when a batch query is used instead of single queries. Using










Equation 3 shows that the impact of the network latency is effectively amortized
among the n queries in the batch.
To evaluate the effectiveness of using batch requests, we measured the proxy’s






















Total query time (tbatch + RTTpd)
tsq = (tbatch) / (batch size)
Figure 15: Total query time (tbatch +RTTpd) and tsq =
RTTpd+tbatch
n for different batch
sizes. Using batch sizes larger than 64 has little effect on improving performance
batch size by a factor of 2 in each step. Figure 14 shows the results of these tests.
The maximum usable throughput occurred with a batch size of 64: almost 1,400 cps.
This performance improvement is small when compared with the parallel execution
approach, but note that these tests where executed with a single process. It can
therefore already be concluded that batch requests alone are not enough to maximize
proxy’s performance.
Figure 14 also shows that the maximum usable throughput with a batch size of
128 is close to 0 cps. With this batch size, the number of retransmissions and failed
calls is extremely high almost immediately after the start of the experiments. These
results provide us with an estimation of the maximum batch size that can be used in
our scenario.
Due to the lower throughput values obtained using only batch requests, the CPU
utilization in both, the proxy and the database, was less than 10 % for all the tests.
To confirm the validity of Equation 1, we measured the total query time (tbatch +
RTTpd) for different batch sizes. Figure 15 depicts how the batch query time increases
with the batch size. However the rate of increase is much lower than using single





















Figure 16: Bandwidth between the proxy and the database for different batch sizes.
Batch requests have lower bandwidth requirements than multiple processes
queries will take approximately 964.6 ms. Instead, a batch query of size 32 takes
approximately 32.581 ms. Figure 15 also shows how the network latency is amortized
among the queries in the batch (Equation 3). It is important to notice that after a
batch size of 64, the curve begins to flatten out. This behavior indicates that larger
batch sizes will have little effect on reducing the impact of network latency.
Figure 16 shows that the use of batch requests also reduces the bandwidth require-
ments between the proxy and the database. For example, a proxy with 8 processes
has a maximum throughput of 265 cps and requires 232 and 482 Kbps for query and
response bandwidth respectively. The same proxy with a single process and a batch
size of 8 has a maximum throughput of 251 cps and requires 64.70 and 136.20 Kbps
for query and response traffic respectively. Batching therefore required 71.8% less
bandwidth than recommended multiple processes technique for the same throughput.
Batch requests require lower bandwidth because they have better payload effi-
ciency (payload/total packet size) than multiple processes. Figure 17 shows how
batch requests have a lower total packet length than the similar number of single
queries. For example, 8 single queries will use a total packet length of 1,008 and























Batch size, # of single queries
Batch queries (size n)
Batch responses (size n)
n single queries
n single responses
Figure 17: Total packet length for batch queries and single queries. Batch queries
have better payload efficiency than the equivalent number of single queries
require 277 and 569 bytes instead. A batch query of size 8 has a payload of 207 bytes
and 450 bytes for the query and the response packets (25% and 21% overhead); 8
single queries have a payload of 448 and 1,168 bytes (56% and 41% overhead).
A tradeoff with the use of batch requests is added latency in session establishment
time associated with the queuing period. In particular, the first request to arrive to
the queue will have the longest delay (worst case). This request will have to wait
for the queue to fill up first in order to continue with authentication procedures.
However, this additional latency is virtually unnoticeable to users as session setups
in telephony are on the order of seconds [67].
Given all of these inputs, we now attempt to select an appropriate batch size.
In general, this will be a scenario dependent value. Equation 3 indicates that using
larger batch sizes is the best strategy to reduce the effect of network latency. However,
increasing the batch size will also increase the execution time on the database (tdb),
as shown in Figure 15. After a certain point, increasing the batch size will no longer
improve performance, especially if the database is not optimized for processing large
batch requests. Our results show that for our scenario, batch sizes larger than 64 will
not help to improve performance; on the contrary, they will degrade it (see Figure 14).
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There are also other factors to consider when choosing the batch size. Using
larger batch sizes will also increase the delay introduced to the session setup, and
produce unnecessary retransmissions and failed calls if the queue is not filled up fast
enough. In general, the queue has to be filled up before the retransmission time of
the first request in the queue expires (default retransmission time is 500 ms). Using
larger batch sizes will also increase the length of the queries and responses packets.
Once the packet length is bigger than the network MTU (Maximum Transmission
Unit), fragmentation will occur. Fragmentation decreases the payload efficiency be-
cause additional control information is required (i.e., more headers). Even worse,
fragmentation will also increase the likelihood of packet loss, and therefore, exces-
sive retransmissions (retransmission of all the fragments). This factor is especially
important in Internet scenarios. In Figure 17, a batch request of size 128 requires 2
fragments for the queries, and 4 fragments for the responses (plus additional TCP
control packets).
A final factor to consider is the proxy’s design and implementation. We found
several problems and error messages with batch sizes of 128 or larger. We concluded
that OpenSER’s design is one of the main reasons for the performance degradation
when a batch size of 128 was used.
4.3.4 Hybrid Approach: Combining Multiple Processes with Batch Re-
quests
The use of multiple processes is an effective way to improve throughput. However, it
is not efficient in terms of the bandwidth used between the proxy and the database.
Request batching, alternatively, is not effective for maximizing throughput, but does
improve performance with dramatic reductions in communications and application-
layer overhead. The complimentary nature of these two techniques makes their com-


























Figure 18: Proxy’s maximum usable throughput for different combinations of number
of processes and batch sizes. The best performance is achieved with the 32 processes
with batch size of 16
further improve performance, we tested the combination of different number of pro-
cesses (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, and 64) with different batch sizes (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, and 64) - a
total of 36 tests.
Figure 18 shows the maximum usable throughput values for each configuration.
The maximum usable throughput is reached with the combination of 32 processes
with a batch size of 16 (32p-16b): approximately 12,100 cps. This value represents
a 34% improvement over the maximum usable throughput obtained with multiple
processes (9,000 cps for 512 processes).
Figure 18 also shows that configurations with higher number of processes or larger
batch sizes than 32p-16b (i.e., 32p-32p or 64p-32p) exhibit poorer performance than
the 32p-16b configuration. These other configurations are able to handle approxi-
mately the same maximum throughput than 32p-16b but also have more retransmis-
sions and call failures, which degrades their usable throughput. Such degradation is
caused by a combination of database saturation and the operation issues associated
with OpenSER and SIPp. If a faster database were used (e.g., in-memory), these con-
figurations would likely perform better than 32p-16b; however, our characterization


















# of processes, batch size
Queries (mult. processes)
Responses (mult. processes)
Queries (32 processes and batch requests)
Responses (32 processes and batch requests)
Figure 19: Bandwidth between the proxy and the database for different number of
processes and for 32 processes with different batch sizes. The combination of multiple
processes with batching required significantly less bandwidth than using multiple
processes only.
Configurations such as 16p-32b also perform worse than the 32p-16b scenario.
While these configurations appear to be equivalent, in practice they are not. The
reason is that the use of a higher number of processes is more effective to maximize
throughput than using higher batch sizes.
Figure 19 presents the measured bandwidth between the proxy and the database
for parallel execution and for the 32 processes hybrid approach. The figure shows
a significant difference between the bandwidth used by multiple processes and the
bandwidth used by the hybrid approach. For example, the best hybrid configuration
tested (32p-16b) requires 2,676 Kbps for queries to the database and 5,625 Kbps for
responses from the database. In contrast, the best multiple processes configuration
(512p) requires 11,780 Kbps for queries to the database and 24,030 Kbps for the
responses from the database. This is an improvement of 77.3% and 76.6% for requests
and responses, respectively. Therefore, the 32p-16b configuration requires 4 times
less bandwidth than the 512p configuration. The main reason for this significant
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%CPU DB (multiple processes)
%CPU Proxy (multiple processes)
%CPU DB (32 processes and batching)
%CPU Proxy (32 processes and dbatching)
Figure 20: Proxy and database CPU utilization for different number of processes and
for 32 processes with different batch sizes. The combination of multiple processes
with batching requires less proxy CPU time than multiple processes
Finally, we compare the CPU utilization in the proxy and the database for the
hybrid approach. Figure 20 compares the CPU utilization for different number of
processes against the CPU utilization for 32 processes with different batch sizes.
In the database’s case, the figure shows that there is not a significant difference
between using multiple processes or the hybrid approach; both techniques saturate
the database (more than 100% CPU utilization). However, in the proxy’s case, the
hybrid approach uses less CPU time than multiple processes. For example, for the
32p-16 case, the CPU utilization is almost 20%. For 512 processes, the proxy CPU
utilization is almost 42%. Figure 21 depicts this difference in greater detail.
To understand why the 512p configuration requires higher proxy CPU utilization,
we compare Figure 10 and Figure 22. Both configurations handled approximately the
same maximum throughput, however, the 512p configuration has more retransmis-
sions and call failures earlier than the 32p-16b configuration. As a result, the proxy
has to do extra processing when the 512p configuration is used. In addition, the use
of a high number of processes increases the probability of more overhead (i.e., more
























Figure 21: Proxy CPU utilization for 512 processes and for 32 processes with batch
size of 16. Both configurations handle approximately the same maximum throughput
but the hybrid approach requires less CPU time
4.3.5 Analysis of the Delay Introduced by Batch Requests
The use of batch requests adds a delay to most of the messages that require authenti-
cation. The reason is that queries to the database need to wait for the queue to fill up
in order to be sent to the database. In general, the longest delay is experienced by the
first query to arrive to the last queue that fills up (each process has an independent





where n is the size of the queue, m is the number of child processes in the proxy and
r is the expected call throughput (calls per second). For example, for 32p-16b hybrid
configuration and a call throughput of 2,000 cps, the longest delay added by batch
requests is approximately 256 ms.
To avoid unnecessary retransmissions, the delay added by batch requests should












Figure 22: Throughput for 32 processes with batch size of 16. Notice the lower
number of retransmissions and failed calls when compared with the 512 processes
configuration (Figure 10)
This constraint is expressed in the following inequality:
RTTcp + tauth + tdmax < tret (5)
where RTTcp is the round-trip time between the clients (UAC and UAS) and the
proxy, tauth is the time required by a non-batching authentication operation (including
the query to the database), tdmax is the maximum delay added by the use of batch
requests (equation 4) and tret is the value of the retransmission timer in the UAs (e.g.,
500 ms). This inequality assumes that the UAS answers the call request immediately.
The additional delay introduced by batch requests increases the setup time of each
call. Therefore, we ran an experiment to evaluate how the call setup time is affected
by batch requests. In this experiment, a proxy with a 32p-16b hybrid configuration
received a constant call load of 6,000 cps during 20 seconds. In this period, we
measured the setup time for all the calls established (120,000 calls). The results are
shown in the histogram presented in Figure 23 (25 ms bins). As this Figure depicts,
98 % of the calls were established in less than 200 ms (99.90 % in less than 350 ms).


















Call Setup Time (msec)
Figure 23: Call setup time distribution for 120,000 calls measured using a constant
call throughput (6,000 cps) and a 32p-16b proxy configuration. Most of the calls
(99.90 %) were established in less than 350 ms.
tauth ≈ 30 ms (RTTpd), the delay added by batch requests is at most 160 ms for nearly
all the calls. This delay is small when compared to the default retransmission time
(500 ms) and unlikely to be noticed by humans. As a result, we can conclude that
the delay added by batch requests is acceptable for VoIP applications.
As equations 4 and 5 show, the delay introduced by batch requests is proportional
to the inverse of the call throughput. Therefore, call throughput below certain thresh-
old (equation 4) will cause retransmissions. One option to avoid retransmissions is
to implement a timer that, on expiration, will indicate the proxy to send the batch
request to the database even if the queue is not full. Other option is to monitor the
call throughput and adjust the size of the queue dynamically to avoid unnecessary
retransmissions.
4.3.6 Evaluating Performance with Multiple Proxies
The testbed used in all previous experiments consisted of servers with high-end hard-
ware specifications, capable of supporting carrier level SIP traffic. However, only one
proxy and one database were used in our experiments due to resource constraints and
the high capacity of the proxy and database servers (e.g., 8 servers were required to
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DB CPU (%) DB send/recv BW (KBps)
128p 1254.17 (±125.86) 114.20 (±1.70) 538.43 (±45.47) / 207.54 (±17.48)
32p16b 1379.26 (±141.32) 65.70 (±4.9) 128.31 (±18.13) / 52.71 (±6.25)
generate enough load to reach the limits of the system). Therefore, a new testbed
based on the Georgia Tech Emulab network testbed was implemented to evaluate
an scenario with multiple proxies. The new testbed consisted of 3 proxies and one
database and different network latencies between each proxy and the database (30, 45
and 70 ms). However, the server nodes in Emulab have much lower capacity than the
servers used in previous experiments. For example, Emulab nodes use virtual machine
technology (guest OS), have lower number of processors (e.g., dual-core machines),
and significantly less memory (512 MB).
In spite of its lower capacity, the new testbed allowed us to evaluate two con-
figurations: multiple processes and the hybrid approach. For multiple processes, a
configuration of 128 child processes per proxy was evaluated (larger number of pro-
cesses caused instability problems). For the hybrid approach, we used a 32p-16b
configuration (best hybrid configuration). The results are presented in Table 1. The
first thing to notice is the lower performance values supported by the Emulab testbed:
less than 1,500 cps. However, despite of the lower call throughput supported by the
testbed, the new results coincide with our earlier findings. We can see that the max-
imum usable call throughput supported by both configurations was approximately
the same. However, the hybrid configuration required less bandwidth and database
CPU utilization than the multiple processes approach (the hybrid approach also re-
quired less CPU utilization in the proxies: approximately 5 % less). These results
confirm that the hybrid approach is more efficient that using only multiple processes
to maximize performance in a multiple-proxy configuration.
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Table 2: Best configuration for each query technique: multiple processes, batch re-










512p 9,000 11,780 / 24,030 42 115
64b 1,366 279 / 555 6 2
32p16b 12,100 2,676 / 5,625 20 135
4.4 Discussion
Table 2 shows the results of the best configuration of each technique: multiple pro-
cesses (512 processes), batch requests (one process with batch size of 64), and the
hybrid approach (32 processes with bath size of 16). These results demonstrate that
the hybrid approach effectively combines the good properties of the other two ap-
proaches: improved throughput values and lower bandwidth between the proxy and
the database.
Based on the above results, 32p-16b provides the best performance for a dis-
tributed proxy architecture with similar components. We note, however, the need to
carefully interpret these numbers. While the results indicate that the hybrid approach
can handle higher throughput than the multiple processes approach, we did not test
every possible configuration for each technique. It may be possible that a different
number of multiple processes (somewhere between 256 and 512) offers performance
closer to that of the 32p-16b configuration. Such a configuration is still unlikely to
improve over the hybrid approach due to the associated bandwidth overhead. It may
also be possible that a different mix of multiple processes and batch size have even
better performance. Accordingly, these results should be used as a guide and aid
network administrators in their parameter setting. Both the 512p and 32p-16b con-
figurations can handle approximately the same maximum throughput (≈ 12,000 cps),
which is bounded by the maximum database’s throughput. The difference resides in
the number of retransmissions and call failures that happen in each configuration,
which results in different maximum usable throughput values. This difference can
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be observed comparing Figure 10 and Figure 22. As a result, the hybrid approach
can maximize throughput as effectively as running multiple processes but using lower
number of processes. The use of lower number of processes helps to reduce context
switching overheads and thrashing situations.
In terms of bandwidth requirements, the hybrid approach is much more efficient
than any configuration of multiple processes. As Figure 13 shows, configurations
larger than 128p require considerable bandwidth between the proxy and the database.
In conclusion, for similar throughput values, a hybrid configuration will require much
less bandwidth than a multiple processes configuration.
CPU utilization in the database is approximately the same for both, the hybrid
and multiple processes techniques. However, the CPU utilization in the proxy will be
higher for multiple processes because of the context switching overhead. Therefore,
for comparable throughput values, the hybrid approach will require the same or less
proxy CPU time than a multiple processes configuration
As a tradeoff, the use of batch requests will increase the session setup time in low
traffic scenarios. However, the delay introduced is unlikely to be noticed by humans.
Additionally, request batching increases the packet length of the queries and responses
between the proxy and the database. Larger packet sizes may require fragmentation,
making this approach more susceptible to packet losses at very large batch sizes.
In general, designers and developers can use the following rule when applying the
hybrid approach: for comparable throughput values, increasing the number of processes
improves throughput to a point, but the use of request batching will be required to
reduce the overhead associated with this technique in order to truly maximize the
usable throughput of the proxy.
It is not a coincidence that the to number of processes in the multiple processes
approach is equal to the product of the number of processes and its batch size in the
hybrid approach (512=32*16). If we look again at Figures 9 and 14, we can see that
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for batch sizes lower than 16, approximately the same throughput is handled using n
multiple processes, or using one process with a batch size of n. Therefore, a configu-
ration using n multiple processes will handle approximately the same throughput as a
configuration with p processes with batch size=q, where p and q are factors of n and
q ≤ 16.
When using the hybrid approach in a production environment, we recommend
having batch requests enabled all the time. As mentioned before, the extra-delay
introduced by batch requests is unlikely to be noticed by humans. Also, the use of
timers will avoid unnecessary retransmissions due to timeouts when the call load is
low. In this way, the system will be always prepared for events when the call load
increases unexpectedly (i.e., flash crowds, distributed denial of service attacks and
emergency situations).
Finally, while production environments may have different topologies and con-
figurations, our testbed can not be considered unrealistic. For example, the use of
multiple proxies sharing a single database is an option suggested by VoIP software
providers [149]. In addition, our testbed is also based in a common topology used
in cellular networks: a central database (the Home Location Register - HLR) servic-
ing multiple proxy servers (the Mobile Switching Center/Visitor Location Register -
MSC/VLR) closer to the clients. Therefore, our findings are relevant for production
environments with distributed SIP topologies.
4.5 Summary
SIP proxies are often distributed across a wide geographic area in order to mini-
mize latency between themselves and clients. However, the supporting authentica-
tion services are often centrally located, potentially leading to the degradation of call
throughput due to network latency. In this chapter we have analyzed two schemes
to improve proxy throughput in such an architecture. First, we demonstrated that
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the commonly recommended approach, parallel execution, improved performance but
quickly caused the rate of call failure to rise. We then implemented a request batching
mechanism that reduced the bandwidth overhead associated with previous approach,
but failed to reach a sufficiently high throughput. Second, we created a hybrid of
these two schemes that improved throughput by more than 34%, reduced bandwidth
overhead by more than 75% over the best parallel execution method and maintained
loss rates below 1%. Finally, we also characterized the delay added by batch requests
to the setup time of each call. Our results showed that this delay is acceptable even
for time-sensitive applications such as VoIP.
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CHAPTER V
PROXYCHAIN: DEVELOPING A ROBUST AND
EFFICIENT AUTHENTICATION INFRASTRUCTURE
FOR CARRIER-SCALE VOIP NETWORKS
Voice over IP (VoIP) is fundamentally reshaping the telephony landscape. Instead of
using dedicated, circuit-switched lines, VoIP allows for phone calls to be multiplexed
with other data traffic over the Internet. This convergence between voice and data
communications provides a number of benefits. For instance, providers can now offer
a range of new services such as video and presence. Unfortunately, the transition from
traditional phone networks to VoIP also creates a number of new security challenges.
Authentication represents one of the most important security issues facing VoIP
systems. Providers have responded by implementing a number of security mech-
anisms, ranging from SSL/TLS to Digest authentication (see Section 3.1.2). Un-
fortunately, none of the suggested schemes are simultaneously strong, efficient and
scalable enough to meet the needs of carrier-scale networks without vastly increasing
the amount of deployed infrastructure.
SIP Digest authentication (see Section 2.2.3) is still the preferred authentication
mechanism due to is simplicity and efficiency. However, despite the performance ben-
efits achieved by our hybrid request approach in the previous chapter, the throughput
and bandwidth overheads introduced by Digest authentication can still be too high
for a large-scale VoIP application. These overheads are the main reason why not all
the SIP message requests are authenticated during a session, which allows a variety
attacks [207, 3]. Moreover, Digest authentication has several known weaknesses such
as vulnerability to offline dictionary attacks and lack of mutual authentication. Thus,
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a more robust and efficient SIP authentication mechanisms is required for large-scale
VoIP applications.
In this chapter, we describe Proxychain, a robust and efficient authentication
infrastructure designed to support operations in carrier-scale VoIP networks. Our
solution is built around a single centralized authentication service working with proxy
nodes distributed across a wide geographic area. We reduce the impact of the latency
and load associated with this architecture by using a modified hash chain construction
(a sequence of one-time authentication tokens generated by applying a hash function
repeatedly, once-per token, to a secret root value). In addition to providing an efficient
mechanism for mutual authentication, our approach also provides improved scalability
through the secure caching of temporary authentication tokens at the proxies. To
the best of our knowledge, Proxychain is the first protocol that applies the concept
of hash chains in the SIP domain. Proxychain not only adapts this idea to SIP
authentication but also extends it by including additional modifications that solve
some of the weaknesses associated with hash chain protocols, resulting in a more
robust protocol.
Moreover, improvements to the efficiency of SIP authentication afforded by Prox-
ychain allow us to significantly increase the overall security of VoIP systems. For
instance, several recently disclosed attacks on VoIP systems [207, 3] can be mitigated
by simply having an authentication infrastructure scalable enough to cryptograph-
ically verify the origin of multiple SIP signaling request types (e.g., INVITE and
BYE).
This work presents the following key contributions:
• Design and implementation of a robust and efficient SIP authentica-
tion protocol for large-scale VoIP applications: We develop Proxychain, a
protocol based on modified hash chains. Our construction not only dramatically
reduces the load on the centralized authentication database and the latencies
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associated with accessing it, but also provides mutual authentication for clients
and providers.
• Evaluation of Proxychain through an extensive measurement study:
We measure, characterize and compare the performance characteristics of our
proposed infrastructure against commonly used mechanisms. Our results show
up to a 1,700% improvement over such schemes. Moreover, we demonstrate the
ability to support the authentication needs of a national-scale VoIP network
using unoptimized COTS hardware and databases.
• Evidence of robustness to outages and downtime: We demonstrate that
our construction allows the network to operate during planned and unplanned
outages, and estimate its robustness to such incidents. We show the ability
to support normal operations with high availability for approximately 6 hours
using only 28 minutes of preemptive computation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 discusses the
different problems associated with the use of Digest authentication; Section 5.2 details
our proposed protocol; Section 5.3 provides the details of our experimental setup and
methodology; Section 5.4 presents the results of our experiments; Section 5.5 discusses
a number of additional points; Section 5.6 offers a summary of our work.
5.1 Problems with Digest Authentication
While more efficient, Digest authentication is less secure than protocols such as TLS or
IPsec. For instance, it does not provide mutual authentication and complete message
integrity. Limited integrity protection is offered but it is optional and not widely
supported by UAs. Additionally, current implementations actually send the shared
secret from the database to the proxy in order to calculate the correct client response.
This approach is dangerous if the proxy is compromised. Several vulnerabilities have
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been published regarding commercial SIP deployments due to these weaknesses [207].
More robust alternatives have been proposed (see Section 3.1.2), but they have not
been adopted due to their deployment and operational costs.
The use of Digest authentication in an environment with a remote authentication
service can reduce performance significantly, as the previous chapter showed (see Sec-
tion 4.3.1). The main reason is that authentication operations become more expensive
– the round-trip time (RTT) between a proxy and the database (tens of milliseconds)
is now added to each authentication operation (hundreds of microseconds). The ad-
ditional time added per call setup reduces the call throughput of each proxy. The
problem is exacerbated by the fact that proxies have to query the database for each
SIP message that requires authentication. This action also creates a considerable
network load when the call throughput is high. If multiple proxies are used, the load
could overwhelm the database or its network link. As a result, scalability is also
affected.
The use of multiple databases (i.e., one local database per proxy) or adding more
hardware resources to the database are not efficient solutions. As we described in
Chapter 4, the effects of network latency could be reduced by a combination of paral-
lelization and batching techniques. However, the network load to the database is still
high enough to affect the scalability of the system. A more efficient approach is to
reduce the number of queries to the database. To achieve this, we can use temporary
authentication credentials that each proxy stores in memory and that can be used in
multiple authentication operations without contacting the database. This approach
reduces the load received by the database and the effects of network latency. Our
proposed protocol follows this approach.
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5.2 Proxychain Protocol Specification
In this section we present the details of the Proxychain protocol. We begin with
describing the threat model. Next, we present protocol’s design goals. We continue
with a brief overview of hash chains, the basic building block of our construction.
Finally, we provide a formal protocol definition.
5.2.1 Threat Model
Our scenario assumes a polynomial-time (PPT) adversary that has access to all the
communications between a SIP proxy and its users. The adversary’s goal is to send
unauthorized requests to the proxy by masquerading as a registered user (i.e., user
impersonation). For this purpose, the adversary can capture valid requests and resend
them to the proxy (i.e., replay attack) or use them to forge new, arbitrary requests
(i.e., session hijacking). In addition, the adversary can try to obtain users’ authenti-
cation credentials from captured requests (i.e., offline dictionary attacks). Therefore,
we assume that a strong password policy is actively enforced by the SIP provider.
We also assume that the database has a high level of security. Only trusted
entities (i.e., proxies) are allowed to communicate with the database using a robust
security protocol (e.g., TLS or IPsec). Therefore, threats against the database are
not considered in our scenario. In addition, we do not consider attacks against the
SIP UAs. In contrast, the proxies and the network traffic between proxies and UAs
have a higher risk of being targeted by both active and passive attackers. Thus, we
consider attacks against the proxies where an adversary can steal users’ authentication
credentials stored in the proxy.
Based on this threat model, the proposed authentication protocol should provide
the following security guarantees. First, the proposed protocol should provide authen-
ticity and integrity protection to each request send to the proxy. For this purpose, the
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proposed protocol should rely on hash chains (see Section 5.2.3) and a Message Au-
thenticated Code (MAC) primitive that meets the standard notion of unforgeability
under chosen-message attack (UF-CMA [77]). Second, during a challenge-response
authentication exchange, the proposed protocol should provide authenticity and in-
tegrity protection to both the proxy’s challenge and the UA’s response (i.e., mutual
authentication). Third, the proposed protocol should be resistant to active threats
such as replay and session hijacking attacks. Fourth, the proposed protocol should
not leak information about the user’s password or other private information. In par-
ticular, it should be resistant to offline dictionary attacks. Finally, the information
stored in the proxy to authenticate the UA’s requests should not allow an adversary
to impersonate the user.
5.2.2 Design Goals
Proxychain design addresses some of the shortcomings of Digest authentication in
SIP topologies with a centralized authentication service. Our first goal is efficiency:
Proxychain should execute authentication operations faster than Digest authentica-
tion, allowing improved call throughput. Second, we focus on scalability: Proxychain
should support more users and proxies than Digest authentication without the need
for additional resources. In particular, Proxychain should reduce the bandwidth and
processing time required by the database to avoid bottlenecks. Finally, our third
goal is security: Proxychain should improve upon the security assurances provided
by Digest authentication.
5.2.3 Hash Chains
A hash chain is created by applying a cryptographic hash function H() (e.g., MD5,
SHA-1, SHA-256) multiple times to a random value r to generate a sequence of













Hash forward n times
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Figure 24: Hash chains are generated by hashing a secret value forward n times. A
principal Bob stores the current value of the hash chain (Hc). A participant Alice
can prove knowledge of the initial secret by presenting Bob with the previous value
(Hc−1). If Bob hashes Alice’s input and generates Hc, Alice must know the initial
secret due to the one-way property of hash algorithms. Bob then makes the current
value Hc−1 and waits for Alice to provide Hc−2.
Hn(r) = H(. . . H(H(r)) . . .)
Figure 24 provides a visual representation of this mechanism. Hash chains rely on
the preimage resistant (i.e., one-way) property of cryptographic hash functions. When
attempting to authenticate to a server possessing Hn(r), the client transmits Hn−1(r).
The server then hashes Hn−1(r) a single time and, if the result matches Hn(r), au-
thenticates C based on the computational infeasibility of an adversary guessing the
correct preimage.
Note that there are a number of potential weaknesses with this basic construction.
Specifically, hash chains do not provide mutual authentication as the server only
verifies the client. Accordingly, an attacker can potentially impersonate the server
and fool the client into computing a response for a low value of n (e.g., n = 1), allowing
the attacker to recover all the remaining unused values (small “n” attack [106]). We
address these concerns in our construction.
5.2.4 Design and Formal Description
Proxychain is designed to reduce the impact of latency and load on the remote au-
thentication service by caching temporary authentication credentials at the proxies.
Using hash chain-based credentials of length l, a proxy can authenticate multiple
requests from a particular user with only 1l queries to the database. The database
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UAC Proxy DB UAS
INVITE [ nA,P ]
A, P
Hl(tkA), l, nD,A,  nD,P, tkP
407 Response [ i, P, nD,A, nD,P , HMAC(tkP , nA,P||i) ] 
INVITE [ A, B, i, HMAC(tkP , A||B||i), H
i-1(tkA) ]
INVITE
INVITE [ nA,P ]
407 Response [ i-1, P, nD,A, nD,P , HMAC(tkP , nA,P||i-1) ] 














Figure 25: Call setup flow using Proxychain. For the first request (above dashed
line), the proxy must request a temporary credential from the database. Subsequent
requests (below dotted line) can be dealt with immediately by the proxy.
creates credentials based on the secret it shares with each user and determines the
credential’s parameters, including length, hash function, and expiration time. This
approach is more secure than the associated Digest authentication mechanism, as the
shared secret between the database and the user is never exposed to the proxies. A
compromise of one of these servers, therefore, does not necessarily require password
resets for large number of users.
Each proxy provides services only to users that are geographically close to it (i.e.,
based on IP address or ZIP code information), much like a traditional telephony
switch. Each proxy accordingly needs to store credentials for only a subset of the
total number of users in the system. We explore the overhead associated with such
credential storage in Section 5.3.2.
Figures 25 and 26 provide graphical and formal definitions of the Proxychain
protocol, respectively. A user Alice attempts to call Bob by first sending an INVITE
request to her proxy, which contains the source and destination of the call and a
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1. A → P : A,B, nA,P
2. P → D : A,P
3. D → P : H l(tkA), l, nD,A, nD,P , tkP
4. P → A : i, P, nD,A, nD,P ,HMAC(tkP , nA,P ||i)
5. A → P : A,B, i,HMAC(tkP , A||B||i), H i−1(tkA)
A,B, P,D : Alice, Bob, Proxy, Database
pwd : Shared secret (i.e., password) between Alice and database
nD,A, nD,P , nA,P : Nonces
l : Hash chain length
i : Hash chain current sequence number
H
i(x) : i-th hash value of x, H(H(...H(x )...))
HMAC(k, x) : HMAC with key k on x [18, 112]
tkA : PBKDF1(pwd, nD,A||P, c, len)
tkP : PBKDF1(pwd, nD,P ||P, c, len)
PBKDF1 : Password-Based Key Derivation Function with c iterations
and len bytes of output [105]
Figure 26: Proxychain protocol: The formal definition of the Proxychain protocol.
We assume that there exists an encrypted channel (e.g., IPsec connection) between
the proxy and the database.
nonce nA,P (Message 1). The proxy checks to see if it has a credential for Alice
and, if not, queries the authentication database with the identifiers corresponding to
Alice and the proxy (A,P ) for a new hash chain (Message 2). Note that requests
between proxies and the authentication database occur over a long-lived, encrypted
and authenticated channel such as IPsec or TLS/SSL. The database generates a five-
tuple that includes a new hash chain (H l(tkA)), the length of the hash chain l, nonces
for both the proxy and Alice (nD,P and nD,A), and a session key tkP (Message 3).
The hash chain secret tkA and the session key tkP are derived from the password
pwd Alice shares with the database. To offer resistance to offline dictionary attacks,
a Password-Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF1 [105]) is used with salt values
nD,A||P and nD,P ||P correspondingly. The number of iterations of the PBKDF1 (c)
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and the length of its output (len) are domain dependent parameters.
After receiving the tuple from the authentication database, the proxy returns
a 407 Proxy Authentication Required SIP message to Alice. This message in-
cludes a counter i ≤ l − 1, the proxy’s identifier P , the two nonces generated by
the authentication database (nD,P and nD,A) and a network authentication token
based on an HMAC function [18, 112]. The authentication token is computed as
HMAC(tkp, nA,P ||i) (Message 4). The client receives the response and uses Alice’s
password (pwd) to calculate the session key tkP and then authenticates the message
from the proxy. If the message authenticates properly, Alice then generates her ses-
sion key tkA and hashes it i − 1 times to generate H i−1(tkA). Alice responds to the
proxy by sending a new INVITE message containing A, B, i, HMAC(tkP , A||B||i)
and H i−1(tkA), which the proxy hashes forward a single time (assuming that the
HMAC properly verifies) (Message 5). If H(H i−1(tkA)) = H i(tkA), then the proxy
records H i−1(tkA) as the next legitimate credential, decrements i and the INVITE
request is forwarded to Bob (message 6). On subsequent authentication attempts
by Alice where c < i − 1, the proxy responds to Message 1 with Message 4, which
contains c, P, nD,A, nD,P ,HMAC(tkP , nA,P ||c).
Note that unlike Digest authentication, Proxychain provides mutual authentica-
tion. Specifically, the network authentication token HMAC(tkp, nA,P ||i) can only be
produced with knowledge of tkP and using the nonce supplied by the user Alice.
Moreover, because only the user and the authentication database could have created
tkP (because only they have knowledge of shared secret pwd), an adversary can not
create legitimate hash chains without the assistance of the authentication database.
5.3 Experimental Setup
In this section, we describe the experimental testbed and methodology we use to




Our experimental testbed is based on the VoIP infrastructure depicted in Figure 1,
Section 2.2.2. As this figure shows, the testbed is composed of three main components:
the authentication database, SIP proxies and the user clients (UAs). The database
and proxies are run on servers from the Georgia Tech Emulab testbed.1 We use seven
servers to represent the infrastructure (one database and six proxies). These servers
run Linux Kernel 2.6.26 (Fedora Release 8), have two 2.80 GHz Intel Xeon processors
and 512 MB of memory. The UAs are run on servers from our research lab. A total
of nine servers are used, each running multiple UA instances to generate call traffic.
These servers run Linux Kernel 2.6.24 (Ubuntu 8.04.2), eight (8) 2.00 GHz Quad-Core
AMD Opteron processors and 16 GB of memory.
The network latency between the proxies and the database is simulated using
Emulab’s traffic shaping functionality. In order to use realistic latency values, we
performed measurements using the Planetlab network testbed.2 Using the ping net-
work tool, we measured the round-trip time (RTT) between a Planetlab node located
in the University of Kansas and Planetlab nodes located at UC Berkeley (67.6 ms),
Georgia Tech (33.1 ms), MIT (44.7 ms), Princeton (43.8 ms), the University of Texas
(20.6 ms), and the University of Washington (43.4 ms). The RTT data was collected
during a 24 hours period and average values were calculated. Finally, no additional
latency values were simulated between the proxies and the UAs (latency was around
1 ms). The reason is that our testbed assumes physical proximity and low latency
values (e.g., < 10 ms) between the UAs and the proxies. Simulating this latency is
not necessary because it would not affect the test load generated by the UAs and our




The proxies are implemented using OpenSIPS3 1.5.2. OpenSIPS is a mature open
source SIP proxy optimized for high performance. The proxies are configured with
minimal functionality (stateless configuration and basic modules required for routing).
We run MySQL4 5.0.45 as our database, a well-known open source relational database
management system. MySQL is run with a default configuration (no optimizations).
Finally, SIPp5 3.1 is used to generate the UAs’ workload, which conforms to a uniform
random distribution. SIPp is an open source traffic generator for the SIP protocol.
A total of 36 SIPp instances are used in our experiments (18 UACs and UASs).
Default SIPp scenarios are modified to support INVITE and BYE authentication for
Digest and Proxychain authentication (SIP call flows in Figure 3, Section 2.2.3 and
Figure 25).
Each proxy serves requests for 200,000 unique users. The number of users per
proxy is limited by the proxy’s available memory, disk space in the database and the
size of authentication credentials (see Section 5.3.2). As a result, the total number of
users in the database is 1,200,000. All the users are part of a single SIP domain (no
inter-domain calls). The experiments are executed and controlled remotely using a
combination of Bash and Perl scripts. Metrics are gathered during the experiments
using several well-known open source tools (e.g., top, mpstat, and vmstat). Call
statistics are collected by the SIPp UAS instances.
5.3.2 Proxychain Implementation
Implementing Proxychain requires a combination of new code modules and modifi-
cations to existing software. In the proxies, OpenSIPS (≈ 320000 lines of code (loc))
required approximately 710 loc to support Proxychain. In the UAs, SIPp (≈ 3000





server application to handle queries from proxies and the associated cryptographic
operations. This server application required approximately 880 loc. The MySQL
database software itself was unmodified. All of our experimental code, which was
written in C, and supporting scripts are available at http://www.cc.gatech.edu/
~idacosta/proxychain.html
Proxychain uses the same SIP headers in the challenge and response messages.





where PC indicates the use of the Proxychain protocol, realm is proxy’s identifier,
i is the sequence number, nda and ndp are the nonces and hmac is the network
authentication token.





where response is the next value in the hash chain sequence. The other parameters
have the same meaning as in the Proxy-Authenticate header.
Our Proxychain implementation uses the MD5 hash function in order to compare
it more directly and fairly to Digest authentication6. Nevertheless, our code requires
6Note that reported MD5 collision vulnerabilities [195] do not affect the security of hash chains
and HMAC functions [190].
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few modifications to support SHA-1 or SHA-256. With MD5, the size of a temporary
authentication credential is 134 bytes. As a result, each proxy in our testbed requires
a minimum of 26 MB of free memory for serving 200,000 users. In addition, for
a direct comparison to Digest authentication, the PBKDF1 function was evaluated
with only one iteration (c = 1) and an output length of 16 bytes. The use of a
large number of iterations to defend against offline dictionary attacks will only add
additional processing time in the database and the UAs.
5.3.3 Methodology
We perform a number of different experiments in order to characterize Proxychain.
We specifically compare our protocol against a system with no authentication mecha-
nism and one using Digest authentication. We do not measure more computationally
expensive mechanisms such as TLS/SSL as previous studies have demonstrated that
they provide significantly lower throughput [134, 130, 41, 34]. We collect the following
metrics in most of our experiments: call throughput, message retransmissions, failed
calls, bandwidth utilization and database CPU utilization. These are global metrics,
the totals for the whole infrastructure (i.e., the call throughput is equal to the sum
of the call throughput measured in each proxy).
The call throughput refers to the number of successful calls per second (cps) mea-
sured every five seconds. Message retransmissions corresponds to the number of SIP
messages retransmitted due to the expiration of timers in the UAs. Our tests use
the default retransmission time defined by SIP standards (500 ms). Failed calls refer
to the total number of unsuccessful calls measured in the last period. In our ex-
periments, we consider only call failures due to maximum number of retransmissions
(maximum number of UDP retransmissions attempts has been reached). We use the
default values in SIPp for the maximum number of retransmissions: five for INVITE
messages and seven for others. Finally, bandwidth utilization corresponds to the total
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Table 3: Response computation time at the UA and verification time at the proxy
for Digest and Proxychain authentication. Proxychain adds little overhead to the
response computation and it is more efficient performing verifications.
Protocol Digest Stdev Proxychain Stdev
Response (µsec) 116.81 13.59 184.76 49.92
Verification (µsec) 197.24 21.51 66.97 15.07
Table 4: Time required by the database to compute credentials with different hash
chain lengths. For lengths < 100, the overhead is small.
Length 10 100 1000 10000
Time (µsec) 294.10 335.15 1383.53 11875.71
Stdev (µsec) 18.42 15.28 18.07 120.44
network throughput (KBytes/sec) measured from the database during each test.
During our experimental analysis, each test was run at least 10 times to ensure
the soundness of the results. Average values are used in our analysis and a 95%
confidence interval is provided in most of the graphs. Note that these bounds are




To understand the computational differences between Digest and Proxychain authen-
tication, we measure the time to compute a response in the UA and the time to
verify a response in the proxy. To measure these values, we use network traces (100
samples per value). For Proxychain, the measurements are performed the first time
a credential is used (hash chain length of 10). This corresponds to the worst case for
response computation because it requires the highest number of hash operations (9
operations).
Table 3 shows the results. The UA running Proxychain requires approximately
70 µsec of additional computation than one running Digest authentication. This
difference is due to the additional integrity checks and hash operations required by
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Proxychain in the UA. However, this difference is not significant as individual UAs do
not perform large amounts of computation in this system. Interestingly, the response
verification is nearly three times faster when Proxychain is used by the proxy. The
reason is that Proxychain only requires two hash operations to verify a response.
On the contrary, Digest authentication requires three hash operations and additional
checks to verify a response. Based on these results, we argue that the computational
overhead added by Proxychain is not significantly different from the one added by
Digest authentication.
We also evaluate the overhead of generating hash chains of varying lengths. Specif-
ically, we measure the time required by the authentication database to generate cre-
dentials of lengths 10, 100, 1000 and 10000. As before, we use network traces to
measure the time for each configuration (100 samples per configuration). Table 4
shows the results of these experiments. As expected, increasing the hash chain size
increases the time required to generate credentials. The additional time remains small
for hash chains with length up to 100 (< 350 µsec).
5.4.2 Call Throughput
Microbenchmarks provide insight into the overhead that can be expected at each
component of the network. However, they do not provide a picture of the overall be-
havior of a system. Accordingly, we characterize the interaction of those components
by measuring total call throughput. We compare throughput for systems configured
to use Digest authentication, Proxychain and no authentication mechanism. UAs
generate an increasing call load (270 cps increments every 5 seconds) over the course
of 10 minutes. In addition, we evaluate the best configuration for each protocol. For
Digest authentication, we use close to 100 concurrent proxy-processes per proxy. For
Proxychain, we preload each proxy with all its user credentials (200K credentials with

































Figure 27: Total call throughput for no, Digest and Proxychain authentication. Prox-
ychain’s maximum call throughput is close to the one obtained without authentica-
tion.
per proxy (OpenSIPS recommended value).
Figure 27 shows the results of these experiments. Without authentication (baseline
configuration), the network supports a maximum call throughput of nearly 24,000 cps.
When Digest authentication is used, the maximum call throughput drops dramatically
to approximately 1,160 cps. This result represents a 95% reduction in call throughput
when compared with the baseline configuration. For Proxychain, the result is more
favorable: a total call throughput of over 19,700 cps. In this case, the call throughput
drops by only 18% when compared with the baseline configuration. However, when
compared to Digest authentication, Proxychain allows an increase of over 1,700%
(more than an order of magnitude). Accordingly, Proxychain is significantly more
efficient than Digest authentication in this architecture.
Figure 28 provides insight into the poor performance of Digest authentication.
The database process rapidly reaches 175% CPU utilization (dual-core machine).
This behavior indicates that queries from the proxies saturate the authentication
database, making it a bottleneck. We observe the opposite when using Proxychain.
The database was virtually idle (< 5% CPU utilization) before the system reaches its


































Figure 28: Percentage of CPU required by the database process for Digest and Prox-
ychain authentication. The database process is virtually idle when Proxychain is
used.
high number of retransmissions.
A näıve solution to improve Digest authentication performance would be to use
a more powerful database. Therefore, we repeated the experiment using a quad-
processor server for the database. As expected, the maximum call throughput in-
creases, but only to approximately 4,000 cps. However, in this experiment the
database does not saturate – CPU utilization is below 300%. In this case, through-
put fails to increase further due to the network latency between the proxies and the
database.
Another important difference is the total bandwidth required for both configura-
tions. The message overhead between a UA and the proxy are arguably equivalent.
Message 4, the challenge, requires an additional 92 B and 165 B for Digest and Prox-
ychain authentication, respectively. The response in Message 5 similarly requires an
additional 199 B and 153 B. At its maximum call throughput (measured from the
database), Digest authentication required almost 130 and 430 KBytes/sec for queries
and responses respectively. In contrast, Proxychain required less than 1 KByte/sec
for both, queries and responses. As expected, the use of temporary credentials sig-
nificantly reduces the total number of queries to the database.
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The previous results also mean that increasing the hash chain length (>10) will
not help to improve performance in our testbed. The reason is that the load in the
database is already low with a hash chain length of 10. Using a longer size will make
the load even lower but the difference will not affect the overall performance of the
system. On the contrary, using hash chains that are too long could affect performance
because of the additional hash operations that will be needed by the UACs and the
database.
Finally, for the baseline and Proxychain configurations, the maximum call through-
put is limited by the proxy application itself: OpenSIPS. Analyzing the resources
usage statistics (memory, CPU and bandwidth) collected during the experiments for
the different testbed components, we find that none of the resources are completely
used (no shortage of resources) when the two configurations reach the maximum call
throughput. Based on this evidence and in our experience with OpenSIPS, we can
conclude that the OpenSIPS software is the performance bottleneck for no authenti-
cation and Proxychain configurations. Using an optimized version of OpenSIPS or a
faster proxy server application will provide higher call throughput values.
5.4.3 Scalability
In this set of experiments, we evaluate how the testbed handles an increasing number
of users, and therefore, an increasing load. To simulate a varying number of users, we
measure performance with a varying number of proxies, where each proxy represents
200,000 users. Using a similar procedure as in the previous test, we measure the call
throughput for 3, 4, 5 and 6 proxy configurations (600K, 800K, 1M and 1.2M users
respectively).
The results are presented in Figure 29. We can see that for Digest authentication,




































Figure 29: Throughput measured for a range of proxies using Digest and Proxychain
authentication. Proxychain is considerably more scalable than Digest authentication.
regression: y = −79.6x+1670.5, R2 = 0.848 7) for all the configurations. The reason
is that even for a three-proxy configuration, the database becomes saturated rapidly
(see previous test). Therefore, Digest authentication limits the scalability of the
system. For Proxychain, the maximum call throughput increases linearly with the
number of proxies (≈3,250 cps per proxy; linear regression: y = 3243.9x + 416.5,
R2 = 0.998). From these results, we can conclude that Proxychain allows the system
to grow by just adding new proxies and without requiring changes to the database.
5.4.4 Credential Preloading in the Proxies
In the previous tests, we evaluated Proxychain’s performance using a best-case sce-
nario: each proxy had all the credentials in memory before the tests started. We
now evaluate performance when a lower number of credentials are preloaded in each
proxy. For this purpose, we use a similar procedure as in previous tests but with two
exceptions. First, we use a constant workload of 10,000 cps with no ramp-up period.






















































































































































(d) 50K credentials (25%)
Figure 30: Call throughput measured for different number of credentials preloaded in
the proxies and a constant offered load (10K cps). Proxychain requires that proxies
have most of the credentials in memory for maximum performance.
Figure 30 shows the results for all the configurations. For the 200K configuration
(best-case, Figure 30a), the call throughput reaches 10,000 cps quickly (< 10 sec) with
virtually no message retransmissions or failed calls. For the 150K configuration (Fig-
ure 30b), the call throughput jumps to approximately 3,000 cps, and then continues
increasing until it reaches almost 10,000 cps by the end of the test. However, a large
number of retransmissions and failed calls occur. Finally, for the other two configu-
rations (Figures 30c and 30d), the behavior is worse. The maximum call throughput
measured was around 2,000 and 1,000 cps respectively during the experiments. The
number of retransmissions and failed calls is also constantly high. In theory, each
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Figure 31: Call setup time for four different configurations: no, Digest, Proxychain
and Proxychain with prefetching authentication. The call setup time for Proxychain
























































































configuration should have reached 10,000 cps after some period of time. However,
the large number of retransmissions makes the system unstable. These results show
the importance of having most of the credentials stored in the proxies to avoid the
negative effects of retransmissions, especially when high loads are expected.
5.4.5 Prefetching Mechanism
The previous test shows that Proxychain is more effective if each proxy has credentials
for almost all its users (best case scenario). However, credentials are stored or up-
dated in the proxy only after a user request that requires authentication. Therefore,
we implement a prefetching mechanism that automatically queries the database for
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credentials without requiring any user action. This mechanism, running as a separate
proxy process, checks if a user has a credential in the proxy or if her credential has
already expired (i.e., l = 0). In short, the prefetching mechanism guarantees the best
case scenario for Proxychain.
In this experiment, we characterize the effect of the prefetching mechanism on the
call setup time for individual UAs (time elapsed between the first INVITE request
and the 200 OK response). We use a UA sending a low load (< 5 cps) to a single
proxy and estimate the call setup time using network traces (100 samples). Four
proxy configurations are used: no authentication, Digest authentication, Proxychain
and Proxychain with prefetching.
Figure 31 shows the results for each configuration. As expected, when no authen-
tication is used (Figure 31a), the call setup is the fastest: 1.47 ms on average. For
Digest authentication (Figure 31b), we can observe the effects of the RTT between
the proxy and the database (≈33 ms) on the call setup time. Two call setup times
are measured: 36 and 71 ms approximately. The reason is that for the first value,
only one RTT is required during call setup, while for the second value, two RTTs are
required due to the low test load used (no TCP piggybacking). In general, only one
RTT is required, so we can assume that the call setup time for Digest authentica-
tion is approximately 36 ms. In the case of Proxychain, Figure 31c shows how the
temporary credentials reduced the call setup time while they are valid. While the
credentials are active (hash chain size > 0), the call setup time is only 2.27 ms on
average. Once a credential expires (hash chain size = 0), a query to the database is
required, so the call setup time increased by one RTT: 36.28 ms on average. When
Proxychain is used with prefetching (Figure 31d), the average call setup time is only
2.67 ms. The reason is that no credential updates are performed during call setups.
Instead, credentials are updated by the prefetching process automatically, before they






























Proxychain (INVITE and BYE)
Figure 32: Throughput for INVITE and INVITE and BYE Proxychain authentica-
tion. Proxychain allows authentication of two requests per call while still supporting
high throughput.
with prefetching is close to the call setup time when no authentication is used (≈1 ms
difference). Accordingly, prefetching helps to eliminate the effect of network latency
on call setup time.
5.4.6 Authenticating Multiple Message Types
In our final set of experiments, we explore the effect of authenticating multiple SIP
message types request per session (call dialog). For example, the lack of authentica-
tion of BYE requests allows several reported attacks against SIP deployments [207].
However, if BYE requests are also authenticated using Digest authentication, the per-
formance of the system will decrease even more due to the additional operations and
queries to the database. In this experiment, we evaluate the impact of authenticat-
ing INVITE and BYE requests on performance when Proxychain is used. We use a
similar procedure as in Section 5.4.2 (i.e., no prefetching). The only difference is that
the proxies and UACs are configured to authenticate BYE in addition to INVITE
requests.
Figure 32 shows the call throughput for the two configurations: INVITE and
“INVITE and BYE” Proxychain authentication. As expected, the maximum call
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throughput supported by the testbed decreases when two requests are authenticated
to approximately 12,000 cps. This represents a performance drop of nearly 50%.
The reason is that credentials are used faster (twice as fast) because two authentica-
tion operations are required per call, making the number of queries to the database
increase, resulting in higher CPU and bandwidth utilization. However, the use of
Proxychain to authenticate two types of signaling messages still provides over 800%
greater throughput than Digest authentication authenticating a single message.
Finally, we test if increasing the hash chain length improves the performance in
this scenario. The idea is that, if credentials are used faster when two requests per
call are authenticated, increasing the hash chain length should reduce how fast they
need to be replaced. This will result in lower load to the database and increased
throughput. The experiment confirms our hypothesis: using a hash chain length
of 20 results in a maximum call throughput of almost 14,000 cps. This represents
an improvement of almost 17% when compared to using hash chain length of 10.
However, increasing the hash chain length further does not improve performance. On
the contrary, the performance drops back to almost 12,000 cps with a hash chain
size of 30 (using a longer hash chain caused earlier retransmissions, which affects the
performance). The reason for these results is that we again reach the limits of the
proxy application. The call throughput achieved is lower because the authentication
of two requests involves additional messages and operations.
5.5 Discussion
5.5.1 Performance
The results presented in the previous section show that Proxychain effectively ad-
dresses the limitations of Digest authentication in VoIP topologies with a centralized
authentication service. Specifically, Proxychain reduces the effects of network latency,
allowing higher throughput. In our testbed, Proxychain’s performance improvement
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was enough to reach the limits imposed by the proxy application (OpenSIPS). More-
over, Proxychain reduces the load received by the database, improving scalability.
The caching of temporary authentication credentials across the proxies allows
our solution to perform so much better than Digest authentication. Not surpris-
ingly, cellular networks perform a similar distributed caching of credentials, which
are generated by a Home Location Register (HLR) and stored in the Mobile Switch-
ing Center/Visitor Location Register (MSC/VLR) closest to the client. However, the
Proxychain approach is more efficient in terms of memory. Specifically, the current
approach used in cellular networks requires that multiple credentials are stored in the
MSC/VLR per user. Should the authentication database (HLR) wish to reduce its
load, the proxies (MSC/VLRs) would need to be equipped with additional memory.
Because Proxychain authentication credentials require a constant amount of memory
regardless of the hash chain length, our approach is also more scalable than traditional
caching. This property is particularly advantageous as it allows for more dynamic
behavior by the infrastructure. For example, a database could monitor the received
load and automatically increase the length of the hash chains in response to a spike
in the load (e.g., busy hours, DoS attack or a flash crowd). We plan to explore such
dynamic reprovisioning in future work.
The performance gains obtained in our experiments are based on the assumption
that each proxy has most of its users’ credentials most of the time. We also assumed
that each proxy has a fixed set of registered users and that users do not register
with other proxies often (e.g., traveling to another state). These assumptions can be
relaxed by providing additional cache space in the proxies. For example, each proxy
will have a cache of fixed size, and keep in the cache the credentials of the most active
users. When new users register with a proxy, the proxy can use an eviction policy
to replace the credentials in the cache based on frequency of use. In this way, each
proxy could handle a variable number of users (more flexibility). This approach will
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be evaluated in future work.
The call throughput numbers achieved in our testbed could be considered high for
commercial VoIP deployments. For example, AT&T average nationwide call volume
is estimated to be around 300M calls per day, or an average of 3,472 cps [70], or
roughly 17% of the throughput provided by our architecture. We note that while our
testbed lacks some of the other functionality that a provider may chose to deploy (e.g.,
billing, media gateways), the performance benefits provided by Proxychain represent
a significant potential improvement to real networks. Specifically, the additional
capacity offered by Proxychain can serve as a defense mechanism to handle unexpected
increments of requests for service.
The performance gains obtained by Proxychain requires some trade-offs. First, a
proxy using Proxychain requires to keep a small amount of state for all its users (cre-
dentials), which is not necessary for Digest authentication. However, our experiments
demonstrated that this was not a significant burden. UACs also need to perform more
authentication operations when Proxychain is used. Specifically, Proxychain requires
additional integrity checks and hash chain computations are required to create a
response. Nevertheless, the most expensive operations are hash computations that
are in general very efficient to execute. In addition, the use of adequate hash chain
lengths (i.e., < 100) and caching intermediate results in the UAC can reduce these
overheads. Third, the database also requires to perform computation to create the
user credentials. However, this is a one-time cost and it is lower than processing an
equivalent number of requests per user as in Digest authentication.
In general, any SIP infrastructure with multiple proxies and a remote central
authentication service will benefit from Proxychain, even if the performance require-
ments are not carrier-level. For example, the SIP infrastructure of a multinational
corporation where each regional office has a SIP proxy and the central database is lo-
cated in the headquarters. The use of Proxychain in this scenario will reduce the load
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to the database (lower bandwidth and CPU utilization) and provide more security.
As our results shows, the main requirement is to cache the credentials of most of the
users (e.g., > 75%) served by each proxy. This is not a hard requirement given the
size of the credentials and the memory costs. Even in environments with high mo-
bility requirements, caching the credentials of all the users in all the proxies or using
caching algorithms are reasonable options. Finally, the concepts behind Proxychain
can also be used in other domains with similar topology requirements. For example,
remote authentication services such as RADIUS or DIAMETER, or authentication
in IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) deployments could benefit from the performance,
scalability and security advantages offered by Proxychain.
5.5.2 Security and Threat Analysis
Proxychain provides the security guarantees described in Section 5.2.1. To provide
authenticity and integrity protection, Proxychain uses one-time authentication tokens
based on a hash chain and a HMAC function. The HMAC value in the challenge
message (message 4 in Figure 25) protects the integrity of the hash chain counter (i).
Moreover, this HMAC also provides proxy authentication because it demonstrates
that the proxy knows the session key (tkP ). In the response message (message 5 in
Figure 25), another HMAC is used not only to protect the integrity of the hash chain
counter but also the source and destination addresses of the SIP request. Therefore,
even if an adversary intercepts a response message and prevents it from reaching the
proxy, the adversary cannot modify it to authenticate a different SIP request.
User authentication is not only achieved with the HMAC but also by including the
next unused hash chain value (H i−1(tkA)) in the response message. These values au-
thenticate the user because they demonstrate knowledge of the user’s password. Due
to the one-way property of cryptographically secure hash functions, it is computa-
tionally infeasible for an adversary to reverse the hash function and obtain an earlier
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value of the chain or the chain’s secret (tkA). Moreover, HMAC is UF-CMA secure, as
any PRF (Pseudo-Random Function) MAC is also UF-CMA [17] (HMAC was proven
to be a PRF [16]). UF-CMA security provides strong guarantees that an adversary
with reasonable resources will not be able to forge a valid HMAC without knowledge
of the user’s password or the session key. In is important to note that, while hash
functions such as MD5 and SHA-1 are no longer considered secure due to reported
collision attacks [195, 194], they can still be used in HMAC functions because HMAC
does not require collision resistance for its formal security proof [16, 190]. However,
it is recommended to use a more robust underlying hash function such as SHA-256
in new protocols, as MD5 and SHA-1 support will decrease.
As described before, Proxychain provides mutual authentication. Proxychain au-
thenticates not only the proxy’s challenge (server authentication) but also the UA’s
response (user authentication). This property provides stronger resistance to threats
such as replay, server spoofing and man-in-the-middle attacks. In addition, the mu-
tual authentication guarantees provided by Proxychain are less expensive and easier
to implement than the ones provided by protocols such as TLS or IPsec.
To prevent session hijacking attacks, each authentication token (i.e., HMAC and
hash chain value) are tied to a particular user request; thus, an adversary cannot
modify or use a valid token to authenticate arbitrary requests. Proxychain also pre-
vents replay attacks of both the challenge and the response message. The freshness
of the proxy’s challenge is guaranteed by the nonce nA,P , included in the initial user
request (message 1 in Figure 25). The freshness of the UA’s response is guaranteed
by the hash chain value attached. Once a hash chain value is successfully validated
by the proxy, it cannot be used again; thus, preventing replay attacks.
To mitigate the risks of offline dictionary attacks, Proxychain derives the session
key (tkP ) and hash chain secret (tkA) from the user’s password via a Password-Based
Key Derivation Function (PBKDF1 [105]). Such a function performs a large number
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of cryptographic operations (e.g., hash or HMAC) to derive a key from the user’s
password. The additional computation time reduces the speed of offline dictionary
attacks; thus, making such attacks more difficult. The number of operations required
by the PBKDF varies according to the scenario and adversarial model. Moreover,
the use of salt values in the PBKDF prevents the use of precomputed tables of hash
values (i.e., rainbow tables) commonly used in dictionary attacks. In addition, the
SIP provider should enforce strong password policies to provide additional defense
against dictionary attacks.
An active attacker could try to compromise a proxy and steal its cached creden-
tials. However, Proxychain credentials cannot be used to impersonate users (another
advantage of hash chains). Instead, stolen Proxychain credentials could only be used
to impersonate the proxy to the users due to the session key included in the creden-
tials. In this scenario, only mutual authentication will be affected, resulting in the
same security level provided by Digest authentication or S/Key (no server authenti-
cation). Therefore, an attacker will still need considerable effort to impersonate users
even if she manages to steal the credentials cached by the proxy. While not imple-
mented in our testbed, Proxychain can also include a revocation mechanism where
the database can invalidate the credentials cached in a proxy. This mechanism will
be useful in situations where a user needs to change her password or when a proxy
has been compromised.
Proxychain not only offers the security advantages of hash chains protocols (i.e.,
protection against eavesdropping and replay attacks), but also solves some of the
weaknesses associated with these protocols [135]. For example, as mentioned before,
Proxychain protects the integrity of the hash chain counter in both the challenge
and response messages. This feature protects against an attacker located between
the proxy and the client trying to change the counter (i) in the challenge to a lower
value (i = 1) to obtain the complete hash chain sequence (i.e., small n attack [106])
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In addition, Proxychain does not require hash chain synchronization8 as S/Key does.
The reason is that the hash chains are generated based on a secret derived from users’
passwords.
Finally, Proxychain makes SIP authentication cheap enough to authenticate more
than one message per session. Authenticating more SIP messages per session pro-
vides protection against several known attacks that target current SIP deployments.
From the security perspective, all the messages should be authenticated to avoid
vulnerabilities. Proxychain represents a first step in this direction.
5.5.3 Availability
The availability of the database is critical in scenarios with a central authentication
service. For example, if the database becomes unavailable, the proxies will be unable
to authenticate UAs requests. As a result, no call sessions can be established until
the database is back online. This risk can be mitigated through mechanisms such as
high availability clusters or backup sites. However, these alternatives are typically
expensive and complex to manage.
Proxychain offers a cheaper alternative for database outages. The idea is that the
database can create a list of authentication credentials with long enough hash chains
and no expiration time. These backup-credentials can be stored offline in each proxy
location and be activated when the database is not available. Once each proxy loads
the backup-credentials in memory, they will be able to authenticate UA requests as
long as the credentials are active (sequence counter > 0). A näıve approach would
be to generate backup-credentials with uniformly long hash chains (i.e., length =
1,000) to reduce the risks of users finishing their credentials before the database
is back online. However, this approach is inefficient because very long hash chains
will cause unnecessary overheads in the database and the UAs and lower performance
8Setting a new hash chain once the current one expires, using a secure secondary channel.
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during their generation. A more efficient approach would be to estimate the necessary
length of the hash chains based on the expected time that the database is going to
be unavailable. For example, a provider needs to install new hardware, requiring the
database to be offline. The provider can estimate how many authenticated requests
occur in a period of six hours based on its call statistics. For example, the provider
can determine the call rate of its most active users. Assuming that the most active
users make 10 calls per hour during busy hours, backup-credentials with a hash chain
length of at least 60 will be required (also assuming that only one request per call is
authenticated). Using Table 3, we know that the time to compute one credential with
hash chain length = 100 is approximately 335 µsecs. Therefore, if the provider has 5
million users, the database will require approximately 28 minutes of computation to
generate backup-credentials that will be active during 6 hours. This simple calculation
could be made more robust by identifying those users most likely to far exceed the
uses of the temporary credentials (i.e., profiling via long-term logging) and selectively
increase the length of their hash chains.
5.6 Summary
VoIP has and will continue to change telephony. These systems not only drastically
reduce the costs associated with building and providing such services, but also offer
the potential for rich new sets of features. Unfortunately, the large-scale usage of
VoIP also creates a number of new security concerns. In this chapter, we develop
Proxychain, a mechanism that provides strong authentication between VoIP providers
and their customers. Unlike previously deployed mechanisms, Proxychain is highly
scalable and offers throughput improvements of greater than an order of magnitude.
This increased efficiency allows providers not only to support a much larger customer
base on a relatively limited hardware footprint, but also increases the overall security
of the network by allowing for multiple message types to be authenticated. In so
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doing, we have significantly increased the robustness of VoIP systems.
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CHAPTER VI
ONE-TIME COOKIES: ROBUST AND EFFICIENT HTTP
SESSION AUTHENTICATION VIA STATELESS
AUTHENTICATION TOKENS
In Chapters 4 and 5 we studied the challenges associated with the development of
robust authentication protocols for large-scale VoIP applications. In this and the
following chapters we will explore similar challenges in large-scale Web applications
(see Section 2.3), a more widespread class of Internet applications.
Web applications rely primarily on the HTTP protocol (see Section 2.3.2) to
communicate with clients (i.e., browsers). Browsers use HTTP to requests and receive
resources from the web application’s servers (i.e., web servers). However, HTTP is a
stateless protocol. Requests to a web server are treated as independent transactions
with no relation to each other. While simple and scalable, this design is not adequate
for web applications that require sessions – the association of multiple transactions
to a single user (e.g., online banking and e-commerce applications). HTTP cookies
(see Section 2.3.5), small pieces of data that keep session state information in the
browser, were designed to address this limitation and rapidly became the dominant
mechanism for HTTP session management.
Although cookies are a practical and efficient mechanism for session management,
they introduce a number of security risks, especially when employed as session au-
thentication tokens – a function for which they were not specifically designed [73]. For
example, most web applications rely on the security provided by HTTPS to protect
the user’s password during the login process. During this step, the web application
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generates cookies that the user can later employ as lightweight session authentica-
tion tokens. However, due to performance concerns, many web applications switch
to HTTP after the user logs in and cookies are transmitted “in the clear”. As a
result, cookies are exposed to any adversary eavesdropping on the communication.
Because cookies are static, an adversary can use them to gain unauthorized access
to the user’s session. While these session hijacking or “sidejacking” attacks are not
new, a significant number of web applications are still vulnerable [187, 191]. Several
factors such as the proliferation of open wireless networks and the release of auto-
mated attack tools [86, 31, 153, 110] have increased the risk of this threat. The most
recommended defense is to use HTTPS to protect all communications with the web
application (“always-on HTTPS”). However, deploying always-on HTTPS can be
challenging due to performance and financial concerns, particularly for distributed
systems. More importantly, always-on HTTPS is not a complete solution; cookies
can still be exposed due to configuration errors [120] or by attacks against HTTPS
[46] and the browser [79]. In short, always-on HTTPS does not address the root cause
of the problem: cookies are weak session authenticators.
More robust alternatives to authentication cookies have been proposed [150, 24, 7,
39] (see Section 3.2.1). However, they have not been adopted due to their additional
requirements and complexity. Specifically, most of these alternatives require state in
the web server. This is a problem for highly distributed web applications because this
state needs to be synchronized among servers in different geographic locations (see
Section 2.3.1). Thus, the effect of network latency will not only make synchroniza-
tion operations more expensive, but will also cause valid requests to be denied due
to “out-of-sync” state. Web 2.0 applications are particularly affected by this problem
due to their higher request concurrency. In short, proposed alternatives to authenti-
cation cookies fail to address the operational requirements of highly distributed Web
2.0 applications and, as result, have not been deployed.
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In this chapter, we present One-Time Cookies (OTC), a more secure alternative
to authentication cookies that does not require state in the web application. Instead
of using a single, static token to authenticate each request, OTC generates a unique
token per request based on a session key. Each OTC token is tied to a particular
request by using a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC); hence, an
adversary cannot reuse OTC tokens to illicitly redirect a session. To avoid state
in the web application, OTC borrows the concept of Kerberos service tickets [142].
Like in Kerberos, an OTC session ticket contains the information the web application
needs to verify an OTC token (i.e., session key), encrypted with a master key only
known by the web application. Thus, any web application’s server can verify OTC
tokens without keeping any volatile data, one of the main barriers for deploying
alternatives to cookies in highly distributed systems. Unlike cookies, OTC credentials
are also securely stored and isolated from other browser components. We evaluate our
proposed mechanism and demonstrate an overhead similar to the insecure traditional
cookie approach. In summary, OTC preserves the performance and scalability benefits
of cookies while providing stronger security guarantees.
We strongly believe that OTC raises the bar against real threats, but are care-
ful not to over claim the guarantees that OTC can provide. Specifically, while our
approach efficiently eliminates session hijacking attacks by ensuring session integrity
(i.e., the integrity of navigation requests), it does not provide confidentiality or full
integrity protection for the information exchanged between the browser and the web
application. If these additional security guarantees are required, OTC can be used to-
gether with always-on HTTPS; OTC and HTTPS are complementary security mech-
anisms. OTC’s main goal is to replace cookies as session authenticators, with a
performance-conscious solution that can be deployed across traditional and highly
distributed web applications. In so doing, we make the following contributions:
• Designing and implementing a more secure and stateless alternative
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to authentication cookies: We identify key properties required to achieve
a robust and practical alternative to authentication cookies. Based on these
properties, we develop a protocol that prevents adversaries from successfully
replaying captured authentication tokens to gain unauthorized control of a web
session. Most importantly, our protocol does not require expensive state syn-
chronization across the web application unlike previously proposed mechanisms,
making it appropriate for highly distributed Web 2.0 applications. We imple-
mented a proof-of-concept plugin for the popular blogging platform WordPress
and extensions for both Firefox and Firefox for mobile browsers, demonstrat-
ing the deployability of our solution. However, we ultimately envision such
mechanisms being included in the browser itself.
• Conducting an extensive analysis on multiple platforms: We perform
extensive performance tests based on our OTC implementation, including desk-
top and mobile clients. Our experiments show that OTC and cookies have
similar performance in both the web application and the browser. For example,
the overall latency added by OTC to a WordPress page request was less than
6 ms when compared to cookies. We also apply ProVerif [21, 22] to formally
verify the security properties of the OTC protocol.
• Making our OTC implementation available to the community: The
WordPress OTC plugin and the OTC extensions for Firefox and Firefox mobile
are already available online at: http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~idacosta/otc/.
Any WordPress-based web site can incorporate OTC in matter of minutes and
point their users to either the desktop or mobile Firefox extensions.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.1 offers important
background information about session hijacking attacks and presents our motivation;

























Figure 33: Simplified view of a session hijacking attack. (1) After login, the victim
sends requests to the web application using a cookie for authentication. (2) Because
this request is sent over HTTP, an adversary can eavesdrop the request and capture
the cookie. (3) Finally, the adversary can use this cookie to send arbitrary requests
to the web application, successfully hijacking the victim’s session.
security analysis of OTC; Section 6.4 presents our experimental testbed, tests and
results; Section 6.5 offers additional analysis and discussion of our proposed solution;
Section 6.6 provides a summary of our work.
6.1 The Session Hijacking Threat
By design, HTTP cookies are static (see Chapter 2.3.5); they do not change during
their lifetime. Hence, if an adversary steals authentication cookies, she will be able
to impersonate the user associated with these cookies. This type of attack is known
as session hijacking or sidejacking because the adversary takes control of the user’s
session.
Figure 33 shows a simplified view of a session hijacking attack. After logging in,
the victim uses an authentication cookie (SID) on each request to the web application
(step 1). As it commonly happens, the cookie is sent unprotected across the network
and it is captured by an adversary eavesdropping on the communication (step 2).
109
For example, the adversary can use an automated tool such as FireSheep [31] for
this attack. Finally, the adversary can use the stolen authentication cookie to make
arbitrary requests to the web application as the user (step 3), until the cookie expires.
It is important to note that the stolen cookie will remain valid even if the victim logs
out of the web application. Cookies are stateless; therefore, the web application
cannot revoke them (the web application could change the key(s) used to create the
cookies, but that will revoke the cookies for all users).
Session hijacking attacks are not new; however, several factors have increased the
risk of this threat. First, the increasing popularity and importance of web applications
makes them a valuable target. Google, for example, was forced to improve the security
of Gmail due to several incidents against its users in China [171, 35]. Second, the
proliferation of wireless networks, particularly open Wi-Fi access points (e.g., airports,
libraries, stores) increases the risk of these types of attacks. Third, the release of
several automated, easy-to-use tools to perform session hijacking [86, 31, 153, 110]
has brought session hijacking to the masses. For example, FireSheep [31], the most
popular of such tools, has been downloaded almost two million times since its release
in December 2010.
Cookies include an expiration time to reduce the window of opportunity for a
session hijacking attack. However, many web applications use long expiration times
(e.g., from hours to weeks if the “remember me” option is used) to avoid affecting user
experience. This approach reduces the effectiveness of the expiration time against
session hijacking. Cookies could also employ other alternatives to guarantee their
freshness such as nonces (e.g., a challenge-response protocol) or counters (e.g., one-
time password mechanisms such as HOTP [138]). While these mechanisms are more
robust against session hijacking than timestamps (i.e., expiration time), they require
additional messages per request or additional state in the web application.
110
Several alternative mechanisms have been proposed to defend against session hi-
jacking attacks (see Section 3.2.1). However, most of these alternatives are not ad-
equate for highly-distributed web applications, in particular due to the high costs
of state synchronization in these applications (see Section 2.3.1). Instead, always-on
HTTPS is the alternative often preferred. Unfortunately, always-on HTTPS can be
difficult to deploy, particularly in large web applications not originally designed for
such a requirement. Always-on HTTPS not only affects performance (e.g., additional
cryptographic overhead, web-caching mechanisms do not work with HTTPS) but also
impacts existing functionality (e.g., virtual hosting, applications [80], network content
filtering [155]). In addition, even with always-on HTTPS, authentication cookies can
be exposed accidentally [74, 43, 120] or stolen by attacking HTTPS [154, 46, 37, 165].
Moreover, HTTPS only protects cookies on the network. An adversary can also
steal cookies from the user’s computer through many different attacks (e.g., cross-site
scripting [103], cross-site tracing [87] and related-domain [25] attacks).
In summary, the simple design of cookies makes them vulnerable to session hijack-
ing. Although authentication cookies are a shared secret between the browser and
the web application, they are treated as standard cookies and can be easily disclosed.
Consequently, additional protection mechanisms are required to safeguard authenti-
cation cookies while traveling on the network and while stored in the browser. This
additional protection adds complexity to the security architecture of web applications.
6.2 One-Time Cookies: A Robust and Stateless Session
Authentication Protocol
We propose an alternative mechanism to replace cookies as session authentication to-
kens. Our solution, One-Time Cookies (OTC), provides robust defense against session
hijacking while complying with the requirements of highly distributed applications.




Our scenario consists of a highly-distributed web 2.0 application, as described in
Section 2.3.1. In such scenario, state synchronization among the web application’s
servers is expensive due to the high network latencies. We assume that all the servers
share a long-term secret key that is changed with low frequency (e.g., monthly). This
key is equivalent to the key used to generate and verify authentication cookies.
The adversary’s goal is to take control of users’ sessions with the web application.
OTC assumes two types of polynomial-time adversaries (PPT): passive and active.
A passive adversary has access to all the information exchanged between the browser
and the web application. She can access this information directly from the network
(online) or from network logs (offline). Based on this information, the passive ad-
versary will try to fabricate or reuse authentication tokens to hijack a user’s session.
An active adversary has the same access to information as the passive one, but in
addition, this adversary can actively modify the requests and responses exchanged
between the browser and the web application. For example, the active adversary can
modify, create and prevent messages from reaching their destination. In addition, an
active adversary can execute application level attacks against the browser and the
web application, including cross-site scripting (XSS), cross-site tracing (XST) and
session fixation attacks. An active adversary can also try phishing attacks to steal
OTC tokens or try to steal the OTC’s persistent storage file from the user’s com-
puter. We do not consider attacks where the adversary takes control of the user’s
browser or OS (e.g., by exploiting a buffer overflow or through malware) or attacks
that compromise the web application infrastructure. Moreover, OTC does not defend
against denial of service attacks.
OTC relies on HTTPS to protect the setup of its credentials during the user
login. Therefore, OTC assumes that HTTPS is established correctly and in a secure
way. We do not consider attacks that break the confidentiality guarantees offered by
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HTTPS during user login. If such attacks were possible, the adversary could also steal
the user’s password – a more valuable credential. However, we do consider attacks
against HTTPS connections established after user login.
Based on this threat model, OTC should provide the following security guarantees.
First, OTC should offer authenticity and integrity protection to each request sent by
the browser to the web application (i.e., user authentication). For this purpose, OTC
should rely on a Message Authenticated Code (MAC) primitive that meets the stan-
dard notion of unforgeability under chosen-message attack (UF-CMA [77]). Second,
OTC tokens should be inherently resistant to session hijacking and replay attacks;
additional security mechanisms should not be required to protect requests against
such attacks. Third, OTC should not reveal sensitive information (e.g., encryption
keys, usernames). For this purpose, OTC should rely on a secure, non-malleable
symmetric encryption scheme that meets the standard notion of indistinguishability
under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA [78]). Finally, OTC credentials should be
securely stored and manipulated in the browser.
6.2.2 Desired Protocol Properties
We identified properties required to achieve a robust and practical alternative to
authentication cookies. We then used these properties to design OTC:
• Session Integrity: the proposed mechanism should provide robust client-side ses-
sion authentication and it should be inherently secure against session hijacking
(i.e., no additional protection mechanisms should be required).
• Statelessness: the proposed mechanism should not require additional state in
the web application for request verification. In other words, it should not be
different from authentication cookies in terms of server state requirements. As
described in Section 2.3.1, this property is critical for highly distributed web
applications.
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• Robustness: the proposed mechanism should generate authentication tokens
with strong confidentiality and integrity guarantees. In particular, authentica-
tion tokens should not leak information that compromises the security of the
web application, should be resistant to cryptanalysis attacks (e.g., volume at-
tacks) and should be tamper-evident.
• Performance and Scalability: the proposed mechanism should be as efficient
and scalable as authentication cookies. Web application’s performance and
scalability should not be affected.
• Secure storage: the proposed mechanism should store authentication creden-
tials securely in the browser. In particular, authentication credentials should
be isolated from other browser components and functionality. For example,
credentials should have similar protection as passwords and private keys. Any
persistent storage should be protected with encryption.
• Deployability: the proposed mechanism should require minimal changes in the
browser and the web application. No additional hardware or software should
be required. In addition, it should be easy to configure in both the browser and
the web application.
• Usability: the proposed mechanism should provide a similar user experience to
cookies. No additional user interaction should be required. In general, the user
experience should not change after upgrading from authentication cookies to
OTC.
• Concurrency: the proposed mechanism should work with web applications that
have high request concurrency (e.g., AJAX). Thus, authentication tokens should
be independent of each other (i.e., avoid serialization).
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• Browser support: The proposed mechanism should be implemented as part of
the browser (core component or extension) to provide adequate security and
functionality guarantees. This property is important because the mechanism
requires access to every HTTP request the browser sends to the web application.
6.2.3 Protocol Description
OTC creates a unique token per request. Each token is bound to a particular request
by using a session secret; thus, a token cannot be reused for different requests. In
addition, OTC borrows the concept of tickets from Kerberos [142] to store the state
information required to validate the token. Each ticket is encrypted with a long-
term key shared among all the web application’s servers (kw).1 Hence, only the web
application’s servers can access the information stored in the ticket. The user never
has access to the contents of this ticket. We define credentials as the values stored
in the browser and tokens as the values attached to each request. OTC tokens are
created based on the OTC credentials stored in the browser.
Figure 34 shows how OTC credentials are established and used. During user login
(message 1), the browser sends the user’s ID (uid) and password (pwd) to the web
application. In addition, the browser includes a special HTTP header field: X-OTC.
This header field indicates that the browser supports OTC session authentication and
the OTC protocol version (v). After successful user authentication, the web applica-
tion checks if the X-OTC header field is present in the request. If the field is present,
the web application generates OTC credentials for the newly created session. The
OTC credentials consist of the credentials’ ID (cid), credentials’ scope (domain and
path), a session nonce (ns), a session key (ks), a session expiration time (ts) and a
session ticket (E(kw ⊕ ns, cid|uid|ks|ts)). The cid, domain and path parameters are
used in scenarios where the web application requires more than one set of credentials
1Recall that distributed web servers already often share a single key for validating traditional
authentication cookies, so we are not requiring any additional state.
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Web App
POST login.php HTTP/1.1 [ {uid, pwd}, X-OTC:v ]
HTTP/1.1 200 OK [ X-OTC-SET: cid, domain, path, ns, ks, ts, 
E(kw!ns,  cid | uid | ks | ts) ]             
GET private.php HTTP/1.1 [ X-OTC: cid, ns, th, HMAC(ks, url | th | data),
 E(kw!ns,  cid | uid | ks | ts) ]







uid, pwd : user ID and password
ks, ns : session key, session nonce
kw : web application long-term key
ts, th : session and token expiration times
url : url of the requested resource
data : POST form data
v : OTC protocol version
cid : OTC credential’s ID
domain, path : OTC credential’s scope
E(k, x) : symmetric encryption of x with key k
HMAC(x) : cryptographic hash-based message
authentication code of x
X-OTC : HTTP header fields for exchanging
OTC protocol information
Figure 34: Flow diagram of a web session using OTC. Messages 1 and 2 represent the
user login transaction and require HTTPS protection. After user login, HTTPS is op-
tional; each browser request includes a unique OTC token (message 3) to authenticate
the request.
per user. For example, the web application may require one set of OTC credentials
for basic operations and another set for administrative operations (see Section 6.4 for
an example). If the X-OTC header field is not present in the browser request, the
web application could switch to standard authentication cookies or halt the commu-
nication and notify the user that OTC support is mandatory.
The web application sends the OTC credentials to the browser (message 2) using
a special HTTP header field: X-OTC-SET. The credentials are sent over the same
HTTPS channel used to protect the user’s password. Once received, the browser
stores the credentials in protected storage, isolated from other browser components.
On every request that matches the credential’s scope, the browser attaches an
OTC token using the X-OTC header field (message 3). The OTC token consists
of the credential’s ID (cid), the session nonce (ns), the token’s expiration time (th),
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a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC(ks, url|th|data)) and the corre-
sponding session ticket (E(kw ⊕ns, cid|uid|ks|ts)). The HMAC computation includes
the request’s URL (url), the token’s expiration time (th) and any web form informa-
tion (data) included in POST requests (GET requests’ parameters are included in the
URL). The OTC token is stateless; the ticket contains all the information required
by the web application to validate the HMAC (statelessness property, Section 6.2.2).
In addition, OTC-tokens are self-contained; thus, they can be verified independently.
This property guarantees that OTC tokens can be used in web applications with high
concurrency (e.g., AJAX) (concurrency property, Section 6.2.2).
After receiving the request, the web application validates it using the attached
OTC token. First, the web application verifies that the token has not expired (i.e.,
checks th). Then, it uses the long-term key (kw) and the session nonce (ns) to decrypt
the session ticket. If the decryption is successful, the web application validates that
the ticket has not expired (i.e., checks ts) and that the credentials’ ID (cid) and user’s
ID (uid) belong to the current session. Next, the web application computes a new
HMAC using the session key ks and the information in the request (url, data). It
then compares the newly computed HMAC with the HMAC included in the OTC
token. If the values match, the request is accepted and the web application returns
the requested resource with a 200 OK HTTP status code (message 4). If the HMAC
values do not match or if any of the previous checks fail, the request is denied and
the web application redirects the browser to the login page.
The session continues until the session ticket expires (based on ts) or the user
explicitly logs off. To log off, the browsers send a request to the web application with
its corresponding OTC token (not shown in Figure 34). The web application verifies
the token and sends back a new X-OTC-SET header that only includes an HMAC of
the value zero (0) using the session key (HMAC(ks, 0)). This HMAC indicates the
browser to delete the OTC credentials for this domain (browser enforced policy). By
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including this HMAC value, OTC prevents the arbitrary deletion or modification of
the OTC credentials via spoofed server responses.
6.3 OTC Security Analysis
6.3.1 Informal Analysis
To provide authenticity and integrity protection to user’s requests, a browser sup-
porting OTC signs each request with the session secret (ks), instead of just attaching
it to the requests (as cookies do). Thus, the browser never sends the session secret
over the network, reducing its exposure to adversaries. The session secret is generated
by the web application’s server after successfully validating the identity of the user
during the login process. The session secret has long entropy (e.g., 128 random bits)
to defend against offline brute force attacks. The server then sends the secret to the
browser across the network in response to the login request (message 2 in Figure 34).
Therefore, the session secret is protected by the SSL/TLS connection established to
protect the user login process. As stated before, OTC assumes that this SSL/TLS
connection is correctly established during user login, otherwise an adversary could
capture the user’s password.
User’s requests are signed using a HMAC function [18, 112] and the session secret.
As specified in Section 6.2.1, HMAC is UF-CMA secure (HMAC was proven to be a
PRF [16] and any PRF MAC is also UF-CMA [17]). This provides formal guarantees
that an adversary with reasonable resources will not be able to fabricate or modify
OTC tokens without knowledge of the session secret. In is important to note that,
while hash functions such as MD5 and SHA-1 are not longer considered secure due to
reported collision attacks [195, 194], they can still be used in HMAC functions because
HMAC does not require collision resistance for its formal security proof [16, 190].
However, it is recommended that a more robust underlying hash function such as
SHA-256 be used in new protocols, as MD5 and SHA-1 support will decrease.
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The inclusion of the token’s expiration time (th) guarantees that each HMAC
value is unique, even for identical requests. Thus, the HMAC makes each OTC token
unique and ties each token to a particular request. As a result, an adversary (active
or passive) will not be able to reuse captured OTC tokens for arbitrary requests; thus,
preventing session hijacking attacks (session integrity property, Section 6.2.2).
An active adversary could still try to resend a previously observed request (i.e.,
replay attack). However, the adversary is limited to replay exactly the same request;
she cannot modify the request’s payload because it is protected by the HMAC. To
make this attack even more difficult, OTC tokens also include an expiration time (th).
The token’s expiration time should have a shorter duration than the session expiration
time (ts). For example, ts = 1 hour and th = 30 seconds. This approach significantly
reduces the window of opportunity for a replay attack. To avoid time synchronization
problems, both ts and th should be computed based on the web application’s clock.
OTC tokens include a encrypted ticket with the information that a server requires
(e.g., session secret, username) to verify the authenticity and integrity of the user
request; thus, avoiding additional state in the server. This information is encrypted
using a symmetric encryption scheme based on AES as block cipher and Cipher-
block chaining (CBC) or Counter (CTR) encryption modes with random initialization
vectors (IV). Both encryption schemes are IND-CPA secure; thus, providing strong
confidentiality guarantees for the data included in the session ticket. In addition, to
increase the difficulty of cryptanalysis attacks, the session tickets are encrypted with
a salted version of the long term key kw (i.e., kw ⊕ ns). Thus, by using the session
nonce ns as a salt for kw, each session ticket is always encrypted with a different (but
related) key.
To hijack a session using OTC, an adversary needs to learn kw or ks. We assume
that kw is securely protected by the web application. Thus, it is more likely that
an adversary will try to obtain ks by stealing the OTC credentials from the user’s
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browser - the only place where ks is stored. However, OTC credentials are isolated
from other browser components by default. In addition, OTC’s persistent storage
is protected by encryption. Therefore, none of the known cookie-theft attacks are
likely to succeed in stealing OTC credentials (secure storage and browser support
properties, Section 6.2.2)
In contrast to authentication cookies, OTC requires a signed response message
from the server to delete or modify existing OTC credentials in the browser. After a
log off request, the server responds with a signed value using the existing session key
(ks). This approach prevents session fixation attacks [111] and “protected” cookie
clobbering [206] that take advantage of the fact that cookies can be overwritten by
spoofed server responses or malicious JavaScript code.
Compared to cookies, OTC requires a simpler security configuration. OTC does
not require additional mechanisms to protect against session hijacking. For example,
OTC does not require the httponly and secure flags, which are often misunderstood
or ignored by web developers [208]. Also, OTC does not require always-on HTTPS
to prevent session hijacking; thus, providing an alternative to web applications that
cannot deploy always-on HTTPS.
Table 5 shows a list of the main threats affecting authentication cookies and if they
apply to OTC. Except for denial of service attacks, network attacks do not affect OTC
because the browser never sends the OTC session secret across the network. In the
browser, OTC is resilient to most attacks affecting cookies because OTC credentials
are securely stored and managed in the browser by default. Only attacks where the
adversary takes control of the browser (e.g., CSRF, malware) can affect OTC. There-
fore, OTC significantly reduces the attack surface affecting session authentication on
web applications.
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Table 5: Main threats affecting authentication cookies. OTC is robust against most of
these threats; thus, it effectively reduces the attack surface affecting session authenti-
cation based on cookies and simplifies the security architecture of the web application.
(Note: x = affected by the threat, - = not affected by the threat).
Threats on the network Cookies OTC
Disclosure due to use of unencrypted HTTP x -
Disclosure due to configuration errors/software bugs [74,
43, 120, 81]
x -
SSL splitting attacks [128, 154] x -
SSL renegotiation attacks [46] x -
SSL BEAST attacks [165] x -
Denial of service attacks x x
Threats on the browser and web application Cookies OTC
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks [186, 103] x -
Cross-Site Tracing (XST) attacks [87] x -
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) x x
Related-domain attacks [25] x -
Clickjacking attacks [156] x -
Session fixation attacks [111] x -
“Protected” cookie clobbering [206] x -
Weak token generation [73] x -
Cookie-stealing malware [200] x -
Malware controlling the browser x x
Social engineering attacks x x
6.3.2 ProVerif Analysis
OTC tokens do not leak information that could allow an attacker to learn the ses-
sion key ks or the web application’s long-term key kw. To verify this property more
formally, we used ProVerif [21, 22], a tool for automatically analyzing the security of
cryptographic protocols in the formal adversarial model (i.e. Dolev-Yao model [54]).
For this purpose, we modeled the OTC protocol (Figure 34) using pi calculus. Us-
ing this model and ProVerif, we successfully proved the following OTC’s security
properties:
• Secrecy of ks: the value ks is only known to the browser and the web application.
• Secrecy of kw: the value of kw is only known to the web application.
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• Authentication of the browser to web application: if the web application reaches
the end of the protocol and believes it has shared the ks with the browser, then
the browser was indeed its interlocutor and it has shared ks.
To test secrecy, ProVerif verified the reachability properties of ks and kw based
on our model. To test authentication, ProVerif verified correspondence assertions
between the two events: when the browser accepted ks and when the web application
finished validating an OTC token. As stated in Section 6.2.1, the symmetric en-
cryption algorithm is assumed to be indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attacks
(IND-CPA), while the HMAC scheme is assumed to be unforgeable under chosen
message attacks (UF-CMA). The OTC model in pi calculus and the output results
from ProVerif are shown in the Appendix A.
These results confirm that, in order to break the secrecy and authentication prop-
erties of OTC, an adversary will have to break the security of the underlying cryp-
tographic components: symmetric encryption, HMAC and cryptographic hash func-
tions. Therefore, by observing and/or modifying the communication between the
browser and the web application, the adversary gains little advantage against OTC
(robustness property, Section 6.2.2).
6.4 Experimental Evaluation
6.4.1 OTC Implementation
We implemented OTC’s browser and web application components for our experi-
mental evaluation. In the web application, we added OTC support to WordPress
v.3.2.1 [198], one of the most popular open-source web content management system
on the Internet. In addition, we configured WordPress with the BuddyPress plugin
v.1.5.1 [30] to add more Web 2.0 and social networking functionalities to WordPress.
OTC was implemented as a WordPress plugin, requiring less than 200 lines of PHP
code. This code replaces the creation and verification functions of authentication
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Table 6: Example of authentication cookies and OTC credentials for WordPress.
Cookies are setup in the browser with the Set-Cookie HTTP header field while OTC
credentials are setup with the X-OTC-SET header field. On each request that requires
authentication, the browser attaches the cookies using the Cookie HTTP header field
or attaches an OTC token using the X-OTC HTTP header field. WordPress uses 3
authentication cookies by default.
WordPress Authentication Cookies
Set-Cookie: wordpress sec 6e7a6b34f1dd07c511f0105e2f4708a8=admin%7C1320449253%7Cf109f3b
b1777a7ca8594286d18e68096; path=/wordpress/wp-content/plugins; secure; httponly
Set-Cookie: wordpress sec 6e7a6b34f1dd07c511f0105e2f4708a8=admin%7C1320449253%7Cf109f3b
b1777a7ca8594286d18e68096; path=/wordpress/wp-admin; secure; httponly
Set-Cookie: wordpress logged in 6e7a6b34f1dd07c511f0105e2f4708a8=admin%7C1320449253%7C5
623496b9ed718a32810ffd056e0d7e8; path=/wordpress/; httponly
Cookie: wordpress sec 6e7a6b34f1dd07c511f0105e2f4708a8=admin%7C1320449253%7Cf109f3bb177
7a7ca8594286d18e68096; wordpress logged in 6e7a6b34f1dd07c511f0105e2f4708a8=admin%7C132044
9253%7C5623496b9ed718a32810ffd056e0d7e8;





cookies with equivalent OTC functions. The OTC plugin can be installed using the
standard WordPress administrative interface in less than 5 minutes (deployability
property, Section 6.2.2).
In the browser, OTC was implemented as an extension for Firefox v.7.0.1 and Fire-
fox for mobile (Fennec) v.4.03b (browser support property, Section 6.2.2). The OTC
browser extension required approximately 300 lines of JavaScript code. This extension
can be installed using Firefox add-ons interface in less than 5 minutes (deployability
property, Section 6.2.2). Both, OTC WordPress plugin and Firefox extensions are
currently available for evaluation at http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~idacosta/otc/.
We ultimately envision OTC as being included with core browser functionality, so
that all users would benefit without having to install an extension.
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Table 6 shows an example of the WordPress authentication cookies and the equiv-
alent OTC credentials based on our implementation. By default, WordPress requires
three authentication cookies: two for accessing administrative operations (e.g., chang-
ing password) and one for general operations (e.g., posting a new message). The two
first cookies, used for administrative tasks, have different scopes and both have the
secure and httponly flags enabled. The purpose of these cookies is to limit the impact
of a session hijacking attack. In contrast, OTC only requires a single set of credentials
and a single token to authenticate the request because it is inherently robust against
session hijacking. In other words, OTC offers simpler but stronger session integrity
protection than cookies. As cookies, OTC also allows multiple sets of credentials by
using the scope parameters (i.e., domain and path); however, in most scenarios, a
single set of credentials should suffice.
As Table 6 shows, OTC uses Base 64 encoding for its credentials and tokens. For
a more direct comparison with WordPress cookies, OTC uses an HMAC based on the
MD5 2 cryptographic hash function (HMAC-MD5) and AES with 128 bit keys (AES-
128) as a symmetric block cipher and CBC with random IV as the encryption mode.
However, it is easy to configure OTC with larger keys or more robust algorithms.
Note that symmetric encryption operations are performed by the web application
only; the browser does not need to encrypt or decrypt information (i.e., the session
ticket).
6.4.2 Evaluation and Results
The main goal of our experimental evaluation is to characterize and compare the
performance of OTC and authentication cookies. First, we measured the delay added
by single OTC and cookie operations. For this purpose, we used code instrumenta-
tion in WordPress and Firefox (desktop and mobile). Second, we characterized the
2Collision attacks against MD5 [195] do not affect HMAC security [190]. However, it is recom-
mended to use a more robust hash function such as SHA-256 as MD5 support will decrease.
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system-level impact on performance of OTC and cookies on WordPress. We focused
on metrics such as page load times, maximum throughput and CPU utilization. All
the experiments were executed at least 20 times to ensure the soundness of the re-
sults. In addition, mean values and 95% confidence intervals are reported for all the
experiments. Finally, we also ran informal experiments to evaluate the usability and
compatibility of OTC with WordPress.
6.4.2.1 Microbenchmarks
For a direct comparison with WordPress’s cookies, OTC was configured to use HMAC-
MD5 and AES-128. In our experiments we used a laptop (MacBook Pro with dual
core 2.53 GHz processor, 4GB of memory and Mac OS X 10.6) and a smartphone
(Google Nexus One with 1 GHz processor, 512 MB of memory and Android 2.3.6) as
our clients. WordPress was installed in an Ubuntu v.8.04 (Linux Kernel 2.6.24) server
with 2 Quad-Core 2.00 GHz processors, 16 GB of memory and Gigabit Ethernet cards.
The server was also configured with WordPress’s supporting software: Apache v.2.2,
MySQL v.5.0 and PHP v.5.3. All the server software used a default configuration
(i.e., no performance optimizations).
We first measured the time required to generate authentication cookies and OTC
credentials and the time required to validate cookies and OTC tokens. Table 10 shows
the average results and confidence intervals. For both generation and validation, OTC
operations required more time than cookies; however, this difference is negligible when
compared to other WordPress operations (performance and scalability properties,
Section 6.2.2). For example, loading a WordPress page typically requires hundreds of
milliseconds. OTC required 0.2060 ms and 0.3990 ms more than cookies for generating
credentials and validating tokens, respectively. These differences are expected because
OTC uses symmetric encryption operations and extra validation steps in addition to
those used by cookies.
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Table 7: WordPress generation and verification times for cookies and OTC. The
additional delay added by OTC operations is small (< 1 ms) and negligible when
compared to other web application’s operations. Note: c.i. = confidence intervals.
Protocol Generation (ms) Verification (ms)
Cookies (95% c.i) 0.1610 (±0.0020) 1.6060 (±0.4500)
OTC (95% c.i.) 0.3670 (±0.0120) 2.0050 (±0.0610)
Table 8: Time to generate tokens in the browser. The overhead added is small and
unlikely to affect the user experience
Device OTC Token Generation (ms)
Laptop (95% c.i.) 0.1335 (±0.0034)
Smartphone (95% c.i.) 2.3945 (±0.0974)
On the browser side, we measured the time that OTC requires to generate and
attach an authentication token to each request. Table 9 shows the average results
and confidence intervals for the laptop and for the smartphone. The results show
that the overhead added by OTC to Firefox (desktop and mobile) is also small. For
instance, the average network jitter in the US3 is 0.67 ms, around 4 times the OTC
overhead in the desktop browser and 33.41% of the OTC overhead in the mobile
browser. Therefore, such delays are unlikely to affect the user experience.
6.4.2.2 Macrobenchmarks
Our first macrobenchmark experiment consisted of measuring the overall latency
added by OTC to WordPress’s responses. For this purpose, in the browser we mea-
sured the time required to load the home page from WordPress for the following con-
figurations: cookies with HTTP, cookies with HTTPS, OTC with HTTP and OTC
with HTTPS. We measured this time only for new TCP or SSL/TLS connections
(i.e., no channel reuse) using Firebug [69], a Firefox extension for web development.
The WordPress home page requires 14 requests for resources (e.g., images, css files)




























Figure 35: Average user experienced latency per request for cookies with HTTP,
cookies with HTTPS, OTC with HTTP and OTC with HTTPS. When compared to
cookies, the delay introduced by OTC is small and unlikely to be noticed by the user.
browser and the web application to simulate a more realistic Internet round trip time.
Figure 35 shows the results of this experiment. For HTTP, the WordPress page
required approximately 1.14 sec and 1.21 sec to load for cookies and OTC, respec-
tively. For HTTPS, it required approximately 1.41 sec for cookies and 1.49 sec for
OTC. Thus, the additional latency introduced by OTC is around 70 ms for HTTP
and 80 ms for HTTPS. These values represent to the total time to load the WordPress
page, which requires 14 requests. Therefore, the mean latency added by OTC to each
request is approximately 5.00 ms and 5.71 ms for HTTP and HTTPS, respectively.
Taking into account the margin of error of this experiment, these values resemble
the ones measured in our microbenchmarks plus a small amount of network jitter.
Therefore, these results confirm that the latency added by OTC to the page load time
is negligible (performance and scalability properties, Section 6.2.2).
Our second macrobenchmark experiment measured OTC’s overall impact on the
maximum throughput that the web application can support. For this purpose, we
characterized the maximum throughput (requests per second) for the four config-
urations described in the previous experiment. For a more realistic comparison of


































































(b) Web server CPU utilization
Figure 36: Web server throughput and CPU utilization for cookies with HTTP, cook-
ies with HTTPS, OTC with HTTP and OTC with HTTPS. These tests used a simple
PHP page (14 KB) because WordPress throughput was too low (< 100 req/sec) to
see performance differences among the configurations evaluated. Cookies and OTC
allow similar performance in the web server for practical throughput values.
HTTPS steady state, avoiding the costs of HTTPS connection setup (most expensive
SSL/TLS operation [41]). Therefore, in these experiments we used a small and con-
stant number of connections while increasing the number of requests made over these
connections (as opposed to increasing the number of connections). In other words, we
simulated the load generated by users that already logged in to the web application.
To generate the traffic load, we used httperf 0.9 [137], a tool for measuring the
performance of web servers. A total of three httperf instances (one per server) are used
to generate the test loads. We wrote our own custom script to automate execution
and data collection of the benchmarking experiments. These servers had a similar
hardware configuration to the WordPress server. In addition, our testbed used a
dedicated Gigabit Ethernet switch.
In our experiment, instead of requesting a WordPress page, the performance tool
requested a small PHP page (14 Kbytes) that contained some blocks of text and OTC
and cookie verification support. The reason for this setup is that WordPress pages
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are more complex and slower to load, resulting in a much lower throughput (< 100
requests/sec). This low throughput did not allow us to measure the differences among
the configurations. In short, WordPress pages become an earlier bottleneck for server
performance instead of cookies or OTC.
The results for request throughput are shown in Figure 36a. As expected, the
configurations using HTTP performed better than the configurations using HTTPS.
When HTTP is used, the web application supported a maximum throughput of ap-
proximately 7,500 requests/sec for cookies and 6,500 request/sec for OTC. These
results represent a reduction in request throughput of approximately 13.33% when
OTC is used instead of cookies. When HTTPS is used, the web application supported
a maximum throughput of approximately 5,400 requests/sec for cookies and 4,900 re-
quests/sec for OTC. These results represent a reduction in request throughput of ap-
proximately 9.26% when OTC is used instead of cookies (the smaller difference is due
to the overhead added by HTTPS). Figure 36b shows the web server CPU utilization
during the experiments for each configuration. When HTTP is used, OTC requires
around 10% more CPU time than cookies due to the symmetric encryption operations.
When HTTPS is used, OTC requires around 5% more CPU time than cookies. This
difference is almost negligible, as Figure 36b shows, because of the HTTPS overhead.
As in our previous experiment, these results show that OTC introduces a small per-
formance overhead to the web application. While a 13.33% reduction in throughput
is not negligible, note that these measurements were taken using a lightweight PHP
page. Our WordPress implementation cannot support more than hundred requests
per second; therefore, the overhead added by OTC is insignificant when compared to
WordPress’s own overhead (performance and scalability properties, Section 6.2.2). In
addition, these results show that OTC can be used with both HTTP and HTTPS con-
figurations. Finally, it is important to note that, as a mechanism to prevent session
hijacking, HTTPS adds a considerably higher overhead than OTC.
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6.4.2.3 Informal Usability and Compatibility Test
We also evaluated OTC’s impact on user experience. We conducted a very infor-
mal user study where we asked other lab members to use our WordPress setup with
both Firefox and Firefox for mobile. None of the participants reported any differ-
ence between using cookies or OTC (usability property, Section 6.2.2). In addition,
we thoroughly evaluated the functionality of WordPress and BuddyPress to detect
any errors or compatibility problems when OTC was used. During this compatibil-
ity test, we did not find any problem with Firefox or with WordPress/BuddyPress
functionality when OTC was used instead of cookies.
6.5 Discussion
6.5.1 Incrementally Deploying OTC
As our implementation shows, OTC can be easily deployed in today’s web applications
and browsers. For most web applications, the operations required to support OTC are
not different from the ones currently used to support authentication cookies. The use
of symmetric encryption by OTC could be considered the main difference. However,
it is not uncommon for cookies to use symmetric encryption to protect sensitive user’s
session information.
The major difference between deploying OTC and cookies is in the browser. With
OTC, the browser acquires an active role during session authentication by signing
each user request (as opposed to just storing and attaching cookies to requests).
Still, the operations required by OTC are already supported by most browsers’ APIs
(e.g., cryptographic hash operations, secure storage). We expect that OTC support in
the browser will follow a similar adoption model as ForceHTTPS [100]: first available
as a browser extension and then adopted natively by major browser vendors as an
Internet standard (i.e., HSTS). As part of our future work, we plan to collaborate
with vendors and groups such as the IETF to propose OTC as an Internet standard.
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Most web applications can follow an incremental approach to deploy OTC. For ex-
ample, web applications can enable OTC while still supporting authentication cookies.
Initially, a small group of users (i.e., beta testers) can evaluate the web application
functionality using OTC while standard users continue using authentication cookies.
Next, the web application can enable OTC support for all users, indicating how to ac-
tivate it on browsers (e.g., browser upgrade or through an extension). At this point,
both OTC and cookies will be allowed for session authentication; the browser will
indicate to the web application the type of protocol preferred. Thus, users that have
not updated their browsers, will still be able to access the web application. Note that
downgrading attacks are unlikely when OTC and cookies are both enabled because
OTC support is announced over HTTPS during user login (see Section 6.2.3). Af-
ter certain threshold is reached (e.g., percentage of users supporting OTC), the web
application can deprecate the use of cookies for session authentication and rely on
OTC only. Web applications with high security requirements (e.g., online banking)
can combine OTC with always-on HTTPS to add another layer of security to their
systems. This type of applications can follow a more aggressive approach and en-
able OTC directly as the only session authentication mechanism (i.e., no transitional
period). Thus, users will be required to update their browsers to use the applica-
tion. Finally, OTC will not replace cookies for other session management tasks (e.g.,
shopping card, user preferences); cookies will still be needed for such functionality.
6.5.2 Extending OTC Integrity Protection
In addition to protecting the integrity of user’s requests, OTC could also protect the
integrity of the web application’s responses. This approach can provide lightweight
integrity protection in scenarios where it is difficult to deploy always-on HTTPS.
For this purpose, the session key ks could be used by the web application to sign
the resources sent to the browsers (e.g., HTML code, JavaScript code, CSS code).
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Because the session key is included in each request, the web application can readily
use it to sign the corresponding response (i.e., no delay is introduced by key retrieval
operations). The OTC browser component will require only minor changes to support
verification of web responses.
By signing web application’s responses, OTC could detect in-flight page modifi-
cations (e.g., ISPs injecting adds, adversaries injecting malicious code). Web Trip-
wires [157] was proposed to detect such activity; however, it is not robust against
some active adversaries because it does not rely on a shared secret. OTC could be
combined with mechanisms such as Web Tripwires to provide a more robust integrity
mechanism for web application’s responses. We plan to explore this approach in
future work.
6.5.3 OTC and Multi-Factor Authentication
Cookies are also used as lightweight second-factor authentication tokens. For example,
mechanisms such as Yahoo’s Sign-In Seal use long-lasting cookies to store a second-
factor authentication token in the browser. The advantage of this approach is that
the browser does not need modifications. However, some of these mechanisms are
not effective against phishing attacks [164]. These cookies can also be stolen from
the user’s browser. Ben Adida proposed Beamauth [6], a more robust alternative
based on specially crafted bookmark instead of a cookie. The use of bookmarks to
store second-factor tokens offers better protection against cookie-theft attacks. But,
as in the case of cookies, bookmarks were not designed for storing security-related
information. Thus, OTC could provide a more robust alternative in this area. For
example, a long-lasting OTC credential and its corresponding session key ks could
be used as a second-factor token. Because the browser isolates OTC credentials from
other components, ks offers better security guarantees than cookies or Beamauth as
a second-factor authenticator.
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6.5.4 OTC in Mobile Devices
Mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets are rapidly becoming the main plat-
forms to consume Internet content. However, due to hardware constraints and lack
of security maturity, these devices are more vulnerable to security threats, includ-
ing session hijacking. Mobile browsers and many mobile applications rely on cookies
for session authentication. But, as with desktop computers, cookies can be easily
exposed. However, the common wisdom is that smartphones are less vulnerable to
session hijacking because they use the mobile operator network for Internet access
instead of Wi-Fi. Unfortunately, this scenario is quickly changing. The popularity
of mobile devices has created capacity problems for mobile operators, that have been
forced to introduce data caps. As a result, smartphone users are increasingly relying
on Wi-Fi networks to access the Internet [42]. In addition, mobile operators are also
exploring how to reduce the load in their networks by using automatic Wi-Fi offload-
ing mechanisms [62]. This trend significantly increases the risk of mobile devices being
targeted with session hijacking attacks and other Internet threats. For this reason,
we decided to also implement OTC as part of a mobile browser. As our experimental
evaluation shows, OTC is lightweight enough to be used in mobile devices such as
smartphones, tablets and other resource-constrained devices.
6.5.5 SessionLock
As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, SessionLock [7] is another proposed technique to pre-
vent session hijacking without requiring always-on HTTPS support. As OTC, Ses-
sionLock uses a session secret to sign each request sent to the web application, creating
unique authentication tokens per request (prior to SessionLock, Liu et al. [123] and
Blundo et al. [24] have also explored this approach). The main novelty of SessionLock
is that it uses URL fragment identifiers to store the session secret in the browser and
only employs client-side JavaScript to sign requests with this secret. Thus, compared
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to OTC, SessionLock offers better deployability because it does not require changes
to the browser, only to the web application. However, this improved deployability
comes at a cost – reduced reliability and robustness due to the limitations of client-side
JavaScript. For example, client-side JavaScript cannot modify browser requests dy-
namically. Thus, in order to sign every possible request, SessionLock needs to rewrite
every link on each web page displayed to the user. This operation can be computa-
tionally expensive for complex web pages and will not work with binary objects (e.g.,
Flash). This technique will also fail if the user types the URL or opens a new browser
tab to send a request to the web application. Moreover, SessionLock’s session secret
can be accidentally leaked by the user (e.g., by sharing a link, bookmarks) or lost
during the session. In addition, the use of JavaScript-only makes SessionLock vulner-
able to active attacks (e.g., code injection) that could compromise the session secret4.
These problems could be avoided if SessionLock is implemented on the browser (as
OTC) instead of relying on client-side JavaScript only. Still, SessionLock requires
additional state on the web application for the session secret; thus, it is not appro-
priate for highly distributed web applications (see Section 2.3.1). From the efficiency
perspective, both SessionLock and OTC have similar performance profiles as they
execute comparable operations. OTC requires additional computation on the server
due to encryption operations associated with session tickets, but the difference should
be negligible in most cases. Furthermore, both solutions are transparent to the user.
Also, OTC and SessionLock cannot prevent attacks based on CSRF, social engineer-
ing or malware and both are susceptible to implementation errors. In summary, while
SessionLock allows easier deployment by avoiding browser modifications, its ad hoc
techniques are not adequate for complex, highly distributed web applications. As a
result, SessionLock has not been deployed in production systems.
4In the paper [7], the author described this weakness and stated that SessionLock was designed
to prevent session hijacking attacks only.
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6.6 Summary
The risks associated with the use of cookies as session authentication tokens have
been known for years. More robust alternatives have been proposed to replace au-
thentication cookies; however, they have not been deployed because they fail to meet
the requirements of highly distributed Web 2.0 applications. Specifically, most of
the proposed alternatives require costly state synchronization across the web applica-
tion, a serious concern for distributed systems. In this chapter, we presented OTC, a
principle-driven secure alternative to authentication cookies. OTC is not only resis-
tant to session hijacking, but also maintains the simplicity and performance benefits
of cookies. More critically, OTC addresses the shortcomings of previously proposed
solutions by removing the need for state in the web application. Moreover, OTC offers
another security layer to web applications that already support always-on HTTPS by
reducing the threats associated with cookies; OTC and always-on HTTPS are com-
plementary mechanisms. We developed OTC for the popular WordPress application
and demonstrated that OTC has similar performance to traditional cookies.
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CHAPTER VII
DVCERT: ROBUST SERVER AUTHENTICATION FOR
SSL/TLS WITHOUT THIRD-PARTIES
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol and its successor, Transport Layer Security
(TLS), have become the de facto means of providing strong cryptographic protec-
tion for network traffic. Their near universal integration with web browsers arguably
makes them the most visible pieces of security infrastructure for average users. In
the previous chapter, we described how SSL/TLS is the recommended mechanism to
protect authentication cookies against session hijacking attacks. Our proposed alter-
native to authentication cookies, OTC, also relies on the security guarantees offered
by SSL/TLS, but only during its setup. While vulnerabilities are occasionally found
in specific implementations, SSL/TLS are widely viewed as robust means of provid-
ing confidentiality, integrity and server authentication. However, these guarantees
are built on tenuous assumptions about the ability to authenticate the server-side of
a transaction by using digital certificates signed by a trusted third-party certification
authority (CA).
The security community has long been critical of the Public Key Infrastructure
for X.509 (PKIX) and its CA-based trust model [63, 90, 5]. Much of the concern
has focused on the role of the CAs and their ability and motivation to not only
correctly verify and attest the coupling between an identity and a public key, but
also to protect their own resources. Browsers and operating systems determine what
CAs users should trust by default (i.e., trust anchors). However, this model has
resulted in hundreds of CAs, all equally trusted and from more than 50 different
countries [160, 58]. Due to this excessive trust, CAs can forge certificates for any
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domain that will be accepted as valid by most browsers. Thus, adversaries can obtain
forged certificates by coercing or compromising any CA and use them to execute man-
in-the-middle (MITM) attacks against SSL/TLS connections. In 2011, the number of
reported attacks against CAs increased considerably [158, 107, 76, 85, 109, 56, 131].
In some cases, adversaries were able to forge certificates for important web domains
(e.g., google.com, yahoo.com and live.com). Even worse, it has been estimated that a
forged certificate was used to intercept close to 300,000 Gmail sessions in Iran [121].
Furthermore, there is evidence that governments and private organizations are using
forged certificates as part of their surveillance and censorship efforts [172, 84, 176, 122].
The frequency of these incidents is likely to increase in the future, as more and more
web applications rely on SSL/TLS to protect all their communications.
Multiple solutions have been proposed to deal with the threat imposed by forged
certificates and MITM attacks (see Section 3.2.2). The most popular approach is the
use of additional third-parties to extend or replace the rigid CA trust model (e.g., net-
work notaries [196, 129], public audit logs [61, 118] and secure DNS (DNSSEC) [95]).
In this approach, users can select one or more third-parties to vouch for the authen-
ticity of a certificate, improving the chances of detecting a MITM attack. However,
depending only on third-parties for certificate validation has several shortcomings
such as: significant deployment and operational costs (e.g., additional infrastructure
with high availability requirements), more complex trust model for users, privacy con-
cerns and more complex revocation procedures. Therefore, the inherent complexity
and costs associated with third-party solutions have prevented their widespread deploy-
ment. As a result, most users still rely on weak certificate validation checks to detect
MITM attacks.
In this chapter, we propose Direct Validation of Certificates (DVCert), an efficient
and easy to deploy protocol that provides stronger certificate validation (i.e., server
authentication) and effective detection of MITM attacks without using third-parties.
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Our mechanism comes from a simple observation – users have already established
secrets (e.g., passwords) with their most important web applications. DVCert allows
web applications to use these secrets to directly and securely attest for the authentic-
ity of their certificates without exposing those secrets to offline attacks. After a single
round-trip DVCert transaction, a browser receives the information required to vali-
date all the certificates that could be used during a session with the web application,
including certificates from other domains. As a result, to execute a MITM attack, an
adversary not only needs to compromise a CA but also each targeted web domain. A
DVCert transaction uses a modified Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE)
protocol known as PAK [26, 126]. However, we are not simply applying a known pro-
tocol; rather, we modified PAK to provide only server authentication and integrity
protection instead of mutual authentication and generation of encryption keys (i.e.,
traditional use of PAKE protocols). These changes allow better performance and sim-
plify deployment without affecting PAK’s formal security proofs. Our experimental
evaluation shows that an optimized DVCert transaction requires little computation
time on the server (e.g., < 1 ms) and on the browser. More importantly, DVCert
transactions are executed at most once per session; thus, their impact on server per-
formance or user experience is negligible. DVCert’s design also provides multiple
advantages over third-party solutions: simpler trust model, lower deployment and
operational costs (e.g., no additional infrastructure is required) and no privacy risks.
Finally, DVCert is a readily available mechanism designed to improve the current
CA trust model and be compatible with third-party solutions such as DNSSEC, once
these solutions are deployed in the future.
In so doing, we make the following contributions:
• Designing and implementing an efficient and easy to deploy mecha-
nism to detect MITM attacks against SSL/TLS without third-parties:
We identify key properties required to achieve a robust and practical defense
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against MITM attacks. Based on these properties, we develop a protocol that
provides more robust certificate validation and detects MITM attacks, even
if the adversary uses forged certificates. By allowing web applications to at-
test directly for their certificates, our mechanism avoids many of the challenges
hindering the deployment of third-party solutions. We implemented a proof-of-
concept extension for Firefox and Firefox for mobile browsers and a PHP-based
server component to demonstrate the deployability of our solution.
• Conducting an extensive performance analysis in multiple platforms:
We characterize DVCert’s performance using our prototype implementation in
both desktop and mobile browsers. Our results show that an optimized DVCert
transaction requires 0.54 ms of computation time on the server and 12.03 and
97.70 ms on a laptop and on a smartphone respectively. Compared to a näıve
implementation, these results represent a 94.96%, 55.07% and 77.82% improve-
ment on the server, laptop and smartphone correspondingly. Moreover, our
experimental evaluation demonstrates that DVCert transactions are as efficient
as existing server operations (e.g., processing HTTPS requests). Thus, given
their low frequency, DVCert transactions are unlikely to degrade server perfor-
mance or scalability. Furthermore, we apply ProVerif [22, 21] to formally verify
DVCert’s resilience to offline dictionary attacks.
• Making our DVCert implementation available to the community: The
DVCert extension for Firefox and Firefox for mobile as well as the server PHP
code are available for evaluation at: http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~idacosta/
dvcert/index.html.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.1 offers important
background information on MITM attacks and presents our motivation; Section 7.2
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provides the design and formal description of DVCert; Section 7.3 presents our se-
curity analysis of DVCert; Section 7.4 shows our experimental analysis and results;
Section 7.5 offers additional analysis and discussion of our proposed protocol; and
Section 7.6 presents a summary of our work.
7.1 Background and Motivation
7.1.1 The SSL/TLS Protocols and Web Applications
The SSL/TLS protocols [72, 53] are the main security mechanisms used to protect
the communications between browsers and web applications. By providing a trans-
parent encryption layer, SSL/TLS guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of the
data traveling across the Internet. Moreover, SSL/TLS allow browsers to authenti-
cate web application’s servers via X.509 digital certificates [4]. A digital certificate
binds the server’s identity (i.e., domain name) to the server’s public key and it is
signed by a Certification Authority (CA) trusted by both the server and the browser
(Section 2.3.7 describes how a SSL/TLS connection is established and how the server
is authenticated). CAs are required because the browser and the server do not share
any secrets at the SSL/TLS layer; thus, a trusted third-party is needed to vouch
for the authenticity of the server’s certificate. Certificates can also be used for user
authentication; however, this is not a common practice in Internet scenarios.
Initially, due to performance considerations, most web applications used SSL/TLS
only to protect requests carrying private data (e.g., passwords, credit card numbers).
However, due to the increasing number of attacks against web sessions (e.g., session
hijacking), many applications have been forced to protect all their communications
with SSL/TLS. For this reason, it is common that during a session, a browser es-
tablishes multiple SSL/TLS connections not only with web application’s servers but
also with servers from third-party domains (e.g., CDNs and ads networks). Through
a short survey from the Alexa Top 20 US sites and popular online banking sites (15
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Figure 37: Example of a MITM attack against SSL/TLS. The adversary establishes
two SSL/TLS connections: one with the victim and one with the client. However,
from the victim’s and server’s point of view, there is only a single SSL/TLS connec-
tion.
in total), we determined that an average of 12 certificates per domain were validated
by the browser, with a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 22. Moreover, most sites
included at least one certificate from a third-party domain.
7.1.2 MITM Attacks against SSL/TLS
The security guarantees offered by SSL/TLS rely on the correct authentication of the
server. All such guarantees are rendered ineffective if an adversary is able to convince
users to accept an illegitimately generated certificate, as shown in Figure 37. First,
the adversary positions herself in the network path between the victim’s computer
and the server. When the victim sends a request for establishing a new SSL/TLS
connection with the server (message 1), the adversary intercepts and responds to it
(message 4) using a forged certificate (Cert’). If the victim accepts this certificate,
then she completes the SSL/TLS setup with the adversary (messages 5 and 8), who
has, as a result, successfully masqueraded as the server. Simultaneously, the adversary
establishes a new SSL/TLS connection with the server (messages 2, 3, 6, and 7).
At this point, the adversary has two active SSL/TLS connections: one with the
victim and one with the server. However, from the victim’s and server’s perspectives,
there is only one secure connection in place. The adversary can now decrypt, re-
encrypt and forward all the messages exchanged between the victim and the server
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(messages 9 to 12). As a result, the adversary can access private information (e.g.,
passwords) or even modify it (e.g., code injection). Finally, notice that the server
cannot determine if it is communicating with the victim or the adversary because
server and user authentication happen at different independent layers (i.e., weak
mutual authentication).
For an adversary, the easiest way to execute a MITM attack is to use self-signed
certificates. While such certificates will fail the browser’s validation checks, several
studies show that average users are likely to ignore browser’s warnings [52, 164, 180,
93]. However, as mentioned earlier, a more effective approach is to use a certificates
forged by a trusted CA to avoid any browser’s warnings. An adversary only needs
to deceive, coerce or compromise one of the hundreds trusted CAs to obtain forged
certificates for the targeted domains. As many recent incidents show [158, 107, 76, 85,
109, 56, 131], such attacks are becoming increasingly popular. Furthermore, problems
with certificate revocation mechanisms (e.g., CRLs, OCSP) [117] provide additional
advantage to adversaries.
7.1.3 Problems with Third-Party Solutions
A considerable number of mechanisms have been proposed to improve server-side au-
thentication and protect against MITM attacks (see Section 3.2.2). The most popular
approach is the use of additional third-party entities that can also vouch for the au-
thenticity of server certificates. Third-party solutions provide a number of benefits:
protection of the first connection to a new domain, scalable attestation of certificates
for all public domains and minimal requirements for web applications. Unfortunately,
this approach also faces several critical challenges. First, these mechanisms have sig-
nificant deployment and operational costs. The additional infrastructure needed can
be expensive to deploy and operate due to requirements such as high-availability,
data consistency, performance and security. Even web applications can be affected
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by the operational overheads required by these mechanisms. Second, the resulting
trust model is more complex. The use of multiple trusted entities to choose from
can make the trust model more complex to evaluate and understand. Thus, average
users are likely to rely on default trust configurations. Moreover, trust is dynamic
– a trusted entity today may become an adversary tomorrow. Third, these mecha-
nisms introduce new privacy risks. Users’ browsing activity is disclosed to third-party
entities. Preventing this problem can add complexity to these solutions. Fourth, cer-
tificate revocation procedures become more complex. The use of multiple entities make
revocation more difficult because of the additional overhead required to revoke multi-
ple proofs of authenticity (e.g., signatures). Finally, captive portals typically interfere
with these mechanisms. In places such as airports and hotels, captive portals can
block requests for certificate validation to external entities before user registration.
Thus, captive portals need to be modified to allow additional certificate validation
mechanisms.
7.2 Direct Validation of SSL/TLS Certificates
We present Direct Validation of SSL/TLS Certificates (DVCert), an efficient and
practical mechanism that improves certificate validation and provides stronger pro-
tection against MITM attacks. Instead of relying on third-parties, DVCert uses the
existing shared secrets between the user and the web application to directly validate
server certificates. DVCert overcomes the limitations of third-party solutions while
also reducing the risks associated with using low-entropy keys in network protocols.
7.2.1 Scenario and Threat Model
Our scenario assumes a large, highly distributed web application. The applica-
tion uses SSL/TLS to protect all the communications with its users (i.e., always-on
HTTPS). To establish SSL/TLS connections, the application has multiple certificates
signed by a trusted CA. In addition, the application’s web pages include content from
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third-party servers. These servers also communicate using SSL/TLS and have their
own valid certificates. We assume that SSL/TLS are correctly configured in the ap-
plication’s servers as well as in the third-party servers. Furthermore, users share a
password with the application and use HTML forms for authentication. Instead of
plaintext passwords, the application stores password salted hashes using public salt
values. Finally, we assume that users follow a robust password policy that is enforced
by the application.
We consider a polynomial-time (PPT) adversary that has access to all the com-
munication between the web application and its users. The adversary’s goal is to
eavesdrop and tamper with this communication by executing MITM attacks against
SSL/TLS. To perform such attacks, we assume that it is possible for the adversary to
obtain forged certificates for any domain that are signed by some trusted CA. How-
ever, the adversary does not have access to users’ passwords, password salted hashes
or server’s private keys. Moreover, this model does not consider attacks against user
computers or application servers to obtain such information and attacks that exploit
SSL/TLS implementation or configuration errors.
Based on this threat model, DVCert should provide the following security guaran-
tees. First, it should provide authenticity and integrity protection of the application’s
certificate information sent by the server to the browser. For this purpose, DVCert
should rely on the user’s password, a PAKE protocol with formal security proof and
a collision resistant hash function (e.g., SHA-256). Second, DVCert should allow the
browser to perform a more robust server certificate validation and detect MITM at-
tacks based on forge certificates. Third, DVCert should not leak sensitive information
such as usernames and passwords. Thus, DVCert should rely on a PAKE protocol
to protect users’ passwords. Finally, DVCert protocol information store in the server
and the browser should not allow adversaries to impersonate users.
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7.2.2 Desired Protocol Properties
We identified properties required to achieve an effective and practical defense against
MITM attacks. We then used these properties to design DVCert:
1. Effective detection of MITM attacks: the proposed mechanism must provide
robust server authentication and effective detection of MITM attacks against
SSL/TLS, even if illegitimately obtained certificates are used.
2. Robustness against offline attacks: the proposed mechanism should not leak
information about the user’s authentication credentials and must be resilient to
offline attacks such as dictionary and cryptanalytic attacks.
3. Deployability: the proposed mechanism should not require additional hardware
or software, only small changes to the browser and web application. In addition,
it should be simple to configure in both the browser and the web application.
4. Performance: the proposed mechanism must be efficient. It must not affect the
overall performance and scalability of the web application. Moreover, it should
not introduce risks of DoS attacks.
5. Privacy: the proposed mechanism should not disclose user information to third-
parties and adversaries.
6. Compatibility: the proposed mechanism must not interfere with existing func-
tionality in the browser and web application. Browsers not supporting the pro-
posed mechanism should still be able to access the web application. Moreover,
the proposed mechanism must be compatible with other certificate validation
protocols.
7. Usability: the proposed mechanism should require minimal user intervention





















Figure 38: High level overview of the DVCert protocol. First, the browser obtains
a fresh DCL (Domain Certificate List) after executing a DVCert transaction over
SSL/TLS with the web application (step 1). Second, the browser uses the fresh
DCL to validate the certificates used in all the SSL/TLS connections with the web
application and associated third-parties (step 2).
8. Simple trust model: the proposed mechanism should have an easier to under-
stand trust model in comparison to third-party solutions. Users must not be
required to make additional trust assessments.
7.2.3 Protocol Description
MITM attacks against SSL/TLS connections are possible because server certificates
are validated using only a single third-party signature and mutual authentication is
weak. DVCert addresses these problems by allowing web applications to use already
available shared secrets to vouch directly for the authenticity of certificates instead of
relying only on third-parties. Figure 38 shows a high level description of the DVCert
protocol. First, the browser establishes a SSL/TLS connection with the web appli-
cation and then executes a DVCert transaction based on the user’s password and a
modified PAKE protocol (step 1). In this transaction, the browser authenticates the
web application and receives its latest certificate information. The certificate infor-
mation is shared using a Domain Certificate List (DCL), a data structure maintained
by the web application that contains the fingerprints1 of all the certificates that could
1A certificate fingerprint is the cryptographic hash of the binary representation (e.g., DER en-
coding) of the certificate.
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be used during a session with the application. The DCL not only includes the fin-
gerprints of the application’s certificates but also of third-party’s certificates used in
the application (e.g., CDNs and ads networks). Second, the browser stores the DCL
temporarily and uses it to validate the certificates of each SSL/TLS connection with
the application (step 2), including the SSL/TLS channel established in step 1. If a
certificate is not found in the DCL, then the corresponding SSL/TLS connection is
flagged as untrusted (i.e., probable MITM attack). Once the DCL expires, a new
DVCert transaction is executed (step 1) to update it. Finally, to avoid asking for the
user’s password on each transaction, the browser securely stores the password salted
hash (PSH) together with the DCL.
DVCert achieves our goals by building on a significantly modified version of
PAK [26, 126, 29, 98]. PAK (and the PAKE family of protocols) is based on the
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange and allows the use of low entropy secrets such as
passwords to securely establish a session secret (i.e., authenticated Diffie-Hellman).
PAK was selected as a starting point for our work because of its formal security proof
and its ability to use shorter exponents [127] for better performance when compared
to other related PAKE-based protocols. The major difference in our approach is that
DVCert uses PAK only for server authentication instead of mutual authentication and
generation of encryption keys (standard use of PAKE protocols), and include features
to protect the integrity of the DCL and distinguish between tampering of the DCL
and password errors. In other words, only the browser verifies the session secret
established during the transaction. By not providing user authentication, DVCert re-
quires fewer messages and, more importantly, avoids changes to the browser login user
interface – a major challenge for the deployment of PAKE protocols in web applica-
tions [65]. Hence, DVCert is compatible with current user authentication mechanisms
(e.g., HTML form-based authentication).
Figure 39 shows the details of a DVCert transaction (step 1 on Figure 38). First,
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Shared information: g, p, d = domain, s = H(u|d). Hash functions H, H1, H2, H3, H4
Information held by Browser: u = username, pw = password






m1 = ga ×H1(u|d|P )(mod p) (1)





ab = ( m1
H1(u|d|P ) )
b(mod p)
m2 = gb ×H2(u|d|P )(mod p)
r = (u|d|P |ga|gb|gab)
h1 = H3(r|H(DCL))
g
ab = ( m2
H2(u|d|P ) )
a(mod p) (2)
m2, h1, h2, DCL←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− h2 = H4(r)








x|y: concatenation of strings x and y
H
i(x): i-th standard cryptographic hash of x
Hi(x): special agreed-on cryptographic hash of x [29, 98]
Figure 39: Detailed description of a DVCert transaction. DVCert uses a modified
version of PAK to establish a session secret (gab) that is used to protect the integrity
of the DCL (Domain Certificate List). At the end of the transaction, the server is
authenticated and the browser can use the DCL to verify all the certificates used
during a session with this domain.
the browser establishes a SSL/TLS connection with the server. This connection is
used to protect protocol information (e.g., usernames) from eavesdroppers. Next,
the browser generates a random exponent a (browser’s DH secret), computes the DH
value ga and uses it and the password salted hash P to compute m1. If the password
salted hash is not available for this domain (e.g., first DVCert transaction with this
domain), then the browser prompts the user for her username u and password pw,
computes the password salted hash P and stores it in a secure location for future
transactions (i.e., the user is prompted only once for her password). Once m1 has
been calculated, the browser sends it and the username u to the server using a special
148
header field in a HTTP request (message 1) over SSL/TLS. After receiving the DVCert
request, the server verifies that m1 ￿= 0 to prevent a known attack, uses the username
u to retrieve the password salted hash P from the server’s database, generates the
random exponent b (server’s DH secret) and computes the DH value gb. The server
now obtains the browser’s DH value ga from m1, calculates the session secret gab and
computes m2 and h2. In addition, the server uses the latest version of the DCL to
compute h1. Next, the server sends m2, h1, h2 and the DCL to the browser in the
HTTP response (message 2). Then, the browser uses the received values to obtain
the server’s DH value gb and to calculate the session secret gab. Next, the browser
uses the session secret gab and other protocol state information to compute new h1
and h2 values. The browser now compares the computed h1 with the one received
from the server. If the values match, then the DVCert transaction was successful.
Thus, the DCL file is trusted (i.e., has not been tampered with) and can be used
to validate certificates. In addition, the successful verification of h1 also proves the
server’s identity. If the h1 values do not match, then the browser proceeds to verify
h2. If this verification succeeds, then the DCL has been modified and there is a
high probability that a MITM is in progress. Therefore, neither the DCL nor any
communication with the server can be trusted. The browser displays a warning to the
user and halts the communications with the server. If the h2 values are different, then
the transaction could have failed due to a password error (e.g., user typed the wrong
password) or a MITM attack. Thus, the browser displays a warning and prompts the
user for a new password for a limited number of attempts. If the protocol still fails
after several attempts, then the browser halts all communications with the server.
In other words, h2 is used to differentiate between protocol failures due to a MITM
attacks or due to password errors.
After a successful DVCert transaction, the browser stores the DCL and the pass-
word salted hashes in a secure location isolated from other browser components. The
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browser stores one DCL per domain for a limited period of time according to a do-
main policy (e.g., once per session). Thus, the total number of DVCert requests per
user is significantly lower than the total number of SSL/TLS connections. When a
SSL/TLS connection is established with a server, the browser checks that the certifi-
cate is in the corresponding DCL (step 2 in Figure 38). If the certificate is not in the
DCL, then a MITM attacks is likely to be in progress. Thus, the browser displays
a warning to the user and halts the communications with the server. Once a DCL
expires, the browser sends an automatic request (i.e., no user intervention) for a new
DVCert transaction to update the DCL.
Finally, DVCert assumes that PAK constants, the prime number p and the gener-
ator g, are publicly known. For example, they can be hardcoded in DVCert’s browser
and server components. This measure is important to prevent an adversary from
sending bogus p and g values and tricking the user into an improper DVCert ex-
change that could leak password information. Moreover, DVCert assumes that the
web application stores password salted hashes (P = H(pw|s)) and that salt values
(s) are also publicly known. If the salt is not known in advance, the browser can also
send an additional request to the server to obtain it.
7.3 Security Analysis
DVCert main’s goal is to detect MITM attacks against SSL/TLS. DVCert achieves
this by effectively binding the SSL/TLS layer to the application layer (i.e., channel
binding [197, 10]). As a result, a MITM adversary trying to avoid detection by mod-
ifying the DCL is not only forced to compromise a CA to obtain a forged certificate
but also to compromise each of the targeted domains to obtain users’ authentication
credentials.
After a DVCert transaction, the browser can verify the authenticity and integrity
of the received DCL based on the user’s password. A cryptographic hash of the DCL
150
is included in the PAK protocol computations; thus, any unauthorized changes to the
DCL will be detected by the browser. In addition, the server is also authenticated
once the DVCert transaction is completed because it is based on the users password.
The cryptographic hash function used to compute the hash value of the DCL and the
certificate’s fingerprint needs to be collision resistant. Given the reported collisions
attacks against MD5 [195] and SHA-1 [194], we recommend the use of a more robust
hash algorithm such as SHA-256 or SHA-512.
An adversary can try to capture DVCert messages and use offline attacks to
obtain user authentication credentials. However, the attacker needs to execute a
MITM attack first to access DVCert messages. Thus, such attempts will be detected
by DVCert. Furthermore, PAK’s formal proofs of security for standard [26] and short
exponents [127] (i.e., 384 bits) provide strong guarantees that the adversary will not
learn password information from DVCert messages. DVCert modifications to PAK
do not affect these proofs. For example, PAK and DVCert transmit the same number
of hash values (2) over the network. The main difference is that DVCert uses one
message less and uses the DCL as part of the computation of h1.
We used ProVerif [22, 21], an automatic cryptographic protocol verifier, to for-
mally characterize DVCert. Using ProVerif, we successfully demonstrated that DVCert
does not leak password information (i.e., resilience to offline attacks). The DVCert
model in pi calculus and the output results from ProVerif are shown in the Ap-
pendix B.
Because DVCert does not provide user authentication, the credentials stored in
the browser or the server can be used to masquerade as the server but not as the
user. Therefore, DVCert offers resilience to server compromise similar to augmented
PAKE protocols. The adversary can still use offline dictionary attacks against the
stolen credentials, but the use of strong passwords can mitigate this risk.
The DCL includes fingerprints of certificates from third-party domains because
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these certificates cannot be validated directly (users do not share secrets with these
domains). This is important because a MITM attack against a third-party SSL/TLS
connection could be used to compromise the session with the web application (e.g.,
code injection attacks). The web application is responsible for maintaining the latest
certificate information from third-party domains in the DCL. For example, the web
application could rely on existing secure connections with third-party domains to
obtain their certificate information. Alternatively, the application could rely on third-
party validation mechanisms (e.g., network notaries).
A concern with PAKE protocols is the risk of denial of service attacks due to the
cost of public key operations. DVCert mitigates this risk by optimizing such oper-
ations without reducing security. For example, DVCert can use shorter exponents
for better performance without affecting formal proofs of security. PAK allows the
use of exponents with a minimum size of 384 bits (1024 bits DH group) [127] while
maintaining a similar level of security. Another suggested optimization is the use of
static parameters in the server (i.e., b, gb and m2) to reduce the number of opera-
tions (see Section 7.4). This technique affects the protocol’s perfect forward secrecy
property; however, DVCert does not require it (i.e., the session secret is not used for
encryption). Finally, the web application could also monitor and limit the number of
DVCert requests a user can make per day according to a domain policy.
7.4 Experimental Analysis
We develped DVCert browser and server components (see Figure 38) to evaluate
their performance and deployability. The DVCert browser component was imple-
mented as an extension for Firefox 10.0.x and Firefox for mobile (Fennec) 4.03b. The
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extensions were written mainly in Javascript, but we also used C code for modu-
lar exponentiation operations through Firefox’s js-ctypes API and the GNU Mul-
tiple Precision Arithmetic library (GMP) 2. Approximately 500 lines of code were
required for both extensions. The DVCert server component was implemented in
PHP and required approximately 400 lines of code. More importantly, the DVCert
server component is completely independent of the web application code; only ac-
cess to the user database is required. PAK implementation details as well as test
vectors were obtained from the RFC 5683 [29] and the ITU-T Recommendation
X.1035 [98]. The experiments used a laptop (Apple MacBook Pro with dual core
2.53 GHz processor, 4GB of memory and Mac OS X 10.6) and a smartphone (Sam-
sung Galaxy S 4G with a 1 GHz Cortex-A8 processor, 512 MB of memory and An-
droid 2.2.1) as our clients. On the server side, we used a Ubuntu 10.10 server with
2 quad-core 2.00 GHz processors, 16 GB of memory and Gigabit Ethernet. The
server was configured with Apache 2.2, PHP 5.3 and a 2048 bits RSA certificate.
Finally, our prototype DVCert implementation is currently available for evaluation
at http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~idacosta/dvcert/index.html.
Certificate validation operations using the DCL are inexpensive. For example, for
each SSL/TLS connection, the browser executes one hash operation and one search
operation. Assuming an ordered DCL, binary search is used to determine if a cer-
tificate is in the DCL with time O(log n), where the DCL’s size n is in the order of
tens of certificates. In addition, the size of the DCL is small (e.g., a SHA-1 certificate
fingerprint requires only 160 bits). Hence, the impact on network bandwitdh due to
the DCL is negligible. Therefore, our experimental evaluation focused on the costs
associated with DVCert transactions where more complex operations take place.
2Javascript-only DVCert add-ons for Firefox required an execution time at least one order of
magnitude higher than add-ons using C native code for modular exponentiation, particularly in the
smartphone. Ultimately, we envision DVCert to be implemented directly in the browser and using
native code for its operations.
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First, we measured the time required to generate a DVCert request (tg) and the
time required to verify the corresponding response (tv) in the browser for different ex-
ponent sizes: 2048, 1024 and 384 bits. Morevoer, we used a DCL with one certificate
fingerprint in all the experiments. Table 9 shows the results for 100 DVCert transac-
tions per configuration using a laptop and a smartphone, including 95% confidence
intervals. The results show that for 2048 bits exponents, an often recommended size
for standard key exchange protocols [23], the browser required 26.78 ms and 440.58
ms of total computation time (tg + tv) on the laptop and on the smartphone respec-
tively. While these computation times should not affect the user experience due to
the low frequency of DVCert transactions, we can see that using 384 bits exponents
decreased these times to 12.03 ms on the laptop (55.07% improvement) and 97.70 ms
on the smartphone (77.82% improvement); thus, reducing the chance that users may
notice these operations.
Second, we measured the server response time using network traces for single
HTTPS requests (baseline) and HTTPS requests with DVCert. Each request re-
trieved a small HTML page (≈ 500 bytes. We chose this small size to measured only
the overhead added by SSL/TLS and DVCert). Moreover, our measurements did not
include SSL/TLS setup times. For HTTPS request with DVCert, we evaluated dif-
ferent exponent sizes (2048, 1024 and 384 bits) and the use of dynamic (tr) and static
(trsp) server parameters. Based on these measurements, we estimated how much time
the server spent on DVCert operations (td and tdsp) by subtracting the baseline time
from the HTTPS+DVCert server response times. The results for 100 DVCert trans-
actions per configuration are shown in Table 10, including 95% confidence intervals.
The most robust configuration, 2048 bits and dynamic parameters, required 10.71 ms
of additional server computation time, while the most efficient configuration, 384 bits
and static parameters, required around 0.54 ms (94.96% improvement). Thus, the
most efficient DVCert configuration requires less time than serving a HTTPS request
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Table 9: DVCert request generation time (tg) and response verification time (tv),
including 95% confidence intervals, on a laptop and on a smartphone for different
exponent sizes. For 384 bits exponents, a DVCert transaction required a total time
(tg + tv) of 12.03 ms on the laptop and 97.70 ms on the smartphone. Thus, these











2048 10.36 (±0.0941) 16.42 (±0.2883) 171.92 (±1.7883) 268.66 (±9.6384)
1024 3.95 (±0.0693) 9.55 (±0.1358) 48.68 (±2.1108) 71.88 (±7.8691)
384 3.26 (±0.0860) 8.77 (±0.1382) 33.58 (±0.7279) 64.12 (±7.4392)
Table 10: Server response time (tr) for a single HTTPS request (baseline) and single
HTTPS requests with DVCert using dynamic and static parameters (trsp) and differ-
ent exponent sizes. By subtracting the time of a single HTTPS request, we estimated
the cost of DVCert operations with static (td) and dynamic (tdsp) parameters and
determined the percentage of improvement (% Imp.) due to static parameters. For
384 bits and static parameters, DVCert operations required half of the time used to
server a single HTTPS request.
Request Type tr (ms) td (ms) trsp (ms) tdsp (ms)
% Imp.
(tdsp)
HTTPS 1.17 (±0.0140) – 1.17 (±0.0140) – –
HTTPS +
DVCert 2048 bits
11.88 (±0.0064) 10.71 6.66 (±0.0066) 5.49 48.74%
HTTPS +
DVCert 1024 bits
3.02 (±0.0060) 1.85 2.20 (±0.0056) 1.03 44.32%
HTTPS +
DVCert 384 bits
2.04 (±0.0084) 0.87 1.71 (±0.0060) 0.54 37.93%
(1.17 ms) and it is smaller than the average network jitter in the US (0.67 ms [11]).
Also, Table 10 shows how static parameters can reduce DVCert processing time on the
server by at least 38%. Overall, these results show that DVCert operations have simi-
lar processing requirements to other server operations (e.g., SSL/TLS setup, HTTPS
requests processing) while still maintaining robust security guarantees. Thus, it is
unlikely that DVCert could degrade server performance or increase the risk of DoS
attacks.
Finally, we evaluated the overall impact of DVCert on server throughput in the




































Figure 40: Comparison of the web server throughput for single HTTPS request and
HTTPS requests with DVCert in the hypothetical case that DVCert transactions are
executed per SSL/TLS connection (i.e., upper bound). HTTPS+DVCert configu-
rations used different exponent sizes and one configuration used static parameters
(HTTPS+DVCert-sp). Using DVCert with 384 bits exponents allowed a maximum
throughput close to the one achieved with single HTTPS requests. Thus, DVCert
transactions are unlikely to degrade server performance. Note: SSL/TLS connections
used a 2048 bits RSA key.
(i.e., upper bound). For this purpose, we measured the rate of HTTPS requests (us-
ing one SSL/TLS connection per request) and the rate of HTTPS+DVCert requests
that the server can handle. As before, we evaluated DVCert with different exponent
sizes (2048, 1024 and 384 bits) and one setup with static parameters and 384 bits
exponents. The test load was generated with httperf, a HTTP traffic generator tool.
Figure 40 shows the results of this experiment for 10 measurements per point (300
in total), including 95% confident intervals. This figure shows that, even if every
SSL/TLS connection uses a DVCert transaction, using 384 bits exponents allows a
maximum throughput close to the one obtained using single HTTPS requests. More-
over, 1024 bit exponents could also allow a similar performance if static parameters
are used (based on the results shown in Table 10). Thus, using 1024 bits exponents
or shorter and static parameters reduces the risk of DoS attacks, eliminating the need
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for additional DoS defenses (e.g., client puzzles).
7.5 Discussion
7.5.1 DVCert Benefits
In addition to meeting the design goals described in Section 7.2.2, DVCert solves most
of the problems hindering the deployment of third-party defenses against MITM at-
tacks (see Section 7.1.3). First, DVCert is easier to deploy and maintain. In most
scenarios, DVCert should not require additional infrastructure due to its low process-
ing costs. Only minor modifications are required to add DVCert support to the web
application and the browser (see Figure 38). For example, DVCert only needs access
to the application’s user database and certificate information (i.e., the DCL). Hence,
DVCert can be deployed as an independent service without modifying any existing
functionality in the application. In the browser, DVCert can also be implemented
as an independent component that only requires the certificate information used on
each SSL/TLS connection and secure storage for the password salted hashes and DCL
data. Moreover, by relying on passwords, users do not need to deal with additional
secrets or devices and can benefit from DVCert on a wider range of platforms. Second,
DVCert has a simpler trust model. It relies on existing trust relationships between
users and web applications; hence, users do not need to assess and establish new
trust relationships with third-parties. Third, DVCert does not introduce new privacy
risks. User browsing activity is not revealed to third-parties when a certificate is
validated using DVCert. This property is particularly important for users with high
privacy and anonymity requirements (e.g., Tor users). Fourth, certificate revocation
is simpler. For instance, a certificate can be revoked by just removing it from the
DCL. Thus, there is no need for mechanisms such as CRLs and OCSP, both criticised
due to their ineffectiveness [117]. Fifth, DVCert is more resilient to compromise than
third-party approaches. Third-party solutions can vouch for certificates belonging to
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a large number of domains. However, if compromised, then all the protected domains
could be affected by MITM attacks. In contrast, DVCert is deployed independently
per domain; thus, attacks against one domain will not affect other domains. Finally,
DVCert is compatible with captive portals in certain scenarios. For instance, DVCert
could verify the certificates of captive portals that already share a secret with the
user (e.g., account with a Wi-Fi provider) or where the user receives a shared secret
via a secondary channel (e.g., a paper receipt).
7.5.2 DVCert Limitations
DVCert allows web applications to vouch for their certificates using existing authen-
tication credentials. Thus, DVCert can only protect web applications where the user
has an account and a shared secret. However, this is not a major limitation because
most of the web applications that are likely to be targeted by adversaries (e.g., sites
with private information) require authentication credentials. A related case are web
applications that rely on federated identity management (e.g., OpenID) or Single
sign-on (SSO) systems. Here, users share a password with an identity provider in-
stead of the web application. Still, DVCert can be extended to validate certificates in
such scenarios. For instance, the web application can provide its DCL to the identity
provider during the login process. Then, the browser can execute a DVCert trans-
action to obtain not only the DCL of the identity provider but also of the targeted
application. We plan to explore this idea in our future work. Another limitation
is that DVCert cannot be used to protect the first connection to a web application.
DVCert is by design a trust-on-first-use (TOFU) [196] mechanism such as the SSH
protocol. Therefore, when registering to a web application for the first time, users can
only rely on CA signatures and other third-party mechanisms to validate certificates.
However, for most scenarios, it is unlikely that adversaries will be monitoring users
before they have created an account with a web application. Moreover, applications
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with high security requirements could also use secondary channels to protect the user
registration process.
7.6 Summary
As recent incidents have demonstrated, adversaries are exploiting weaknesses in the
CA trust model to compromise communications protected by SSL/TLS via MITM
attacks. This trend is likely to accelerate as more and more web applications adopt
SSL/TLS to protect all their communications. Currently proposed solutions face
multiple challenges due to their complexity and deployment and operational costs;
thus, they are unlikely to be widely available in the near future. We present DVCert,
a practical mechanism that relies on previously established shared secrets to allow
the web application to directly and securely vouch for the authenticity of its certifi-
cates. By using a single round-trip transaction with the web application, based on a
modified PAK protocol, the browser learns the information required to locally verify
all the certificates that could be used during a session with the application. Our
experimental analysis shows that DVCert transactions require little execution time
on the server and the browser; therefore, they should not have a serious impact on
server performance or user experience. Finally, DVCert could be extended to protect
not only the integrity of SSL/TLS certificates but also other application’s resources




CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Internet systems such as VoIP and Web applications will continue growing in size
and complexity to support a larger number of users and richer functionality. Mobile
platforms such as smartphones are rapidly becoming the main medium to access and
consume Internet content. This trend means that users will be generating more re-
quests to Internet applications due to the always-connected nature of smartphones.
Similarly, the adoption of ubiquitous computing technologies (e.g., smart devices,
wearable computing, in-car computing, etc.) will also increase the number and type
of requests that need to be processed by Internet applications. All the request load
generated by applications needs to be properly handled by taking into account not
only the requirements of Internet applications but also the constraints of clients’
platforms. As the threat level against Internet application increases and powerful ad-
versaries try to compromise these systems, the security of Internet applications cannot
longer be considered a secondary goal. Therefore, more robust security mechanisms
that satisfy the performance and scalability of large-scale Internet applications are
needed.
In this dissertation we have demonstrated that there is no inherent conflict be-
tween implementing robust authentication protocols and the unprecedented perfor-
mance and scalability requirements of large-scale Internet applications. We have
shown that by taking into account factors such as network latency, server state re-
quirements, network bandwidth, response times and deployment costs, we can design
and implement practical authentication protocols that offer stronger security guar-
antees than currently deployed mechanisms, while satisfying the performance and
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scalability constraints of large-scale VoIP and Web applications.
The main contributions of this dissertation are:
• Experimental analysis of the impact of SIP Digest authentication on a
large-scale VoIP infrastructure and design and evaluation of more ro-
bust and efficient alternative. We demonstrated that the seemingly efficient
SIP Digest authentication protocol, the most popular authentication protocol
for VoIP, reduced proxy’s performance by almost three orders of magnitude
in our distributed SIP testbed. Therefore, we designed Proxychain, a mecha-
nism that provides strong authentication between VoIP providers and their cus-
tomers. Unlike previously deployed mechanisms, Proxychain is highly scalable
and offers throughput improvements of greater than an order of magnitude.
This increased efficiency allows providers not only to support a much larger
customer base on a relatively limited hardware footprint, but also increases the
overall security of the network by allowing for multiple message types to be
authenticated
• Design, implementation and evaluation of a robust and practical
HTTP session authentication protocol resistant to session hijacking
attacks. As an alternative to the inherently insecure use of HTTP cookies as
session authentication tokens and to mitigate the threat of session hijacking
attacks, we developed One-Time Cookies (OTC), a more secure alternative to
authentication cookies that does not require state in the web application. OTC
is not only resistant to session hijacking, but also maintains the simplicity and
performance benefits of cookies. More critically, OTC addresses the shortcom-
ings of previously proposed solutions by removing the need for state in the web
application. In addition, OTC offers another security layer to web applications
that already support always-on HTTPS by reducing the threats associated with
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cookies.
• Design, implementation and evaluation of an efficient and easy to de-
ploy protocol that provides stronger server authentication in SSL/TLS
connections and prevents MITM attacks. We presented DVCert, a prac-
tical mechanism that relies on previously established shared secrets to allow the
web application to directly and securely vouch for the authenticity of its cer-
tificates (i.e., server authentication). By using a single round-trip transaction
with the web application, based on a modified PAK protocol, the browser learns
the information required to locally verify all the certificates that could be used
during a session with the application. As a result, to execute a MITM attack,
an adversary not only needs to compromise a CA but also each targeted web
domain.
8.1 Future Work
Our work can be extended in a variety of ways:
• Security and efficiency improvements to Proxychain. While Proxychain provides
better security guarantees than SIP Digest authentication, it is still vulnerable
to offline dictionary attacks. By using ideas from our work with DVCert, we
can make Proxychain resistant to offline attacks by adding low-cost PAKE op-
erations. In addition, we could also explore the use of encrypted tickets (as in
OTC) to replace hash chains and avoid additional state in the SIP proxy and
hash chain initialization operations.
• Improving and extending OTC. OTC offers no defense against CSRF attacks.
For example, if an adversary manages to inject malicious code in the browser
(e.g., XSS attack), she could be able to generate certain requests (OTC only
prevents the adversary to steal the session secrets in this scenario). To prevent
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this type of attacks, OTC can be extended with anti-CSRF techniques. In
particular, OTC could be combined with an extended version of DVCert (see
next point) to prevent the execution of injected code. Moreover, OTC could
also be extended to not only protect the integrity of the user requests but also
the integrity of the server responses.
• Extending DVCert protection. DVCert can be extended to protect not only
the integrity of the web application’s certificates but also the integrity of other
resources such as JavaScript code and HTML login forms. This approach can
help to prevent phishing and XSS attacks.
• DVCert support for Federated authentication. DVCert can be extended to work
in scenarios where federated authentication (e.g., OpenID) and Single-Sign On
(SSO) mechanisms are used. Thus, DVCert will be able to provide protection
to a larger number of users and Web applications.
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APPENDIX A
OTC SECURITY VERIFICATION USING PROVERIF
V.1.86






free secret1_ks, secret2_ks, secret_kw:bitstring [private].
fun encrypt(bitstring,key): bitstring.
reduc forall m: bitstring, k: key; decrypt(encrypt(m,k),k) = m.
fun hmac(bitstring, key): bitstring.
fun xor(key, nonce):key.




(* Correspondance events *)
event acceptsClient(key).
event termServer(key).
(* Browser to WebApp session authentication query *)
query x:key; inj-event(termServer(x)) ==>inj-event(acceptsClient(x)).
(* Browser macro *)
let browser(uid:bitstring, passwd:bitstring) =
out(HTTPS, (uid, passwd));





out(HTTP, (ns, th, hmac((url, th, data), ks), ticket, url, data)).








out(HTTPS, (cid, ns, ks, ts, encrypt((cid, uid, ks, ts), xor(kw,ns))));
in(HTTP, (nsx:nonce, th:timestamp, hmacx:bitstring, ticket:bitstring,
url:bitstring, data:bitstring));




let (hmacy:bitstring) = hmac((url,th,data), ksx) in






( !(browser(uid, passwd)) | !(webapp(kw)) )
A.2 Proverif Output
RESULT inj-event(termServer(x)) ==> inj-event(acceptsClient(x)) is true.
-- Query not attacker(secret_kw[])
Completing...
Starting query not attacker(secret_kw[])
RESULT not attacker(secret_kw[]) is true.
-- Query not attacker(secret2_ks[])
Completing...
Starting query not attacker(secret2_ks[])
RESULT not attacker(secret2_ks[]) is true.
-- Query not attacker(secret1_ks[])
Completing...
Starting query not attacker(secret1_ks[])
RESULT not attacker(secret1_ks[]) is true.
165
APPENDIX B
DVCERT SECURITY VERIFICATION USING
PROVERIF V.1.86
B.1 Pi Calculus modeling of DVCert
(* DVCert protocol based on PAK description in RFC 5683 *)
free c: channel.
type exponent.
fun G_to_bitstring(G):bitstring [data, typeConverter].
fun bitstring_to_G(bitstring):G [data, typeConverter].
(* Diffie-Hellman *)
const g: G.
fun exp(G, exponent): G.
equation forall x: exponent, y: exponent; exp(exp(g, x), y) = exp(exp(g, y), x).
(* Modular multiplication and division *)
fun multm(G, G):G.
fun divm(G, G):G.
equation forall x:G, y:G; divm(multm(x,y),y) = x.
equation forall x:G, y:G; multm(divm(x,y),y) = x.
(* Hash function *)
fun h(bitstring):bitstring.
(* Host names *)
const A, B: bitstring.
const s1, s2, s3, s4: bitstring.





(* Initiator with identity hostA talking to responder with identity hostX *)
(* Browser *)
let processA(hostA: bitstring, hostX: bitstring, P: bitstring) =
new RA: exponent;
let gRA = exp(g, RA) in
let m1 = G_to_bitstring(multm(gRA, bitstring_to_G(h((s1, hostA, hostX, P))))) in
out(c, (hostA, m1));
in(c, (m2:bitstring, h1:bitstring, h2:bitstring, DCL:bitstring));
let gRB = divm(bitstring_to_G(m2), bitstring_to_G(h((s2, hostA, hostX, P)))) in
let K = G_to_bitstring(exp(gRB, RA)) in
if h1 = h((s3, hostA, hostX, P, G_to_bitstring(gRA), G_to_bitstring(gRB), K, h(DCL)))
&& h2 = h((s3, hostA, hostX, P, G_to_bitstring(gRA), G_to_bitstring(gRB), K)) then
0.
(* Server *)
let processB(hostB: bitstring, hostX: bitstring, P: bitstring, DCL: bitstring) =
in(c, (=hostX, m1: bitstring));
new RB: exponent;
let gRA = divm(bitstring_to_G(m1), bitstring_to_G(h((s1, hostX, hostB, P)))) in
let gRB = exp(g, RB) in
let K = G_to_bitstring(exp(gRA, RB)) in
let m2 = G_to_bitstring(multm(gRB, bitstring_to_G(h((s2, hostX, hostB, P))))) in
let h1 = h((s3, hostX, hostB, P, G_to_bitstring(gRA), G_to_bitstring(gRB), K, h(DCL))) in
let h2 = h((s3, hostX, hostB, P, G_to_bitstring(gRA), G_to_bitstring(gRB), K)) in
out(c, (m2, h1, h2)).
process
new DCL:bitstring;
(!processA(A, A, PAA)) |
(!processB(A, A, PAA, DCL)) |
(!processA(B, B, PBB)) |
(!processB(B, B, PBB, DCL)) |
(!processA(A, B, PAB)) |
(!processB(A, B, PAB, DCL)) |
(!processA(B, A, PAB)) |























{4}let gRA: G = exp(g,RA) in
{5}let m1: bitstring = multm(gRA,h((s1,A,A,PAA))) in
{6}out(c, (A,m1));
{7}in(c, (m2: bitstring,h1: bitstring,h2: bitstring,DCL_8: bitstring));
{8}let gRB: G = divm(m2,h((s2,A,A,PAA))) in
{9}let K: bitstring = exp(gRB,RA) in
{10}if h1 = h((s3,A,A,PAA,gRA,gRB,K,h(DCL_8))) then






{15}let gRA_10: G = divm(m1_9,h((s1,A,A,PAA))) in
{16}let gRB_11: G = exp(g,RB) in
{17}let K_12: bitstring = exp(gRA_10,RB) in
{18}let m2_13: bitstring = multm(gRB_11,h((s2,A,A,PAA))) in
{19}let h1_14: bitstring = h((s3,A,A,PAA,gRA_10,gRB_11,K_12,h(DCL))) in






{24}let gRA_17: G = exp(g,RA_16) in
{25}let m1_18: bitstring = multm(gRA_17,h((s1,B,B,PBB))) in
{26}out(c, (B,m1_18));
{27}in(c, (m2_19: bitstring,h1_20: bitstring,h2_21: bitstring,DCL_22: bitstring));
{28}let gRB_23: G = divm(m2_19,h((s2,B,B,PBB))) in
{29}let K_24: bitstring = exp(gRB_23,RA_16) in
{30}if h1_20 = h((s3,B,B,PBB,gRA_17,gRB_23,K_24,h(DCL_22))) then






{35}let gRA_27: G = divm(m1_25,h((s1,B,B,PBB))) in
{36}let gRB_28: G = exp(g,RB_26) in
{37}let K_29: bitstring = exp(gRA_27,RB_26) in
{38}let m2_30: bitstring = multm(gRB_28,h((s2,B,B,PBB))) in
{39}let h1_31: bitstring = h((s3,B,B,PBB,gRA_27,gRB_28,K_29,h(DCL))) in





{44}let gRA_34: G = exp(g,RA_33) in
{45}let m1_35: bitstring = multm(gRA_34,h((s1,A,B,PAB))) in
{46}out(c, (A,m1_35));
{47}in(c, (m2_36: bitstring,h1_37: bitstring,h2_38: bitstring,DCL_39: bitstring));
{48}let gRB_40: G = divm(m2_36,h((s2,A,B,PAB))) in
{49}let K_41: bitstring = exp(gRB_40,RA_33) in
{50}if h1_37 = h((s3,A,B,PAB,gRA_34,gRB_40,K_41,h(DCL_39))) then






{55}let gRA_44: G = divm(m1_42,h((s1,B,A,PAB))) in
{56}let gRB_45: G = exp(g,RB_43) in
{57}let K_46: bitstring = exp(gRA_44,RB_43) in
{58}let m2_47: bitstring = multm(gRB_45,h((s2,B,A,PAB))) in
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{59}let h1_48: bitstring = h((s3,B,A,PAB,gRA_44,gRB_45,K_46,h(DCL))) in





{64}let gRA_51: G = exp(g,RA_50) in
{65}let m1_52: bitstring = multm(gRA_51,h((s1,B,A,PAB))) in
{66}out(c, (B,m1_52));
{67}in(c, (m2_53: bitstring,h1_54: bitstring,h2_55: bitstring,DCL_56: bitstring));
{68}let gRB_57: G = divm(m2_53,h((s2,B,A,PAB))) in
{69}let K_58: bitstring = exp(gRB_57,RA_50) in
{70}if h1_54 = h((s3,B,A,PAB,gRA_51,gRB_57,K_58,h(DCL_56))) then






{75}let gRA_61: G = divm(m1_59,h((s1,A,B,PAB))) in
{76}let gRB_62: G = exp(g,RB_60) in
{77}let K_63: bitstring = exp(gRA_61,RB_60) in
{78}let m2_64: bitstring = multm(gRB_62,h((s2,A,B,PAB))) in
{79}let h1_65: bitstring = h((s3,A,B,PAB,gRA_61,gRB_62,K_63,h(DCL))) in
{80}let h2_66: bitstring = h((s3,A,B,PAB,gRA_61,gRB_62,K_63)) in
{81}out(c, (m2_64,h1_65,h2_66))
)
-- Weak secret PBB
Termination warning: v_716 <> v_717 && attacker_guess(v_715,v_716)
&& attacker_guess(v_715,v_717) -> bad
Selecting 0
Termination warning: v_719 <> v_720 && attacker_guess(v_719,v_718)
&& attacker_guess(v_720,v_718) -> bad
Selecting 0
Completing...
Termination warning: v_716 <> v_717 && attacker_guess(v_715,v_716)
&& attacker_guess(v_715,v_717) -> bad
Selecting 0
Termination warning: v_719 <> v_720 && attacker_guess(v_719,v_718)
&& attacker_guess(v_720,v_718) -> bad
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Selecting 0
Termination warning: v_3491 <> v_3492 && attacker(v_3491)
&& attacker_guess(v_3491,v_3492) -> bad
Selecting 1
Termination warning: v_3695 <> v_3696 && attacker(v_3695)
&& attacker_guess(v_3696,v_3695) -> bad
Selecting 1
200 rules inserted. The rule base contains 186 rules. 87 rules in the queue.
400 rules inserted. The rule base contains 346 rules. 150 rules in the queue.
600 rules inserted. The rule base contains 500 rules. 198 rules in the queue.
800 rules inserted. The rule base contains 682 rules. 296 rules in the queue.
1000 rules inserted. The rule base contains 880 rules. 346 rules in the queue.
1200 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1068 rules. 331 rules in the queue.
1400 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1260 rules. 230 rules in the queue.
1600 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1368 rules. 142 rules in the queue.
1800 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1518 rules. 102 rules in the queue.
2000 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1709 rules. 133 rules in the queue.
2200 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1908 rules. 126 rules in the queue.
2400 rules inserted. The rule base contains 2107 rules. 112 rules in the queue.
2600 rules inserted. The rule base contains 2280 rules. 56 rules in the queue.
RESULT Weak secret PBB is true (bad not derivable).
-- Weak secret PAA
Termination warning: v_2761076 <> v_2761077 && attacker_guess(v_2761075,v_2761076)
&& attacker_guess(v_2761075,v_2761077) -> bad
Selecting 0
Termination warning: v_2761079 <> v_2761080 && attacker_guess(v_2761079,v_2761078)
&& attacker_guess(v_2761080,v_2761078) -> bad
Selecting 0
Completing...
Termination warning: v_2761076 <> v_2761077 && attacker_guess(v_2761075,v_2761076)
&& attacker_guess(v_2761075,v_2761077) -> bad
Selecting 0
Termination warning: v_2761079 <> v_2761080 && attacker_guess(v_2761079,v_2761078)
&& attacker_guess(v_2761080,v_2761078) -> bad
Selecting 0
Termination warning: v_2763813 <> v_2763814 && attacker(v_2763813)
&& attacker_guess(v_2763813,v_2763814) -> bad
Selecting 1
Termination warning: v_2764017 <> v_2764018 && attacker(v_2764017)
&& attacker_guess(v_2764018,v_2764017) -> bad
Selecting 1
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200 rules inserted. The rule base contains 186 rules. 87 rules in the queue.
400 rules inserted. The rule base contains 346 rules. 150 rules in the queue.
600 rules inserted. The rule base contains 500 rules. 198 rules in the queue.
800 rules inserted. The rule base contains 682 rules. 296 rules in the queue.
1000 rules inserted. The rule base contains 880 rules. 346 rules in the queue.
1200 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1068 rules. 331 rules in the queue.
1400 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1260 rules. 230 rules in the queue.
1600 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1326 rules. 142 rules in the queue.
1800 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1518 rules. 102 rules in the queue.
2000 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1709 rules. 133 rules in the queue.
2200 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1908 rules. 126 rules in the queue.
2400 rules inserted. The rule base contains 2107 rules. 112 rules in the queue.
2600 rules inserted. The rule base contains 2280 rules. 56 rules in the queue.
RESULT Weak secret PAA is true (bad not derivable).
-- Weak secret PAB
Termination warning: v_5521398 <> v_5521399 && attacker_guess(v_5521397,v_5521398)
&& attacker_guess(v_5521397,v_5521399) -> bad
Selecting 0
Termination warning: v_5521401 <> v_5521402 && attacker_guess(v_5521401,v_5521400)
&& attacker_guess(v_5521402,v_5521400) -> bad
Selecting 0
Completing...
Termination warning: v_5521398 <> v_5521399 && attacker_guess(v_5521397,v_5521398)
&& attacker_guess(v_5521397,v_5521399) -> bad
Selecting 0
Termination warning: v_5521401 <> v_5521402 && attacker_guess(v_5521401,v_5521400)
&& attacker_guess(v_5521402,v_5521400) -> bad
Selecting 0
Termination warning: v_5524135 <> v_5524136 && attacker(v_5524135)
&& attacker_guess(v_5524135,v_5524136) -> bad
Selecting 1
Termination warning: v_5524339 <> v_5524340 && attacker(v_5524339)
&& attacker_guess(v_5524340,v_5524339) -> bad
Selecting 1
200 rules inserted. The rule base contains 186 rules. 87 rules in the queue.
400 rules inserted. The rule base contains 346 rules. 150 rules in the queue.
600 rules inserted. The rule base contains 500 rules. 194 rules in the queue.
800 rules inserted. The rule base contains 682 rules. 295 rules in the queue.
1000 rules inserted. The rule base contains 880 rules. 342 rules in the queue.
1200 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1068 rules. 330 rules in the queue.
1400 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1260 rules. 221 rules in the queue.
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1600 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1292 rules. 117 rules in the queue.
1800 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1390 rules. 96 rules in the queue.
2000 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1574 rules. 105 rules in the queue.
2200 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1768 rules. 91 rules in the queue.
2400 rules inserted. The rule base contains 1951 rules. 43 rules in the queue.
RESULT Weak secret PAB is true (bad not derivable).
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